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ABSTRACT
A Neuropsychological Model of Human
Behavior and Therapeutic Change
February 1983
Efrain Segarra, B.S., University of Puerto Rico,
M.S., St. John's University, M.S., University of
Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard Gadlin
This work introduces a comprehensive theory of behavior which inte-
grates neurological factors with phenomenological concepts. The
resulting neuropsychological model proposes that the concept of
person actually defines the integrated functioning of the organism.
Such a functioning is postulated to be under the direction of
cognitive activity which is conceptualized as a system of stochastic
neuronal networks. A fundamental element of the proposed theory is
the notion of a phylogenetic negative affective state of limbic
origins being the motivational root of behavior. The limbic activity
in question is conceived as a subliminal sensation of danger to which
the person is constantly reacting cognitively, behavioral ly , and
physiologically. Such an unwitting anticipation of harm, labelled
as core affect
,
is postulated to be synonymous with emotional pain
and universal. The inadvertent adaptive or maladaptive ways in which
a person interacts with the environment are considered to occur as
a direct reaction to the prevalent intensity of core affect. Such
reactive behavioral maneuvers are understood in terms of a continuum
which defines ordinary adaptive behavior at one end and emotional
disturbances at the other extreme. Anxiety in the model is construed
as an ordinary reaction of the organism to core affect. The manifes-
tations of anxiety are conceived in terms of a gradient according
to their severity and are classified into cognitive and physical
types. A central purpose behind the development of the theory has
been the determination of the nature of the psychotherapeutic change
and the process of psychotherapy. Both of the latter concepts are
articulated in terms of the normalization of an exaggerated core
affect as a function of the interpersonal process in psychotherapy.
The proposed model of behavior is incompatible with the traditional
assumptions about psychopathology and unconscious processes. The
material is presented in terms of progressive levels of integration
from reduced neural constructs to behavioral phenomenology, including
developmental perspectives.
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CHAPTER I
REDUCED FORMULATIONS OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES
Introduction
This dissertation proposes a comprehensive model of human beha-
vior based on the functional integration of neurological factors and
psychological concepts. That sort of neuropsychological synthesis
gravitates around a subliminal negative affective state postulated
to be at the core of human behavioral activity and motivation.
The affective state in question is conceived as an omnipresent
sensation of variable intensity ordinarily out of active cognitive
awareness. Such a sensation, as will be discussed later on, appears
to originate at the limbic system.
Although the affective state under consideration is very resis-
tant to definition, the word "sensation" is used in this work to
depict its properties because such a term may constitute their best
description. The use of the term is derived from the consideration
of such a neuropsychological activity being synonymous with emotional
pain.
Given that such a sensation appears to be central to human
behavior and to have an affective nature it has been labelled as
core affect in this work.
A primary purpose in the development of the model of behavior
'i
proposed in this work has been to provide an explanation for the
1
2personal changes which are observed in a client as a result of psy-
chotherapy. As a matter of fact, the concept of core affect crys-
tallized from the speculations about a possible mechanism for psy-
chotherapeutic change.
Undoubtedly, change as a consequence of psychotherapy should
be purposeful, significant, and beneficial in terms of the indivi-
dual's interaction with the environment. As such, it is the reduc-
tion in intensity of core affect from an excessive level to a normal
range of activity that is considered here as the primary factor
underlying the change toward increased emotional competence and cap-
acity of the person to cope with the environment. The latter means
that at its most basic level psychotherapeutic change is synonymous
with the normalization of core affect.
Therefore, the primary change one is looking at in the psycho-
therapeutic process appears to occur at the reduced levels of the
organi sm.
It is an easy deduction, even at this early point in the dis-
cussion, to formulate that any model which accounts for core affect
as a limbic function would have to take into consideration the re-
duced aspects of behavior.
In tune with the latter, this dissertation proposes a functional
(neuropsychological) model of human behavior which accounts for
such an affective state as a mostly subliminal sensation of danger
or threat in its most pure form and in terms of different cognitive
interpretations in other instances.
3As will become obvious later on, the term functional is used
here in context with the integrated activity, that is, the function-
ing, of the material systems of the organism such as the neurologi-
cal and physiological substrates. The functional view of the per-
son postulated here considers the action of such material systems
in interaction with the environment to constitute the individual
himself. Accordingly, the material systems of the organism and
their own functioning are considered inseparable, much like language
is inseparable from speech during the production of the latter.
Similarly, a behavior and the processes in the organism which
are taking place during such a behavior may also be considered in-
separable from each other. Behavior then can be viewed in general
terms as the expression of the functioning of the organism. Since
a particular behavioral display is invariably a global activity,
that is, a unitary action composed of multiple components, the or-
ganismic functioning associated with such a sample of behavioral
activity must also be global.
Naturally, the organ whose functioning is responsible for the
management of behavior is the brain. As such, the functional view
of the individual shall be based here on the integrated or global
function of the neural substrate. In this case the total neural
mass and its function are both considered inseparable. In other
words, the psychological and neurological aspects of the organism
are functionally inseparable.
•1
The proposed model attempts in general terms to integrate cog-
nition with other brain functions and physiological systems. It
envisions the cognitive activity of the individual as the product
of the integration of vast neuronal networks and behavior in general
as the expression of the functional representation of ongoing expe-
rience in the brain. At any given moment such a representation and
its behavioral manifestations are considered to be influenced in
several ways by the intensity level of core affect.
Human behavior is further defined by the model in terms of the
behavioral maneuvers, adaptive or maladaptive, which the person
develops to avoid, validate, or react to the affective state briefly
introduced above. However, since such a core affect is ordinarily
out of active awareness the behavioral maneuvers are directed to the
environment. The latter occurs partially as a result of the influence
of core affect on the cognitive interpretation of the surrounding
events
.
The functional model of human behavior proposed here also de-
fines certain concepts in conflict with other theoretical views.
For example, while the topic of anxiety may be premature at this
juncture, it should be advanced that the model considers such a
complex state of arousal as an automatic and ordinary reaction of
the organism to elevations in core affect.
The postulated model does not allow for the existence of an
organized dynamic unconscious in the traditional sense, nor for
the conventional assumptions about mental illness in the absence of
5definite pathological changes in brain tissue.
It should be clarified that the model being proposed is
psychodynamic in a neuropsychological sense. That is, here cog-
nitive function depends on the dynamic associative properties of
the neural substrate. However, the constraints of the model do
not permit mental processes which would suggest different layers
of organized thinking, such as the conceptualization of mental
activity in terms of the traditional view of unconscious or sub-
conscious mechanisms.
A somewhat controversial notion suggested by the proposed
theory is that of the possibility of the free will of the person
being subordinate to the intensity of core affect rather than it
being inherently free from predetermined influences.
The latter may be considered controversial if free will is
defined as the capacity of the person to cognitively engage the
environment and make decisions in freedom from external or inter-
nal predetermined influences. The preceding definition of free
will assumes that cognitive processes are under the control of
the person through some sort of mechanism which would not be af-
fected by such cognitive processes themselves.
In contradistinction to the latter, the model of human beha-
vior proposed here postulates that the cognitive processes are
ordinarily out of the volitional control of the individual to a
great extent.
6The bulk of the supportive material in this dissertation
predominantly addresses the ways in which a person interacts with
the environment. The evidence supporting the notion of the cognitive
nature of the representation of experience in the brain is discussed
in terms of the interaction between the individual and the environ-
ment and the interplay between cognition and core affect.
The functional (i.e., neuropsychological) aspects of the model
are examined around the information about cerebral function and mor-
phology which may support an associative organization characterized
by neuronal networks or systems.
The interacting components of the theoretical model are consi-
dered in terms of both clinical and nonclinical situations. That is,
in terms of the maladaptive or adaptive maneuvers the individual
develops in reaction to core affect as a means to deal with the en-
vi ronment
.
Such defensive maneuvers are considered by the model as the ele-
ments which constitute the personality of the individual when they
possess significant longitudinal stability. In a similar vein, the
defensive maneuvers are examined as manifestations of conditions
which have been commonly labelled as mental illnesses when they are
associated with a chronic elevation above the normal range in the
intensity of core affect.
Psychotherapeutic change is presented as a function of the
completion of the clinical process which brings about the normaliza-
tion of core affect. The therapeutic process is in turn considered
7to be mediated by the relationship between the client and the thera-
pist. Such a relationship is viewed as the essential medium in which
the clinical process takes place.
Due to their complexity, the theoretical constructs of the model
could not be presented simultaneously in a manner which would facili-
tate their penetration. Understandably, the penetration of the work-
ings of the comprehensive theory proposed could not be performed to
any degree of satisfaction without first taking a look at each of the
components of the model.
The presentation of the material following may be considered
to proceed in a sort of hierarchical order. That is, it goes from
the basic functional elements of the model to its phenomenol ogical
aspects
.
It is possible that during the early phases of the progression
in the presentation of the material from reduced neuronal organization
and function to phenomenological human activity, the subject matter
may seem tedious to some of those without a previous interest in
neuropsychology. Unfortunately, such a stepwise examination of the
model becomes necessary in order for the logic of its design to be
developed and maintained through increasing levels of complexity.
The material in this work is organized into seven chapters. The
first chapter emphasizes the paradigmatic value of the functional
model being proposed and considers cognitive representation in terms
of the integration of neuronal networks.
The second and third chapters deal with the basic functional
8elements of the mode!, their integration, and the different manifes-
tations of such elements.
Chapter 4 briefly considers the ontogeny of core affect as it
pertains to the model
.
The fifth chapter describes some of the defensive behavioral
maneuvers a person may develop to interact with the environment
depending on the prevalent intensity of core affect.
The penultimate major section, Chapter 6, considers psycho-
therapeutic change and the process of psychotherapy in context with
the therapeutic relationship.
Chapter 7, the final chapter, reflects on some of the general
implications of the model of human behavior proposed by this disser-
tation.
Perhaps it would be appropriate to point out at this stage that
the theoretical findings of this work are predominantly based on
clinical observations rather than on formal empirical studies. The
investigation has been conducted to the greatest extent during the
course of routine clinical interventions in different settings. Thus,
the findings draw their validity primarily from clinical experience.
As it may become clear further on, some of the clinical formu-
lations postulated by the model being proposed could only be developed
and evaluated within the parameters of the therapeutic relationship.
Without any difficulty, the functional model of behavior pro-
posed by this work may be conceived as a very objective or prag-
matic view of the person. However, the construction of the person
9according to our model is not cold or impersonal. On the contrary,
the theory promulgated here tells the story of emotional pain and
the role the latter plays in human relations.
Towards a Functional Paradigm
This dissertation considers therapeutic change and the process
of psychotherapy intimately related to the psychotherapeutic relation-
ship through the intensity of what has been introduced as core affect.
It then would be propitious if any of the prevailing psychological
theories of behavior could account for such an affective state as
defined here.
Unfortunately, none of the preponderant psychological theories
of human behavior appear to qualify in that respect, perhaps mostly as
a result of their theoretical exclusivity. It appears that the
most generally accepted paradigms of behavior may be too intertwined
with metaphorical strands to be useful in defining change in a simple
and efficient manner, much less in a manner which could make the
paradigm applicable in a universal manner. As a matter of fact, it
seems that there may be as many psychological paradigms as there are
psychological disciplines and subdi sci pi i nes
.
It seems that if a scientific paradigm could be described as
the paramount general principle whose validation is attempted by
scientific research (Kuhn, 1970), it would be extremely difficult
to currently find such a fundamental and unifying principle as the
cornerstone of psychology. In fact, it appears that despi te the contri
-
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butory relationship between psychology and many other sciences
(Piaget, 1979) and it being a century or so since psychology became
established as a science separate from philosophy (Mueller, 1979),
a consensual theoretical understanding of human behavior appears
far from being reached.
Such a lack of a basic unifying theoretical principle in psycho-
logy has been the basis for considering modern psychology, with the
exception of neuropsychology, to consist of "a collection of tautolo-
gous truths, unverified premises, contradictions, outright nonsense,
as well as facts" (Needham, 1978, p. 7).
Perhaps one of the most potent inhibitors of the development
of a coherent paradigm for human behavior has been the pervasiveness
of the psychoanalytic influence. Anyone with some awareness of what
is being published can quickly realize how popular the traditional
psychodynamic theories are in the fields of psychology and psychiatry
However, in our view they are too cumbersome and metaphorically com-
plex to sustain reduction to a simple basic principle. A major hin-
drance to their usefulness in accounting for a universal process for
change is their reliance on the notion of an organized unconscious
mental activity. The latter assumed mental processes do not tolerate
any reduction and their existence does not appear to be supported by
neuropsychological scientific evidence.
The efforts to validate traditional psychodynamic concepts are
still very strong and while some are aimed at reducing such concepts
to neurobiological principles the efforts do not appear successful.
11
For instance, the functional disconnection of the cerebral hemis-
pheres has been suggested as the neurophysiological mechanism for
the notion of defenses, such as the assumed principle of repression.
It has been also mentioned in connection with the localization in the
right hemisphere of the equally assumed concept of unconscious pro-
cesses (Galin, 1974).
Although probably a lesser inhibitor of paradigmatic development
than the the psychoanalytic influence, behaviorism in a most conser-
vative form (Wolpe, 1969) appears to have directed psychology away
from seeking a unifying concept due to its narrow theoretical field.
Nevertheless, of lately behavioral concepts have been subjected to
attempts at integration with the contribution of cognitive function
to human behavior with apparent satisfactory technical results (e.g.,
Mahoney, 1974; Miechenbaum, 1977; Wolpe, 1978). However, while these
attempts at establishing bridges between behaviorism and other models
of behavior are in the direction of an integrated paradigm, the em-
phasis still remains on the manipulation of behavior to induce change
Although there are many psychological models of human behavior
and some attempts have been made at their partial integration at
one theoretical level or another (e.g., Prochaska, 1979), it is pain-
fully clear that psychology does not have a fundamental scientific
principle at the core of its activity. It appears that a common
shortcoming of the prevailing paradigms of human behavior is their
lack of tolerance for reduction to a simple singular principle or to
the neurological substrate of behavioral activity.
12
Since change, therapeutic or otherwise, appears to be the es-
tablishment of new ways of dealing with the environment by the per-
son, any model of human behavior considered to account for change in
neuropsychological terms would have to focus upon the individual's
functioning in interaction with the environment at a any given mo-
ment. However, such a functioning can exist only as a direct con-
sequence of the activity of its neural substrate. Therefore, a model
of behavior which would account for a universal mechanism for change
as the one considered by this dissertation would have to be based
primarily on the functional nature of the activity and organization of
the neurological structures underlying human behavior.
The functional view of behavior suggested here construes human
activity as the distillate of the functioning of the neural substrates
and the rest of the organism at extreme levels of functional integra-
tion. Functional integration in turn is conceptually defined as the
amalgamation of the functioning of the material systems of the orga-
nism into a global function resistant to fractionation. This latter
synthesized function would be capable of representing activities,
such as the elaboration of concepts, which could not be ascribed to
the capabilities of any single functional aspect of the material sys-
tems of the organism.
In other words, our functional view of behavior is based on
the notion of human diligence being inherent in the global functional
activity of the material systems of the organism in interaction with
the environment.
13
Function and Reduced Neuro1qcQcal_0rganization
The study of an entity such as the human being may be pursued
at several levels, such as the biochemistry from the chemical ele-
ments, the psychology from cell assembly dynamics, and the persona-
lity and culture from the psychology as the lowest and two highest
levels respectively (Scott, 1977).
A comprehensive review of the psychobiology of mental processes
reaches the basic conclusion, as part of a set of principles, that
"... it is the pattern of activity and the organization of the paths
of information flow, rather than the mechanics of the neural com-
ponents, that really matters in the representation of mental process
by nervous tissue" (Uttal
, 1978, p. 683). It also reaches the
major conclusion that "... the essential neural aspects of mental
function are to be found in the organization of the networks into
which either individual neurons or macroscopic brain nuclei are
arranged." (p. 683)
In agreement with the preceding view it would appear that look-
ing at human behavior as the result of the integration of many dis-
crete functional aspects may be reasonable if such an outlook bases
its assumptions on the corresponding functional organization of cere-
bral structures.
As such, the ideas about human behavior and clinical change in-
troduced by this dissertation are based on the equivalency between
mental activity and the brain. That is, such ideas are based on a
14
monistic functional view of ongoing experience. The latter concept
is not new since it is well known that functional organization as a
conceptual explanation for human activity goes far back in psycho-
logical history.
An example of such historical antecedents appears to be the
manifest ambition of Sigmund Freud to reduce the clinical association
of pleasant or unpleasant sensations with cognition, and integrate
such a reduction with his formulation of unconscious mechanisms. The
difficulty of such an integration is now obvious in the following
excerpt from one of his early attempts to create a scientific psycho-
logy (Rothgeb, 1973).
With the hypothesis of wishful attraction and of the
inclination to repression, the state of the system of
permeable neurones (phi) has been touched. These
2 processes indicate that an organization has been
formed in the system of impermeable neurones (psi)
Judging is a psi process which is only made possible
by inhibition by the ego and which is evoked by the
dissimilarity between the wishful cathexis of a
memory and a perceptual cathexis that is similar to
it. (p. 49)
Although the historical comments in this section are not intended
to appear as a review of the history of the notions about cerebral
functional organization and their relation to human behavior, it
appears worthwhile mentioning a few related facts.
One of these is that as far as 50 years ago, the functional
correlation between distinct parts of the brain was integrated into
an associative model to help explain human activity (Luria, 1932).
The aforementioned correlation between the different parts of the brain
has been recently described in terms of a more complex functional
model of the organization of the brain, especially, the cortical
mantle (Luria, 1966, 1973).
Less than two decades after Luria (1932) suggested an integrated
functional structure in relation to human activity, the mechanics of
human cerebral function were suggested to be definable in terms of
the development of cell assemblies and the subsequent interaction
between these cell assemblies (Hebb, 1949). It is interesting that
in Hebb's view some sort of postsynaptic change was seen probable
as facilitating future traversing of the same synapse in connection
with learning. The latter is currently a very acceptable notion.
In recent times the relationship between function and structure
has been described very clearly in some disorders of language, with
a corresponding disruption of function in the presence of a disrup-
tion in structure (Geschwind, 1974). A similar relationship between
structure and function may be suspected in the orderly matrix-like
structural organization found in the cerebellum (Eccles, Ito &
Szentagothai
,
1967) and the hippocampus (Shepherd, 1974).
Clearly, the overwhelming amount of scientific research valida-
ting the observation that when brain tissue is altered or removed
a corresponding change occurs in particular aspects of the individual,
such as language or movement, would deter even the most radical anta-
gonist from considering behavior in the absence of an active brain.
The adjective denoting activity is very important because it is the
functional manifestation of the brain which appears to constitute
16
ongoing experience.
To stress the point, in terms of human behavior there appears
to be equivalency between mental activity and the brain, or as Uttal
(1978) has put it, psychoneural identity. This view appears to be
shared by Young (1978), who defines a human brain as "a set of nerve
cells of immense complexity whose intense activity is continually
directed to furthering the life of a particular individual." (p. 266)
The importance of a functional view of behavior may actually
reside in the capacity of such a view for being understood in terms
of how the individual interacts with the environment. That is, an
individual is not such an individual except in context with his cir-
cumstances (Ortega y Gasset, 1961). Otherwise, behavior could not be
def i ned.
In a similar tone, it would be more appropriate to characterize
the perception of the environment as a function of the extent to which
a person interacts with such an environment in some reasonably struc-
tured fashion, rather than as the ability of the person to perceive
per se (Szentagothai & Arbib, 1975).
Yet this functional interaction between the person and the en-
vironment appears far from being elucidated completely because com-
plete information about brain processes is not available. Neverthe-
less, there is no dearth of conceptual examples of the relationship
between function and neurological organization, especially in terms
of explaining that relationship with models for the neuronal repre-
sentation of ongoing experience.
17
Presentational models. The relationship between function and
neurological organization has supported the development of several
approaches to the study of ongoing experience and fostered the crea-
tion of many theories. However, reviewing the large number of simi-
lar theories would be an overwhelming chore and would not be of any
assistance to the task in this section.
Instead of an extensive review this section will consider just
a few of the theoretical models which depict the relationship between
function and neurological organization in a somewhat reduced manner.
The models considered follow an apparent current trend towards the
explanation of ongoing experience (i.e., consciousness) in terms of
the relationship between function and neurological organization.
One of the models considered in this section envisages the
relationship between neurological organization and cognitive function
in terms of electroencephalograph^ patterns (Thatcher & John, 1977).
It considers ongoing experience (i.e., consciousness) as a "represen-
tational system." (p. 301)
The model is based on the dispersion pattern of electroencephalo-
graphs measurements as a function of cognitive tasks. These electro-
physiological patterns are considered to be the product of an inter-
action between the parts of a system of organized cerebral anatomical
structures. The interaction in turn is characterized by a statisti-
cal, non-random and temporally coordinated neuronal activity, and
occurs as a result of either internal or external input into the or-
gan i sm.
18
When the latter complex interaction last long enough, "conso-
lidation" (p. 301) occurs. That is, the pattern of the interaction
becomes a functional aspect of the nervous system and it may be
easily elicited back into the stream of ongoing experience there-
after. The latter means that activation of a portion of such an
established pattern results in activation of the pattern as a whole.
The immediately preceding notion and the consideration of the
emergence and consolidation of the neuronal patterns as a consequence
of environmental and internal (functional) input to the central ner-
vous system appear to be in some agreement with a functional model
of behavior or of ongoing experience.
Such an agreement would be found on the notion of said electro-
physiological model requiring a global or unitary functional repre-
sentation of ongoing experience in the brain. That is, a global
cognitive representation with metaphorical consequences due to maximal
associative integration of the elements which constitute the experi-
ence. Obviously, such a representation would need to have previous
experience incorporated into it but would be a direct consequence
of the current experiential instant, and could be modified by its own
cognitive content.
The model suggested by Thatcher and John proposes that represen-
tational systems constitute the basis for experience, such as subjec-
tive experience, memories, thoughts and awareness of sensations, or
moods and emotions. Although this model of ongoing experience based
on electrophysiological observations takes into account the relation-
19
ship between the functional cognitive nature of ongoing experience
and neurological organization, it does not provide for the reduced
neural organization required to explain such a relationship.
More recently other models have been suggested in which some
of the functional aspects of ongoing experience are associated with
a reduced neurological organization. Two of these more reduced models
which appear to include many of the properties of other models will
be briefly considered next in support of the conceptualization of
function as result of a neural organization based on the interaction
of associative neural networks.
One of these models is a neuropsychological model based on
neurobiological mapping units, with similar mapping mechanisms for
both conceptual and pictorial representations (Wasserman, 1978).
Wasserman proposes (a) that the wiring in the nervous system
is specific to the system and does not follow randomness, (b) that
messages in the nervous system are not encoded by nerve impulses,
but are encoded and carried by cable-like chemospecif ic molecular
channel systems in the form of an electronic excitation wave, (c) and
that cognitive structures are carried out by means of "unit molecular
mapping systems (UMMSs)" (p. 7), which is a continuous network of
eel 1 s
.
This model assumes a molecular continuity across a particular
mapping system and between interacting mapping systems, including
continuity across synapses. The preceding assumption is based on the
tubular carrier capacity of some elements of the neuron, such as the
20
structural support provided by the microtubules and the capacity of
the cell to synthesize protein. The latter involves DNA playing
an active role in a sort of algorithmic cell differentiation.
In such a way, the creation or permanence of the mapping systems
representing images, memories, or concepts actually involve either
change or stability in the pre- and post-synapti c appendages of the
participating cells.
Cognitive functions are explained in this neuropsychological
model in terms of interacting UMMSs. For example, paraphrasing
Wasserman, from the UMMSs which represent images a subsequent remap-
ping occurs onto UMMSs which map engrams of images. Such engram-
mapping UMMSs, called engUMMSs in abbreviated form, either contain
already-stabilized engrams or are still capable of forming engram
representations. The latter engUMMSs are referred to as hierarchical-
ly first-order engUMMSs.
The presynaptic mapping appendage heads of the first-order
engUMMSs would serve to represent images, while the postsynaptic
appendages of a first-order engUMMS could be involved with forming
an engram corresponding to a particular image. The latter may be
accomplished by presynaptic release of an engram-stabi 1 izing sub-
stance, which would stabilize the pattern formed by the postsynaptic
shaped surface of the first-order engUMMS.
The stabilized postsynaptic shaped surface subsequently would
have to be matched, at least approximately, by an image-representing
pattern on the presynaptic shaped surface of that engUMMS if a pattern
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recognition process would be to occur. In terms of this process,
since stabilization only would occur at the postsynaptic appendages
of the UMMSs and not at the presynaptic appendages, this would imply
an assumed compositional difference between the two synaptic borders.
In Wasserman's neuropsychological model the engUMMSs on which
the engrams of images are represented are of a different class from
those on which the engrams of concepts are represented. That is, the
forms of the mapping are different in both cases, but the mapping
mechanism is the same in both cases.
It is very clear that the model being considered is very complex
and it is hardly likely that justice could be done to it in a brief
exposition such as this one. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to state
that the model follows current trends in understanding behavior in
neuropsychological, that is, functional terms. Some of the properties
of the model, especially the process of synaptic differentiation, have
considerable appeal as ideas worth incorporating into any functional
model of behavior. Perhaps the major apparent drawback of the model
as a functional model of behavior is that it does not appear to clear-
ly provide for the comprehensive process which would account for the
global quality of ongoing experience and the metaphorical character
of human behavior.
To clarify matters, it should be observed that according to our
view human behavior may be considered metaphorical because it appears
to be the indivisible synthesized output of the integration of many
processes which conveys meaning or symbolism that may not be derived
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from any one individual process. The ascription of metaphorical
properties to any system in this work would naturally follow the
preceding criteria.
The other neuropsychological model considered in this section
suggests that higher cortical functions, such as ongoing experience,
depend on the organization of very large populations of neurons into
complex interactional systems (Edelman & Mountcastle, 1978). This
model may be referred to as a "columnar functional model" (p. 16)
because it considers the basic anatomical unit of the model a columnar
arrangement of 110 neurons in a cortical cylinder of about 30 urn
of diameter. This columnar arrangement appears to be both repetitive
and pervasive in the brain and is viewed as a local neural circuit.
The model under consideration treats brain function as the reci-
procal interconnection and dynamic interplay of neural activity within
and between connected systems of these replicated neural circuts. This
selective theory assumes the formation of structured neuronal groups
before birth and during development. These neuronal groups have
connections within each group and connections between the groups which
are specific by gene programming and synaptic selection. The selec-
tivity is conceived in terms of the lack of influence which a signal
pattern may have on the formation of anatomical connections and on the
selection by a signal pattern of groups which already have a particu-
lar established mode of activity.
The organization of anatomical structures in terms of basic units
and the possible distribution of these units in the form of functional
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ensembles are clearly compatible with the notions considered in this
section about the neuronal representation of ongoing experience.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to present a com-
prehensive discussion of the extensive literature concerning the
subject of neuronal representation. The latter is especially true
when one considers that with the current scientific knowledge it
would be extremely unlikely that an accurate description of the neu-
ronal representation of experience could be verified. It is more like-
ly at this point in scientific history that if the actual neuronal
representation of experience is presented as a theory, the incapacity
for its validation by the scientific community would relegate it to
just another possibility among the many models of neuronal represen-
tation.
However, despite one's misgivings about considering one theory
or another as the most factual, there is considerable consensus among
scientists about some of the elements of the models for neuronal
representation considered in this section.
One of these elements is the notion of neuronal representation
being somewhat of an analog of ongoing experience or of the internal
and external environments. This analog representation is not con-
ceived in the same terms as one would consider a homologous pictorial
representation, but rather as a homologous functional representation
with hierarchical levels of representational complexity between the
origins of its elements and the integrated neuronal representation.
This means that a vast number of neurons would be involved with the
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production of the neural representation in such a way that they
would be organized in networks with increasing interactional com-
plexity working all together as a functional unit (Young, 1978).
Examples of such a homologous functional representation may
be found in the neuronal representation of cerebellar function, which
appears to be associated with a matrix-like systematic morphological
organization (Szentagothai & Arbib, 1975). Other examples are the
neuronal maps on the body of the retina formed by the neurons which
analyse sensory information (Young, 1978). That is, the neuronal
activity in the brain must provide a faithful representation of the
events taking place outside.
Another accepted element within the notion of neuronal represen-
tation is the interactional nature of its components. Yet while a
single neuron may be considered able to account for particular eel 1 -
ular memory mechanisms (Fedor & Majernik, 1977), function is construed
as the result of the interaction of many ensembles of neuronal net-
works of untold proportions.
However, neuronal interaction occurs at the synapse, so that the
interaction within a particular network of neurons has to take into
account not only the kind of activity that takes place at the synapse
but also the pattern, the intensity, and the frequency with which
such an activity occurs in the network.
So far in this chapter the aims of the dissertation have been
introduced and the opening remarks have been made in defense of a
functional model of human behavior. As shall be considered ahead,
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such a model departs primarily from the cognitive representation of
ongoing experience in terms of the interactional activity within and
between neuronal networks.
Considering the preceding, it would be appropriate, if not
necessary, to consider some of the ways in which neuronal networks
behave, before turning to the general discussion of the model of
behavior in the chapters ahead.
Obviously, the ensuing descriptions of the behavior of neuronal
networks are entirely hypothetical, as currently there are no direct
means to establishing their authenticity. However, the characteris-
tics of the neuronal networks to be described appear to blend into an
exemplary general model of the cognitive representation of ongoing
experience, with the advantage of operating within the biological
constraints applicable to such systems.
To a reasonable extent, their consideration ahead is influenced
by the fact that they generally conform to the functional requirements
of the model of behavior being proposed. Nevertheless, the infor-
mation need only be presented and discussed in general terms as a
functional example of cognitive representation to which the explana-
tion of some of the aspects of the model of human behavior proposed
by this dissertation could be referred.
Neuronal Collectives . Trehub (1969) indicates that the gross bio-
electric output (occipital electroencephalographi c recordings) of the
brain may be electronically filtered to produce an output charac-
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terized by a narrow frequency of the signal. Such an output can
then be understood as a series of temporally distributed intervals
in amplitude modulation. That is, any given positive inflection be-
tween two cyclic depressions in the output wave could be fractioned
into its portions reflecting changes in the amplitude of the wave
within particular periods of time.
In humans, the distributions of such periods of modulation, when
measured and classified in terms of their temporal duration, are
similar among individuals and are different between conditions of no
visual stimulation and of photic stimulation.
In order to explain the observed distributions of modulation
periods in the brain Truhub suggests a set of theoretical transition
probabilities for increase or decrease in the temporally coherent
pattern of discharge of a particular subset of neurons, in terms of
the maximum number of neurons potentially available to discharge
coherently under a specified situation.
The group of neurons which participates in the temporally co-
herent pattern of discharge would be called a kinetic neuronal collec -
tive
,
while the maximum number of neurons in the neural mass in ques-
tion which could discharge in a coherent manner at a given level of
stimulus intensity would be called a potential neuronal collective .
A neuronal collective is defined by Trehub as a subset of neurons
characterized by a temporally coherent discharge pattern.
As such then, at each successive temporal interval of amplitude
modulation the decrease or increase in inflection is associated with
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the number of cells discharging in a coherent manner, that is, with
the intensity of the kinetic neuronal collective.
The successive intensity of the kinetic neuronal collective in
turn would be a function of the ratio of the latter to the potential
neuronal collective. This way, the larger the ratio of the kinetic
collective to the potential collective the less likely an increase
in the intensity of the kinetic collective during the next modulation
period. Equally assumed, the smaller the ratio of the kinetic collec-
tive to the potential collective the more likely it is that the kinetic
collective will display a higher intensity. In other words, the
greater the number of neurons from a particular set is engaged in a
coherent discharge pattern, the lesser likely it is that such a number
will increase during the next coherent discharge, and viceversa.
Taking those factors in consideration Trehub compared the the-
oretical probability model to the actual occipital electroencephal o-
graphic measurements. The duration of each period occurring between
successive positive inflections in the amplitude envelope was mea-
sured and multiplied by the number of periods in that same duration
class. The percentage of total time occupied by each class of dura-
tion cycles was determined for each of nine subjects.
He then observed that the mean distributions of percentage time
occupied by each duration class obtained empirically and those ob-
tained theoretically with the aid of a digital computer turned out
to be closely similar for both no-stimulation and visual stimulation
condi tions
.
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These findings lend some support to the notion of collectf
neuronal behavior being stochastic to some degree. Trehub (1971b)
assumes the mamalian brain as a parallel coherent detector of sig-
nals. That is, an organ with cognitive processing mechanisms charac-
terized by stochastic coherent neuronal discharge activity. The
latter implies support to the concept of the neuronal collective being
a basic interactive process in cerebral neuronal networks.
Cognitive and sensory information to the brain appears to follow
multiple channels of hierarchical complexity (Young, 1978). That is,
while inputs from different parts of the organism which are associated
with a particular experience are integrated at the level of the asso-
ciation areas of the brain (Luria, 1966, 1973), many of these inputs
travel through different routes and undergo neuronal consolidation as
they travel through the brain.
For example, Trehub (1971a) has found that under ipsilateral
or contralateral photic stimulation conditions the bioelectric signal-
to-noise ratio is significantly higher at the visual cortex than at
the lateral geniculate in rats. While the improvement in signal may
be attributed also to a host of other factors, it is nevertheless
consistent with the notion of cortical measurement being the result
of higher-order integration.
It appears that the concept of the neuronal collective as a
basic interactional process among neuronal networks may be equally
applicable to small and large networks or ensembles of such neuronal
networks
.
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In tune with the theoretical and empirical considerations about
coherent neuronal activity to this point, Trehub (1975a) proposes
notions about signal transfer of sensory information which could
account for hierarchical processes.
He assumes that groups of the smallest receptor-neuron systems
capable of transferring stimulus intensity ( sensory kernels ) have
specific and exclusive afferent neurons ( nervelets ) at one or higher
orders of association, whose axons terminate in synaptic contact with
a specific group of neurons ( target groups ) which serve as recoding
stations for stimulus intensity conveyed by the nervelet axons.
He further assumes that the nervelet axons synapse randomly on
the neurons belonging to the target group. It should be noted here
that the target groups are assumed to be specifically related to the
sensory kernels from which they receive information through the
nervelets, and that the neuronal discharge is coherent. It should
be added that in terms of neuronal systems, Trehub (1975a) defines
coherent signals as "... those parallel, mul ti neuronal discharges
which are optimally related to the spatio-temporal summation charac-
teristics of their higher-order target cells during each phase of
integration of postsynaptic potential." (p. 388)
Just like it is assumed that the nervelet axons synapse randomly
on the neurons belonging to their respective target group, it is e-
qually assumed that the relative intensity of stimulation at each
sensory kernel is coded into the number of neurons coherently dis-
charged in such target group once the axons of the nervelet make
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effective contacts with them. That is, coded in terms of a kinetic
neuronal collective.
It is also assumed in the latter case that the potential neuronal
collective can increase as a function of stimulus intensity. In
addition, it is necessary for the number of effective axons in each
afferent nervelet to be approximately three times as great as the
number of neurons in the matrix of target cells for the kinetic poten-
tial to exceed 95% of its potential collective in the target group.
The latter situation may be described as one of functional
redundancy. In that situation a number of the cells in a neural mass
associated with the signal transfer of a particular function would
not be at a given time engaged in the coherent discharge pattern of
such a signal. However, at some other given time those same cells
could be enlisted into the group most likely to participate in the
coherent discharge pattern of the same signal as a result of the
increased ratio of stimulus intensity to neural mass.
First-occupancy principle
. Now based on this random synaptic contact
between the axons of the nervelets and their respective cells in the
target group, and in consideration of the preceding notions, Trehub
(1975a) suggests that the signal transfer considered here follows a
first-occupancy model.
The immediately preceding notion translates into a situation
where the probability of an active nervelet axon discharging its
target cell at any given instance is less than unity, and where only
one effective axon can discharge the target cell within any given
31
arbitrarily brief period of time. That is, the first effective
axon on a target cell precludes the influence on such cell by any
other effective axon impinging on it during the time period in ques-
tion. The situation being described would also provide for the pos-
sibility of a limited number of target cells not having effective
synaptic input from any axons impinging on them during a given period
of time.
The latter may also be viewed as a case of functional redundancy
because it suggests that at any given moment part of the neuronal
mass associated with a particular function would not be participating
in the coherent discharge corresponding to such a function.
Once again, it must be remembered that the target cells are
associated with a particular function and are part of an intensely
interactional system.
As Trehub (1975a) points out, this first-occupancy model favors
continued adequate cerebral function without the severe impairment
which would otherwise follow the progressive loss of cells in the
central nervous system due to aging or as the result of pathological
processes. For example, he calculates that with the loss of 50% of
nerve fibers in a particular sensory kernel of a major pathway, there
is only a loss of 12% in the magnitude of the kinetic collective.
Incidentally, according to the behavioral model proposed by this
dissertation the impression of redundancy of function in the human
brain is attributed primarily to the effects of the extremely inter-
actional nature of its neural substrate. In other words, the synthe-
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sized cognitive output of the vast stochastic interaction within
and between complex neuronal networks would cover the loss of
discrete portions of such networks. However, when such discrete
losses in neural tissue become generalized, such as in the case of
progressive cortical degeneration, the impoverishment of cognitive
function becomes evident. In a case such as the latter, cognitive
function would continue to deteriorate with the gradual loss of
neuronal substance and the neuronal networks would progressively
become stripped of some of their associative capacity.
From a similar perspective, Trehub's signal transfer model
would probably serve as an explanation for the improvement in memory
functions occurring with slight elevations in anxiety (Loftus, 1980).
The latter may be associated with the increased magnitude of the kine-
tic collective as a result of enhanced stimulation intensity. Natu-
rally, in this case the associative power of the brain would be am-
plified by the heightened synaptic interaction.
The memory deficits observed with high levels of anxiety could
probably be seen as a reduction in the magnitude of the kinetic
collective. The latter reduction could be blamed on the disorganiza-
tion of the pattern of discharge and a delayed refractory period
between discharges due to stimulation beyond the capacity of the
system.
Similarly, the construct of first-occupancy and, specifically,
the kinetic collective could probably the applicable to the under-
standing of the disorganized cognitive state observed in psychosis,
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and maybe to the illogical or haphazard associative nature of cogni-
tive representation during dreaming. The preceding may be construed
in terms of significant alterations in the coherency of discharge and
the number of neurons involved due to extremes at one end or the other
of the range of stimulus intensity. Obviously, a disruption in the
associative logic of the brain would occur as a result of either
excessive or insufficient stimulation to its cortical neuronal path-
ways .
As indicated earlier, interaction within and between neuronal
networks appears to occur primarily at the synapse. With this latter
notion in mind some of the general characteristics of neuronal net-
works behavior have been presented so far.
Since the effort at the moment is aimed at promoting a function-
al view of human behavior, the further reduction of neuronal networks
to adaptive models of synaptic interaction would probably facilitate
such a view.
However, as it will become evident in the material which follows,
only the highlights of such functional models shall be furnished. As
in the preceding sections, the material is presented without its
mathematical derivations and its technical details. It would appear
that the exposition, however scanty, of the general characteristics
and applications of one or two examples of functional synaptic models
of cognitive processes would suffice as a source of reference for
material and concepts considered in subsequent chapters.
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Functional Synaptic Networks
Assuming a neuronal representational system without previous
exposure to any type of input, the synaptic junctions between the
presynaptic boutons of the axons and the postsynaptic appendages
of the dendrites could be considered to be naive to experience.
Assume also that the activity from the presynaptic bouton onto
the postsynaptic dendritic appendage is of a constant nature, but
that such a presynaptic activity induces an excitatory variable
change in the postsynaptic dendritic matter when both of the neurons
involved fire simultaneously.
Incidentally, the idea of a postsynaptic alteration as the
result of synaptic transmission has been considered in terms of
changes in concentration and structure of a postsynaptic protein com-
plex, and of time-controlled ionic transport across the cell membrane
as a result of the conformational state of such protein complex
(Fedor & Majernik, 1977). These same authors also propose that the
reception surface of the dendrite can be composed of one or more
reception fields with excitatory or inhibitory functions.
Now following the traditional notions about neuronal conduction
and considering the knowledge available about the state of affairs
during synaptic transmission, Trehub (1975b) proposes a renewable pre-
synaptic activity or substance as a constant axon transfer factor
(ATF) and suggests the existence of a postsynaptic activity or sub-
stance to be known as dendrite transfer factor (DTF).
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When pre- and post-synapti c neurons fire at the same time, the
reaction between the ATF and the DTF within the postsynaptic dendritic
matter is suggested to produce an increase in a type of transmission
capacity labelled as the synaptic transfer weight . The synaptic
transfer weight is described as "the magnitude of any single synaptic
contribution to the integrated EPSP [excitatory postsynaptic poten-
tial] of its associated cell given standard presynaptic input"
(Trehub, 1975b, p. 440).
Upon reaction with ATF, the DTF is depleted and its transfer
weight contribution to the synapse is inversely proportional to the
number of axons making contact on the neuron in question at the time
both substances or activities react with each other.
Considering a naive two-stage cognitive neuronal network with
input and output cells, the coherent discharge of the input cells
as a result of an environmental stimulation would be randomly distri-
buted among the synapses of the output cells. Then, at each of the
synapses in which there are simultaneous pre- and post-synapti c dis-
charges, there would be an increase in its synaptic transfer weight
or, in other words, in the magnitude of the contribution of the syn-
apse to the coherent EPSP during a learning period.
Being affected by random distribution and the number of afferent
axons impinging on the output cell, the transfer weight at particular
synapses may be higher than at others while it will remain the same
in unaffected synapses.
It is assumed that the distribution of the synaptic transfer
36
l on
an
weights among the output cells of the network follows the activate
of the input cells by a particular firing pattern elicited by
environmental stimulus with certain characteristics. Therefore, the
synapses of those output cells which intersect such an afferent firing
pattern will undergo an increase in transfer weight. The increase
in transfer weight is established in the postsynaptic matter of the
output cells in connection with the particular environmental stimulus.
Thereafter, presentation of that same stimulus will cause the output
cell with the greatest sum of synaptic transfer weight with respect
to the input pattern produced by such a stimulus, to fire along the
integrated EPSP.
The learning efficiency of the synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1975b)
scantily described above, which by definition is characterized by
the mechanisms for synaptic malleability considered so far, has been
tested under simulation conditions with the aid of a computer.
In the latter case Trehub (1975b) simulated a theoretical retina
with 25 afferent neurons or input cells which synapsed with each of
nine output cells ( class cells ). He then presented nine different
patterns for simulated learning to the resulting synaptic matrix.
As would be expected the responses to the learned patterns by the
class cells were 100% correct. Moreover, the responses by the class
cells to fragments of the patterns, resulting from the random omission
of approximately 40% from each of the original forms, were about 92%
correct.
Despite the 1 imitations of a very brief description, it appears
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from the foregoing example that the concept of the synaptic matrix
developed by Trehub may be a viable model for neuronal networks in
the brain, at the very least from the mathematical and theoretical
points of view.
It seems appropriate at this point to briefly furnish a graphic
example of a larger synaptic matrix which could aid the visualization
of the unlimited extent to which the concept of the synaptic matrix
may be applicable to explain cognitive processes.
Figure 1 (Trehub, 1977), appearing in the following page, dis-
plays a complete synaptic matrix with 48 input neurons with afferent
input from the optic tract in point to point synapse with a group of
equally afferent neurons to be known as mosaic-cells (M). The en-
suing adaptive excitatory synapses of the matrix ( imaging matrix ) are
conveniently illustrated as a orderly arrangement of ovals with the
appropriate transfer weight for each synapse after learning two
different environmental patterns. Notice that each of the unaffected
synapses have an arbitrary transfer weight of one unit.
The axon of each of the mosaic-cells is in parallel synapse with
all the twelve neurons ( f i 1 ter eel 1
s
) in the detection matrix . Once
again the synapses of the matrix are shown as ovals with their respec-
tive transfer weight values appearing inside each of them. Each of
the filter cells is in discrete synapse with an output eel 1 . Notice
that each of the axons of the output cells (class cells) sends a
collateral to synapse with all the dendrites of the mosaic-cells in
the imaging matrix.
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Figure 1. Schematic of synaptic matrix including neuronal circuits
for the transformation of size and angular orientation of input pat-
terns. Note
. From "Neuronal Models for Cognitive Processes: Net-
works for Learning, Perception and Inagination" by A. Trehub, Journal
of Theoretical Biology
,
1977, 65, 141-149. Copyright 1977 by Academic
Press, Inc. Reprinted by permission.
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The neuron whose axon is in parallel synapse to the dendrites
or bodies of the output cells is an inhibitory or rej^ejjr™ (-)
which also receives as its input the axons from those same output
cells. The function of the reset neuron is to generate an inhibi-
tory postsynaptic potential (IPSP) to reset all the class or output
cells when these are discharged. The short oblique slashes in the
illustration depict fixed inhibitory synapses. The large dots repre-
sent fixed excitatory synapses and the small dots represent branch
points of axon collaterals.
Now the mosaic-cells (M) of the first detection matrix near the
center of the illustration project in retinotopic order through two
series-connected inter-matrix layers onto the second detection matrix
on the right margin of the illustration.
The dendrite of each cell of the inter-matrix layer near the
center of the illustration (first layer), receives an excitatory
input from an associated cell in the mosaic-cell (M) array. It also
receives an inhibitory input from each of the two decoupler cells
appearing closest to the input cells at both the upper and lower
left corners of the illustration. One of the decoupler cells is
activated by an initiate rotation spike signal and the other by an
initiate zoom signal.
The axon of each cell in the aforementioned first inter-matrix
layer connects in excitatory synapse to its co-ordinate cell in the
second inter-matrix layer to the right of the illustration. Said axon
also contributes one excitatory collateral to its co-ordinate cell in
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the rotation transformer circuit and one to its co-ordinate cell in
the size transformer circuit.
In addition to receiving axonal input from the cells in the other
inter-matrix layer, the dendrites of the cells in the second inter-
matrix layer receive also excitation inputs from their respective
co-ordinate cells in the rotation transformer and size transformer.
The axon of each of the cells in this layer synapse with all the
filter cells in the second detection matrix.
Each of the filter cells in this second detection matrix is in
discrete synapse with an output or class cell whose dendrite also
is under the inhibitory influence of the reset neuron (-).
The values found in the ovals (synapses) in the second detection
matrix at the right margin of the illustration represent the transfer
weights associated with all the possible retinal sizes of the two
patterns learned by the network. These two patterns are depicted by
the synaptic transfer weights in the first detection matrix near the
center of the illustration.
The size transformer would operate to expand or contract the
retinotopic discharge pattern in the mosaic-cells. The pattern of
discharge is carried by the neurons of the first inter-matrix layer
to activate the size transformer when the thresholds of its neurons
are lowered by the initiate zoom neuron. That way the pattern of
discharge is replicated in the size transformer. Input to the size
transformer at this time would be blocked by the inhibitory action of
the decouplers.
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The neuron array of the first i nter-matri x layer is inhibited
by one decoupler as a result of the onset of activity of the zoom
initiating cell. The other decoupler inhibits the intermediary neu-
rons whose axons provide the size transformer with the pattern of
excitation. Inhibition in the latter case occurs as a result of
the output of one or more cells of the size transformer.
The size transformer transmits the pattern in question to the
second inter-matrix layer and subsequently to the second detection
matri x
.
The operation of the rotation transformer follows processes for
activation, inhibition and transmission of patterns somewhat identical
to those for the operation of the size transformer. However, both
transformer systems have a reciprocal inhibitory relationship with
each other. That way only one transformer performs at any given time.
As indicated above (p. 40 ), the values in the synapses of the
second detection matrix represent the transfer weights associated with
all possible retinal sizes of two learned patterns.
Given that, it is not difficult to imagine that the firing of
any one of the output cells would represent a particular retinal
size of a learned pattern. Therefore, if the output cells could
be stimulated to fire in a particular sequence the output of the
matrix would represent a series of changes in retinal size. That is,
a zooming effect which could correspond to the moving of an object
toward or away from the retina.
The functional flexibility afforded by the stochastic process
4?
illustrated above allows for an associative interaction of untold
proportions.
At any given time a particular neuron may constitute a very
minute fraction of a module being represented by a particular synap-
tic matrix. That means such a cell has the largest sum of transfer
weight and fires along the EPSP associated with the matrix output.
Just the same, that particular cell may participate in count-
less synaptic matrices at different times. That is, at one instant
it may be an effective part of one matrix and at the next instant
participate in a different one.
Now if one considers that each of the billions of cells in the
brain may have as much as tens of thousands of axons synapsing with
it, in addition to its own autaptic synapses, it is not difficult to
visualize the magnitude of the degree of synaptic matrix integration
which may be possible.
In analogy, such an interaction may be seen as an impenetrable
web, whose weaving pattern changes from instant to instant.
Clearly, the capacity of one cell to participate in a different
synaptic matrix at any given different time would be accompanied
also by the identical capacity of a particular synaptic matrix to
contribute to different synaptic matrix ensembles at different times.
Thus, one would end with an infinite number of combinations.
According to the view presented here, if it would not be for
the associative flexibility considered above, one would not be able
to discriminate between two objects with similar properties in a
43
metaphorical manner. For example, one would not be able to construe
the circular properties of a wheel as similar in principle to those
of an orange.
That is, the synaptic matrix (or matrices) representing the
concept of circularity participates in the cognitive representation
of each of the objects.
It is painfully obvious that in order to do justice to the
neuronal models already described in this chapter it would be neces-
sary to go into details of the models which for the sake of brevity
have been omitted.
It is hoped, however, that despite the cursory exposition of
such models, the purpose of suggesting a possible theoretical format
for understanding cognitive representation of ongoing experience in
terms of neuronal networks has been achieved.
In terms of the latter, Trehub (1977) presents very compelling
arguments in favor of a neuronal view of cognitive processes in terms
of networks for learning, perception and imagination. Also for
stereoscopic vision (Trehub, 1978) and associative sequential recall
in a synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1979).
It is possible, with a little imagination
, to visualize how the
principle of the adaptive synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1975b) could be
used to formulate all types of cognitive representation in the brain.
As a matter of fact, Trehub (1977) suggests that a brain model based
on the stochastic principles proposed by him accounts for a few hun-
dred million cells less than the total number of neurons estimated for
44
the brain. The latter would allow for considerable loss of brain
cells before function would be affected significantly.
Considering the material addressed so far, it appears the
metaphorical nature of ongoing experience could be visualized as
the result of the elaborate integration of vast multiples of stochas-
tic neuronal networks.
Understandably, the cognitive representation required in such
an integration would have to be expeditiously coalescent in order
for it to be an analog of ongoing experience from instant to instant.
A global analog of ongoing experience of this sort would have to rely
on highly accelerated hierarchical processes in order to maintain its
dynamic properties.
Unfortunately, as stated before, the veridical organization of
the neuronal networks representing ongoing experience is currently
undeterminable. That is, the biological reduction of what appears
to be a global integration of such neuronal networks seems beyond
reach at this point.
Obviously, a considerable theoretical jump would have to be
made in order to suggest any sort of model for a final integration
of neuronal networks which could account for ongoing experience.
While the suggestion of any particular neuronal organization
for the representation of ongoing experience would have to be more
speculative than factual, in the present case such a suggestion should
have some coherent relationship with the elementary theoretical no-
tions about neuronal network behavior.
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It seems necessary that the theoretical jump from the elementary
notions about neuronal network behavior to the phenomenology of on-
going experience be based on a basic concept which could connect,
even if tenuously, the two edges of the theoretical abyss between
such two ideas. For the current purposes, that kind of basic concept
appears to be the stochastic neuronal network integration depicted
by the synaptic matrix (Trehub, 1975b).
Cognitive Matrices
The functional model of behavior proposed by this dissertation
is visualized in terms of a cognitive representation of ongoing ex-
perience with the stochastic characteristics of neuronal networks
considered in the preceding sections.
In the proposed model, the cognitive representation of ongoing
experience can be conceived as the global integration of higher-order
matrices of neuronal networks. Much like the synaptic matrices pre-
viously discussed, but in this case the output of given matrices,
rather than a cell, containing vast numbers of neuronal networks would
constitute the input of other matrices during higher-order integra-
tion. At a less than ultimate level, this intensely associative
process can be envisaged between, let us say, the primary cortical
areas for vision and their respective cortical association areas
(Luria, 1966), as a theoretical example.
It is hard to visualize the extreme degree of interconnection
between and within mammoth neuronal networks which would be necessary
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to describe a higher-order matrix of such networks. However, the
cognitive resolution required for the global representation of on-
going experience demands such a level of associative activity. Given
the very refined cognitive product which emerges from the represen-
tational properties of these hypothetical matrices they will be called
cognitive matrices in this work.
Since the person can only actively focus on a limited portion
of the environment at any given time, such a portion of the environ-
ment about which the person is perceptually aware constitutes the re-
presentation of ongoing experience in the form of a highest-order
matrix of higher-order cognitive matrices. That is, it is the cog-
nitive representation of that portion of the environment the person
is purposefully interacting with. This highest-order matri x obviously
would have a substantial input from the frontal association areas of
the brain. Being dynamic, the highest-order cognitive matrix would
vary from instant to instant depending on the changes in cognitive
input occurrring with shifts in the active focus of awareness.
To clarify, it should be emphasized that the highest-order cog-
nitive matrix is postulated to encompass the maximal level of cogni-
tive resolution allowed by the perceptual substrate and other material
systems of the organism. Naturally, the level of cognitive resolu-
tion would be affected by neurophysiological variations and cognitive
deficits. However, regardless of the person being blind, deaf, or
brain-damaged the cognitive resolution of the highest-order cognitive
matrix at any given time would always be the maximal one for that
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organism.
Of course, at any given cognitive instant, the portion of the
environment which is out of the active perceptual awareness of the
person is represented in the brain in terms of higher-order cognitive
matrices. Incidentally, it is possible to visualize the foregoing
process as facilitating representational transition from higher-order
matrices to the highest-order matrix when focus is actively shifted
to a different portion of the environment being primarily represented
by an adjacent higher-order cognitive matrix. That is, the cognitive
representation in the higher-order matrix is already integrated close
to the integration required by the highest-order level, and only
needing the focus of active awareness to complete the transition.
The preceding notions imply that thebrainis constantly also
processing as cognitive input that portion of our environment which
is out of our active perceptual awareness. That is, the brain is
processing information into higher-order cognitive matrices in a
passive manner, even if the person is not aware of the information
being coded. One may look at this process as some sort of passive
awareness or parallel thinking. From a purely popular point of view,
this process may be considered equivalent to the notion of "uncon-
scious" thinking.
The assumptions considered above establish a passive mechanism
through which particular cognitive material may become part of the
highest-order cognitive matrix, that is, drifting into the person's
awareness apparently from nowhere.
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Evident in the upcoming example and examined in the forth-
coming chapter, the invasion of the highest-order cognitive matrix
by cognitions from higher-order matrices representing material out
of awareness may be mostly related to the intensity of the core affect
associated with such cognitions. As a reminder, core affect is des-
cribed as a sensation of consternation or danger, ordinarily out of
the awareness of the individual and which is synonymous with emotional
pain. Thus, the sensation of consternation in question would influ-
ence the infiltration of cognitions into the highest-order cognitive
matrix which may be tangential or alien to the activity being focused
upon
.
An anecdotal example of the latter cognitive transfer is the par-
ticular experience someone had while riding as a passenger on the
rear seat of an automobile. At the time of the experience in ques-
tion, the passenger was riding on the center of the back seat with
ample view of the windshield and dashboard. Suddenly, without having
any connection with the conversation the passenger asked the driver
if he possessed a portable electric pump to use in case of the acci-
dental deflation of one of the tires. He then proceeded to offer the
driver one of these pumps he had in his own automobile two thousand
miles away. Right after the latter verbal exchange the party arrived
at their destination, a restaurant which turned out to be closed at
the time. Returning immediately to the automobile the driver noticed
with considerable bewilderment that the right front tire was deflated.
Apparently, the passenger had subliminal or passive awareness of
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perhaps the inclination of the dashboard or of any other cognition
such as the noise of the deflating tire as it rolled over the road.
According to our model, such cognitions would be symbolic of danger
and would elicit some elevation in the intensity of core affect, as
an affective complement to the cognition.
However, since the focus of awareness is not on such cognitions,
the brain tries to make sense out of that sensation through the asso-
ciative integration of the highest-order cognitive matrix by virtue
of the influence of the frontal lobes. This way, a particular cogni-
tive association at the margin of active perceptual awareness becomes
integrated into the highest-order cognitive form of the representation
of the ongoing experience. That is, there is a transfer of material
from a higher-order matrix (passive awareness) to the highest-order
cognitive matrix (active awareness) which is associated with a parti-
cular intensity of affective complement.
Notice that the behavior in the preceding example had to do with
dealing with the affective complement or core affect associated with
the cognition. It is, therefore, not difficult to see the behavior
of the passenger as an attempt to feel secure by trying to achieve
a certain degree of closeness with the driver, who happened to be his
brother.
Recalling from previous sections, once a pattern is encoded in a
synaptic matrix as the result of the presentation of a particular
stimulus, the subsequent presentation of a fraction of that same
stimulus will in many cases elicit the whole pattern encoded before.
',()
Similarly, according to the model proposed whenever a higher-
order cognitive matrix at the margin of perceptual awareness contains
cognitive information which may resemble, however vaguely, a parti-
cular stimulus associated with certain elevation of core affect,
the material may invade the highest-order cognitive matrix and be-
come part of our awareness.
Apropos, while the latter may or may not occur, the elevation
in core affect may be sufficient to elicit a reaction of anxiety by
the body. The topic of anxiety will be covered in subsequent chap-
ters, but to avoid being vague it will be advanced again that anxiety
is considered in this dissertation as an ordinary defensive reaction
of the body to the generally subliminal sensation of threat or of
personal disintegration being called core affect.
Human activities require active parallel thinking at times, such
as when efforts at recall are made or when the need arises to esta-
blish particular cognitive associations.
This process appears to be an accessory mechanism to the highest-
order cognitive matrix. By definition, this accessory mechanism would
perform a host of highly associative functions, such as recall and
imagery. Such a mechanism could serve to hold patterns or to inte-
grate information being recalled.
The proposed accessory mechanism appears to function as an
accessory imaging system with the associative properties of a higher-
order cognitive matrix. The cognitive material it represents at any
given moment may constitute input to the highest-order cognitive
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matrix or may be the object or representation by the highest-order
cognitive matrix itself. The latter appears possible when the
imaging system is visualized as having somewhat similar stimulus
properties as the external environment.
The preceding statement means that while the cognitive mate-
rial in the imaging system may become the focus of active per-
ceptual awareness, its representation in the highest-order cog-
nitive matrix would have to adhere to the same perceptual con-
straints as the representation of an external stimulus.
However, the highest-order representation of material from
the imaging system would have less than analog characteristics in
virtually all instances where the material would be more complex
than simple dimensional designs.
An ordinary example of the latter is the observation of the
very poor fidelity of the mental image of a complex object when
compared to the actual observation of the object. In other words,
the example depicts the inability to recall any complex object
accurately enough to describe it as well as when the object is ac-
tual ly bei ng seen
.
It should be noted that the fidelity of mental images increases
when the material is associated with a mildly increased level of
core affect, hence increased anxiety. It also appears to increase
with episodes of intense concentration, such as during hypnosis
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(Spiegel & Spiegel, 1978). As a special case, the fidelity of mental
images is increased in the cases where the person displays what has
been called eidetic imagery, or as popularly known, photographic
memory (Loftus, 1980).
General Assumptions of the Proposed Model
One could say that all the effort has been devoted in this
first chapter to proposing human behavior, hence ongoing experience,
as the functional manifestation of the ultimate global integration of
neuronal networks. Naturally, since the interaction between the per-
son and the environment is metaphorical it can only be described in
phenomenological terms. With the latter in mind, a general theoreti-
cal format for understanding ongoing experience in terms of cognitive
matrices has been proposed.
While pithy, the cumulative theoretical exposition of the rela-
tionship between neurological organization and function in the preced-
ing sections has been aimed at establishing said relationship as a
foundation for the understanding of the functional and phenomenologi-
cal aspects of the model of behavior considered in forward chapters.
Hopefully, at least for some, such a goal has been achieved.
Now it may be suggested, according to the arguments presented
so far and those considered in subsequent chapters, that the function-
al model of behavior proposed by this dissertation follows the ensu-
ing assumptions.
1. It considers human behavior as metaphorical according to our
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definition of the term.
2. It considers ongoing experience as a dynamic global activity
possessing instantaneous cognitive efficiency.
3. It considers ongoing experience as essentially a cognitive
activity with affective and behavior-mediating components.
4. It considers ongoing experience as the product of functional
aspects which maintain a reciprocally-influencing relationship with
each other and their combined global integration.
5. It accounts for the additive influence of experience on
human behavior.
6. It accounts for the gradation of cognitive and emotional
development and the stability of a range of behavioral characteristics
during adulthood.
7. It accounts for changes in the beliefs, attitudes, and be-
havior of individuals.
8. It accounts for idiosyncratic human conditions, such as a
state of psychosis.
9. It endures a limited neurobiological theoretical reduction
which tends to support a coherent relationship between the model's
own functional properties and the phenomenol ogi cal character of
human behavior.
CHAPTER II
THE COGNITIVE NATURE OF ONGOING EXPERIENCE
Explaining the interaction of the many aspects of the model
of human behavior proposed by this dissertation in a manner which
could make it easily and readily understood appears to be a form-
idable task.
The complexity of the model requires more than just a brief
general explanation to convey the integrated design which under-
lies it.
Therefore, while according to the proposed model ongoing ex-
perience and its manifestations are considered to be global func-
tions, the model could be best understood if its elements would be
presented in a gradual fashion.
To such an effect, as depicted by Figure 2 on the next page,
an artificial separation of the basic functional elements of the
model is considered as an aid in the discussion of the model.
Parenthetically, this illustration will be presented as part of
a comprehensive diagram of all the elements of the model in Chapter
5.
The reciprocal interaction of the functional elements of the
model as indicated by the connecting arrows between such elements
is obvious at first glance. Indeed, the reciprocal interaction in
question is more accurately defined as the reciprocal integration
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Figure 2. Primary elements of functional representation.
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of the functional elements into a global functional activity.
To simplify matters, each of the functional elements of the
model is discussed as independently as possible from the others.
However, overlap between the discussions of the different functional
elements is not only inevitable, but also facilitative of under-
standing
.
Accordingly, this second chapter will consider the basic
elements of the model associated with cognitive representation.
That is, the cortex, the cognitive representation of the environ-
ment, and the accessory imaging system.
As a reminder, the accessory imaging system was briefly dis-
cussed in the previous chapter and its consideration in this chapter
will be supplemental
.
The stochastic cognitive representation of the environment in
terms of neuronal networks was considered also in the previous chap-
ter. It should be indicated that the topic of neuronal representa-
tion was considered very early in this dissertation in the belief
that an early introduction to the topic would facilitate the penetra-
tion of the many elements of the model which are being subsequently
i ntroduced
.
Now, while this chapter mainly addresses the phenomenol ogical
manifestations of cognitive representation, reference to the neuronal
representation of ongoing experience, that is, the cognitive matrices
discussed in the previous chapter, will be made all along the dis-
cussion. The latter is a theoretical necessity because the model
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is based on such a global cognitive representati
Unquestionably, an attempt at accurately defining ongoing
experience in terms of neuronal networks currently is a virtual
impossibility. Therefore, speculation in the form of theory has
to substitute for fact during such an attempt. However, as indi-
cated earlier, in the latter situation the speculation should be
based on some fact and have a coherent relationship with the pheno-
mena it tries to explain.
In consideration of the foregoing premise, it was postulated
in the preceding chapter that ongoing experience is represented in
the brain in terms of a cognitive functional analog resulting from
the coherent integration of cognitive processes. Such cognitive
processes have been conceptualized at their upper levels of inte-
gration in terms of stochastic higher-order cognitive matrices com-
posed of hierarchical ensembles of neuronal networks.
The approach to the understanding of brain function based on
the interaction of neuronal networks is hardly novel or unique since
most neuroscientists appear to concur with such an approach.
However, the conceptualization of the higher-order and highest-
order neuronal network integrations postulated in the preceding chap-
ter is perhaps one step beyond what has been proposed by neuroscience
to this point in defining the cognitive representation of experience.
The succinct treatment accorded to the topic of cognitive repre-
sentation in the brain in the preceding chapter could be considered
58
by some as inadequate to justify the consideration of the notion of
the proposed cognitive matrices.
However, it must be emphasized that such a notion emerges from
the observation of the mature brain's virtually instantaneous cog-
nitive efficiency. It appears obvious that the brain could not
represent ongoing experience from instant to instant as expeditiously
as it does unless such a representation would have the metaphorical
properties ascribed to the postulated cognitive matrices.
Obviously, the cognitive representation of ongoing experience
has global functional properties, but from the fund of information
in the neurosciences emerges the fact of the neocortex being the
tissue with the highest capacity for integration of cognitive materi-
al .
The Cerebral Cortex
Clearly, the vast portion of cognitive processing, especially
in terms of functional representation, appears to occur at the cor-
tical mantle (Luria, 1966, 1973). That is not to say that other
areas of the brain are not involved with functional representation,
for example, the cerebellum (Szentagothai & Arbib, 1975).
The cerebral cortex, as it appears, possesses the orderly
cellular organization which would support the understanding of brain
function in terms of neuronal networks. The orderly structure of
the cerebral cortex becomes obvious when contrasted to the irregular
neuronal organization found in subcortical areas, for example, par-
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ticular areas of the reticular formation (Nauta & Feirtag, 1979).
The thickness of the cerebral cortex has been considered to
consist of about six cytoarchitectonic layers or laminae (Luria,
1966; Szentagothai & Arbib, 1975) with varying types of cells.
These layers appear to have a somewhat discrete columnar organiza-
tion, which at very small diameters could be construed as a basic
neuron unit (Szentagothai & Arbib, 1975).
Indeed, one is reminded about the prevalent vertical neuronal
organization found in the thickness of the neocortex in some areas
of the brain, consisting of about 110 cells within a column with a
diameter of about 30 pm (Edelman & Mountcastle, 1978). This type of
cellular arrangement has been identified in some cerebral areas,
such as the frontal and parietal cortices. The basic unit of func-
tion of the neocortex in this case has been suggested to consist of
anywhere between 50 and 10,000 neurons.
The cortex appears to operate as a very powerful associative
organ. The late Luria (1966, 1973) emphasized the associative nature
of the cortex by describing the brain as consisting of hierarchical
functional levels of association. For example, in his view of the
higher cortical functions, the basic perception of a stimulus occurs
at a primary cortical representational area for a particular sensory
modality. Such an information gathered by the primary cortical
region is then integrated at two succeeding association areas, not
only in terms of the sensory modality in question, but also in terms
of other functional modalities converging on the association areas
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of the cortex. Therefore, at a tertiary association area, such as
the inferior parietal lobule, cross-modal associations can be made
which allow the integration of visual, tactile, and auditory stimuli
(Strub & Black, 1981 ).
Of particular interest is the role of the frontal lobes in
the associative process. The frontal cortex has considerable af-
ferent and efferent connections with the association areas of the
cortex which are prevalently reciprocal. These neuronal pathways
convey integrated cognitive information to the frontal lobes about
the internal (functional) processes and the external environment
(Strub & Black, 1981).
A second extensive reciprocal connection exists between the
frontal lobes and the limbic system. The extensive limbic input
arriving at the frontal cortex comes from several subcortical struc-
tures, such as, the amygdala, hypothalamus, and the limbic midbrain
area (Nauta & Feirtag, 1979; Strub & Black, 1981).
The reciprocal nature of the pathways between the frontal lobes
and the two major systems, cognitive and affective, has been consid-
ered to suggest that "the frontal lobe acts to modulate the activi-
ties of the intellectual and emotional systems through the synthesis
of both types of input" (Strub & Black, 1981 p. 33). The latter
synthesis will be illustrated in the following chapter in terms of
what may be called a functional metaphor .
The magnitude of the associative power of the brain can be
visualized, not without difficulty, if one considers that each of
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the estimated 100 billion cells in the central nervous system has
thousands of synaptic contacts with neurons impinging on it (Nauta
& Feirtag, 1979).
Obviously, such a staggering associative cerebral engagement
would support a global functional view of cognitive processes. One
of the ways of conceptualizing such a view is through the observa-
tion of the functional activation of the brain during the perfor-
mance of cognitive tasks.
Functional activation
. As indicated in the previous chapter, the
functional activation of the brain can be ascertained to some extent
by means of electroencephalograph^ recordings (Thatcher & John,
1977). In the latter case, differing dispersion patterns of elec-
troencephalograph^ recordings have been obtained during the perfor-
mance of cognitive tasks.
A more recent development has been the preliminary work on a
method to discriminate between different areas of the brain by measur-
ing the respective magnetic fields during the performance of cog-
nitive tasks (Kaufman & Williamson, 1980). Such a method may also
reportedly detect the differences in response latencies to certain
visual stimuli between two different populations of cells in fairly
close proximity.
A more colorful and graphical method to measure functional
activation, which conforms to the topography of the neocortex, is
the evaluation of metabolic activity at the cortex with the aid of
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radioisotopes. For example, administering a radioactive nutrient
and measuring the cortical metabolic diligence during the perfor-
mance of different cognitive tasks (Lassen, Ingvar & Skinh0j,
1978).
In the preceding example, the radioactivity emitted by the
labelled nutrient was measured for each cerebral hemisphere. The
radiation was dispersed with a collimator in a manner which divided
each hemisphere into many small portions of cortex. In the resul-
ting composite depiction of the measurements, the cortex appeared
to be composed of continuous small squares of a particular color
depending on the level of metabolic activity.
Consistent with the preceding, it appears obvious that depending
on the context of ongoing experience certain areas of the cortex
would display considerably more metabolic activity than others at
any given time. For example, the measurement of emitted radiation
during reading aloud has reflected an increase in metabolic activity
in the occipital, Broca's, Wernicke's, and supplementary motor areas
(Lassen, et al
. ,
1978). A particular observation with this method
is that during the performance of all the cognitive tasks some in-
crease in metabolic activity was always observed in the supplemen-
tary motor cortex, that is, the frontal lobe.
Another observation which can be made with the latter method
is that, akin to the view of a synthesized functional representation
of ongoing experience proposed by this dissertation, varying low
levels of activity can be detected in areas other than those
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intensely involved with a particular cognitive task.
The clever method to measure cortical activity described above,
may be considered to demonstrate the global functional characteris-
tics of brain function. That is, while some cortical areas may be
intensely involved with a particular task, other areas of the cortex
appear to contribute in limited varying degrees to the overall func-
tion of the brain during the performance of such given task. A
particularly animated state of global activation of virtually the
entire cortex may be observed with this method when a subject engages
intensely or emotionally in a task (Lassen et al
. , 1978).
The Accessory Imaging System
As postulated in the previous chapter, the accessory imaging
system is conceived as an internal mechanism possessing the asso-
ciative properties of a higher-order cognitive matrix. The cogni-
tive material represented by such an accessory imaging system may
at any given moment constitute input to the highest-order cognitive
matrix. It can also be the object of representation by the highest-
order cognitive matrix, as if within the focus of perceptual aware-
ness .
Such an imaging mechanism, ascribed with higher-order associ-
ative power, could serve to hold mental patterns or to integrate
information being recalled.
Clearly, such volitional cognitive functions could best be
modulated by the influence of the frontal cortical area.
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In support of the preceding, an imagined kind of speech, such
as, counting repeatedly from one to twenty in one's head, activates
the frontal regions, particularly the supplementary motor area
(Lassen et al
.
,
1978). While there is some noticeable activity in
other areas of the cortex, including those involved with regular
speech, in the above case such an activity is insignificant when
compared to that of the frontal cortex.
Such findings lend support to the notion of pure mental events
being primarily modulated by the frontal cortex. Similarly, they
would support the notion of the highest-order cognitive matrix being
also under the predominant influence of the frontal areas of the
brain. The latter appears especially congruent with the findings
of the pervasive measurable activity at the frontal region of the
cortex during the performance of cognitive tasks, and its consider-
able activation during other periods (Lassen et al
. ,
1978).
It should be noted that the person's capacity for parallel
consideration of perceived, or recalled materials during active
thinking may be a predominant function of the accessory imaging
system. Clearly such a system could not possess the cognitive
efficiency it displays without the metaphorical properties ascribed
to the already proposed higher-order cognitive matrices.
A particular example of the associative power of such an imaging
system is obvious in the capacity of blind people to integrate
sensory information into the mental image of an object and be able
to draw a reasonable facsimile of the object in some cases (Greenberg,
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1978).
Functional Analog of Ongoing Experience
The predominantly cognitive view of ongoing experience suggested
here follows from the observations made in the preceding sections
about the necessarily integrated functional quality of human conduct.
Nevertheless, such a cognitive view of ongoing experience is func-
tional by biological definition.
Not too long ago, it was suggested that ongoing experience
(i.e., consciousness) is derived from the functional properties of
presumably discoverable higher-level cerebral processes which simul-
taneously exert influence on the lower-order processes which produce
them. That is, ongoing experience seen as the complex interaction
of highly organized brain processes (Sperry, 1976). More recently,
as discussed in the preceding section, the integrated functional
activity during different tasks has been elegantly demonstrated
using radioactive labelling (Lassen et al
. , 1978; Sokolof, 1977).
Perhaps some of the best evidence for the cognitive properties
of ongoing experience is provided by the results of electrical
stimulation of the cerebral cortex during neurosurgery (Penfield,
1975). In the latter case, it was found that electrical stimula-
tion of certain areas of the cortex produced visual and auditory
imagery of previous circumstances, as if watching a scene, while
being aware at the same time of the present. At least two things
are noteworthy in the latter situation: (a) the subject was aware
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that the memories were just that and did not confuse them with the
then present circumstances, and (b) the stimulation of a group of
cortical cells produced coherently organized visual and auditory
images
.
Both of the preceding observations appear to be in substantial
agreement with the notion of a cognitive representation of experi-
ence at the cortex. It is evident that in the experiment described
above the electrical stimulation would have had to affect directly
or indirectly many brain cells, necessarily a vast network, in order
to produce such a complex cognitive output.
In accordance with the proposed model, it should be emphasized
that meaning, objective or subjective, appears to be directly re-
lated to the synthesized functional representation of an experiential
event. Thus, despite the fact that in the surgical case above, the
inhibition of the language mechanisms by electrical stimulation
hampered the proper identification of a picture of a butterfly, the
subject later reported to the neurosurgeon not having been able to
get the words, but being able to think in terms of an approximation
to the meaning of the object, such as the word moth. That is, the
subject could sense the objective meaning, but could not express it
and sought for an acceptable approximation to it.
Although the site of stimulation in the latter case included
the speech area in the left cerebral hemisphere, it nevertheless
appears that the processing of the global aspects of a stimulus is
not obviously lateral ized to one hemisphere, but rather may be a
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reasonably bilateral function (Martin, 1979).
It should be noted that the reference to cognitive represen-
tation made here includes all sensory modalities.
The sensory cortex may not be easily perceived as a network
of systems with coherent organization when the observation is made
that the cells that compose it do not seem to be much different
from each other (Puccetti & Dykes, 1978). However, it is obvious
that some functional organization is necessary in order to have
sensations, just as it is obvious that sensory information is inte-
grated with and is part of cognitive representation. Obversely,
people would not be able to ascribe the same meaning, verbally or
otherwise, to a construct which is perceived through different
sensory pathways.
For example, congenitally blind persons are able to make recog-
nizable drawings of things such as tables, moving objects such as
pinwheels, and of a person (Greenberg, 1978). It is obvious that
these blind persons must have used nonvisual sensory mechanisms to
construct these "images" whose originals they had never seen.
A similarly interesting situation takes place in the case
of the phantom limb phenomena. In this case the representation at
the cortical level allows for the limb to be cognitively perceived
as if it would still be there. Thus, the functional representation
for the limb remains sensitive to activation after there is no
longer such a limb under certain neurological conditions at the
stump. This activation appears to occur as a result of pulses on
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the neuronal pathways previously connected to the limb, which ap-
parently elicit the same representation at the cortex as if the
limb had not been removed. These latter phenomena appear to support
the notion of highly associative hierachical processes forming a
part of functional representation.
While on the subject, the frequency of phantom limb sensations
has been found to be higher in the dominant limb (Almagor, Jaffe
& Lomranz, 1978). According to our model, the latter dominant limb
effect may be associated with a more intense associative processing
in the language-dominant cerebral hemisphere. Such a fine-grain
cognitive processing would result in a more enduring cognitive
integration of sensory information in the language-dominant hemis-
phere.
A somewhat unfortunate and aberrant example of a deficit in the
capacity for an adequate integration of different functional aspects
of ongoing experience is provided by the study of an individual
with a tremendous capacity for remembering (Luria, 1968). The man
in question could remember things perfectly even twelve years later,
and could lower the temperature of one arm while raising that of
the opposite arm by just using his imagination. This man associated
his perfect memory to the fact that his senses were all vividly active
at the same time. That is, he smelled, saw, tasted, felt, and heard
everything at the same, but could not integrate everything into a
synthesized whole.
The material being discussed appears to be illustrative of the
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manner in which ongoing experience is functionally integrated in
a global fashion. That is, each functional aspect appears to con-
tribute to ongoing experience, not as a separate mechanism usually
detectable through empirical means, but as part of the synthesized
whole.
The significance of the integrated view of human functioning
being portrayed here should not be underestimated. The view of
human functioning expressed in the present work indicates that
resynthesis of the person's global functional representation of an
experience may be caused by the ongoing incorporation of new ex-
perience on that experience previously assimilated by the individual.
This historic resynthesis appears to be able to occur in context
with the ongoing experience and the affect linked to it. The pre-
ceding implies that everything, and anything, may influence the man-
ner in which an individual will interpret or act the meaning of an
event or experience, from birth, or even before, to death. However,
although the latter statement may be a formal truth, the statement
needs modification in terms of what the field of psychology, and
for that matter what most people have observed in that respect.
It is a well known fact that the number of elements of any
event or experience which the person may visually attend to are
related to his capacity for purposeful perceptual focusing (Neisser,
1976). That is, one cannot attend separately to every element of
a visual experience at the same time, but may focus on a very small
number of such elements as a result of the limitations of the visual
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apparatus. However, such limitations do not mean that those el
ments of an experience which are not purposely focused on, for
example, those peripheral to the fovea! region, do not become
part of the functional aspects of the global representation of
event or of the ongoing experience in the form of a functional
anal og
.
In order to interact with the environment, including other
people, the individual cannot stop to analyze and integrate every
detail of an experience before reacting to it, but has to react to
the experiential event as a whole. He has to react with such an
efficiency and speed as if the experience and the reaction to such
an experience were continuous or part of each other, that is, as if
they were analogs.
Thus, the individual's observable behavior in context with
an experience must actually be a functional aspect of the global
representation of that experience. In other words, it appears that
both the actual experiential event and the behavior related to that
event share the same functional representation.
This may be the reason why the individual behaves in a global
way towards an event, as if he could focus on all the elements of
an experience at the same time on an ongoing basis, and automati-
cally produce a response. Since the global functional representation
of any one experience within two finite points in time seems equi-
valent to its meaning (objective or subjective) for the individual,
it appears reasonable to suggest that behavior in any form (e.g.,
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speech) is an expression of meaning, thus, metaphorical.
As a result of the sharing of the global functional represen-
tation of ongoing experience by both the experiential event and
the behavior of the individual, the latter considered merely an out-
come of behavior-mediating processes, it becomes clear that there
is a continuum between the physical world and the metaphorical one
through the processes that mediate behavior. That is, the meaning
of experience, experience itself, and the physical world are func-
tionally intertwined with each other.
The functional representation of an experiential event is
unequivocally inseparable from the biological processes which produce
it, and the biological processes which produce the functional repre-
sentation are inseparable from the experiential event. For example,
spoken language is inseparable from the biological processes, which
produce it (Needham, 1978). In the same manner, the biological
processes which produce language are inseparable from either the
functional representation of language in the ongoing experience
or the physical world. One speaks according to the meaning being
conveyed, and such a speech reaches a tympanic membrane by means
of molecular vibrations which in turn activate the biological pro-
cesses or functional aspects associated with experience in another
organism in terms of that same meaning being conveyed. The same
situation occurs with vision, but by means of the action of photons,
that is, a physical contact between an individual and the general
envi ronment.
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It is possible that the inseparability of language from the
synthesized functional representation of ongoing experience in the
human organism has been the reason why ongoing experience (i.e.,
consciousness) has been considered to be built up with a vocabulary
or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of beha-
vior in the physical world, and only as new as 1,500 years old
(Jaynes, 1976).
It is obvious that the latter definition of ongoing experience
may be considered questionable on the grounds that it assumes the
totality of meaning to be based on only a part of a major functional
aspect, as is language of the behavior-mediating processes which
express ongoing experience. It also lacks the comprehensiveness
of the functional global ity which is actually observed in humans.
Moreover, communicational abilities in global aphasics, with a normal
right hemisphere, demonstrate that the individual who lacks language
skills evidences a conceptual system with which he can handle some
logical tasks (Gazzaniga, 1972). However, language, due to its
functional flexibility, may be the best medium for the expression
of meaning. Its importance as the means to obtain the most accurate
approximation to what the global functional representation of an
experiential event could be, cannot be overestimated.
The nature of language is such, that the group of mechanisms
which maintain it forms an essential part of the cognitive aspect
of meaning. It is with language that the global representation of
an experiential event for one individual becomes alive for another
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individual. It is also where meaning may be observed to be both
the content of the cognitive function of language and to be beha-
viorally mediated by the speech mechanisms simultaneously. That is,
all three seem inseparable.
For these reasons, it does not come as a surprise the fact
that in all therapeutic interactions, language plays a cognitive
role albeit the theoretical or methodological differences assigned
to such a role.
However, verbal expression may only be considered an approxi-
mation to the actual global representation of ongoing experience.
That is, no matter how accurate a verbal expression of the content
of the representation of ongoing experience may be, it would never
be a perfectly accurate description of such a content. The reason
for the latter appears to be that the global representation of
ongoing experience seems to have equivalence with meaning. That
implies a cognitive complexity not verifiable through any discrete
functional aspect, such as verbally organized cognitions.
To concretize this notion of a synthesized representational
function, one may suggest the analogy of a color mixture. Imagining
each of the functional aspects of an individual as a color, the
addition or deletion of one color, or changing any of its charac-
teristics, will affect the color or the characteristics of the final
mixture.
Similarly, in the human being there appears to be a continous-
ly coherent reciprocal influence between the individual functional
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systems of the organism and the integrated output of those systems.
That is, between any two given points in time, any variation in the
global representation of an experience will cause a relevant comple-
mentary variation in some or all of the functional systems. Thus,
change of the parts causes change of the whole and vice versa.
It seems noteworthy to mention how the preceding appears to
have some relevance to the attempts to favorably influence the
treatment of cancer patients with mental imagery ("Fighting Cancer
With Mental Images," 1978). In the latter case, the immunological
defenses are apparently stimulated to act through the cognitive
influence of mental images.
The functional representation of ongoing experience obviously
changes instantaneously and can only occur as a coherent dynamic
process in constant synthesis as a function of constantly changing
experiential input from one cognitive instant to another.
It should be emphasized that the global representation of ex-
perience necessarily has to be constituted by biological processes
organized in such a way as to produce a coherent functional analog
of such an experience. In addition, such a coherent analog of ex-
perience must be able to continuously change as a function of ongoing
experience without loss of efficiency, that is, automatically.
Perhaps a good example which may support the existence of the
global representation of an experiential event may be found in the
naturalistic brain-lesion experiments of the visual agnosias. In
the case of the rare syndrome of visual object agnosia (Hecaen &
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Albert, 1978), the subject may see an object which is shown to him,
but cannot appreciate its character or meaning. The latter is ob-
served albeit the contention that visual sensory defects, aphasia,
and general intellectual impairment may be evidently absent in the
subject. However, the subject may possess object-related abilities
which have been suggested (He'caen & Albert, 1978) to enable the
subject to
describe the shape, outline and interior parts of the object
without being able to name it or describe its usage verbally
or by gesture. If the object has a characteristic sound and
the subject hears the sound, or if the subject is allowed topalpate the object, or if the object has a characteristic o-dor that that the subject smells, he can immediately name it
(p. 195) J
It is also possible that the latter subject may deduce the
meaning of the object presented by adding the pieces he is able to
identify. He may also use one particular detail which may be meaning-
ful enough to allow the identification of the object as a whole, such
as the identification of a boat by its mast.
A similar situation in which one aspect of functioning is absent,
but in which apparently the global representation of an experiential
event appears virtually intact when other functional aspects are
challenged, it is probably the condition known as either pure word
deafness or auditory verbal agnosia (Shoumaker, Ajax & Schenkenberg,
1977). In this case, there is a selective inability to understand
spoken words in the absence of aphasia or hearing loss. Nonverbal
sounds are recognized and reacted to and there is no loss of spon-
taneous speech, writing, or understanding printed words.
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These examples appear to make clear the connection between
objective meaning and the individual functional aspects. They also
demonstrate that all the functional aspects involved with the global
functional representation of an experiential event or object are
associated with each other. In addition, they show that in the
absence or impairment of one of the functional aspects, the objective
meaning or global cognitive representation in question is not lost.
Finally, the ability of an individual suffering from any of the above
two mentioned conditions to ascribe meaning through other sensory
or sensorimotor modalities supports the notion of the cognitive
nature of the functional representation of an experiential event.
The integration of functional aspects into a global represen-
tation with the metaphorical properties of objective meaning may be
depicted by the task of learning a musical instrument.
For example, mastering an instrument like the piano from scratch
would take much longer than mastering the swinging of a wooden stick.
The amount of integration of elements in the latter is not as great
as in the former.
That is, learning to play the piano requires the mastering of
motor movements which have to be painstakingly integrated at the same
time with cognitive elements such as the types of musical notes,
their values, their relationship to each other, and so forth. Like-
wise, everything else would have to be gradually integrated with sen-
sorimotor elements such as the feel of the keys, the precision of
the hands, the sound of each note, the differences in pitch, and so
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forth.
Thus, the skilled production of a musical piece is the out-
come of the integration of many active functional aspects of the
individual into one ongoing synthesized representational function,
expressed in this case by a set of behaviors.
The cumulative quality of such an integration is probably seen
in the commensurability of the level of complexity of the music
Played with the skills of the pianist at different epochs of his
development as a musician. That the skilled production of a musical
Piece is a global ongoing function is evident in the instantaneous
manner in which all the functional elements come together to make
musical sense out of a series of symbols and letters.
Stability of Cognitive Representation
It has been observed here that objective meaning appears to be
equivalent to the global cognitive representation of any experien-
tial event and that is is constituted by major functional processes.
Such a cognitive representation appears to have longitudinal stabil-
ity to some extent.
For example, personal experience may show that a man who has
never worn a beard before may realize that others notice the beard
while it was being grown or after. However, if the beard is shaved
off after a very short time, the incidence of acquaintances, and
even of close relationships noticing the absence of the beard may
actually be lower than those noticing the beard initially.
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This example suggests that the global perception of a known
event or object, in this case a familiar face, is fairly stable
and resistant to change even under conditions where a part of the
cognitive representation of that object or event must be functi
ally slightly different than the original representation learned.
The following empirical example may make these notions a little
more clear.
A psychological experiment conducted for purposes other than
those considered here (Bruner & Postman, 1949, cited in Kuhn, 1970),
had the subjects identify a series of playing cards using short and
controlled exposure techniques. The group of cards contained many
regular or normal cards, and some cards which had been made anoma-
lous in terms of the shape and color of their figures (e.g., a red
six of spades).
A single card was displayed to a single subject in a series
of gradually increasing exposures at each experimental run, with
recall after each exposure. Each run was terminated when two suc-
cessive correct identifications were made of each card. Most of the
normal cards were identified correctly by most of the subjects either
at the shortest exposure or after a small increase in exposure time.
However, the anomalous cards were almost always identified as normal
without any indications of having noticed their incongruous proper-
ties. Further increases in exposure time produced reports of undif-
ferentiated anomalies and confusion until the correct identification
of two or three anomalous cards would be produced by most of the
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subjects. The subjects who were able finally to identify correctly
the anomalous cards would not have further difficulties identifying
the rest of such cards.
It is noteworthy that even at forty times the mean exposure at
which normal cards would be recognized for what they were, more than
10% of the anomalous cards were not correctly identified. The latter
was related to the expressions by the subjects denoti ng personal dis-
tress at their inability to identify the incongruous cards. Thus,
it appears as if most subjects already had a cognitive representation
of the normal cards as a function of previous experience and were
able to perceive the anomalous cards in those terms, at least until
the exposure was long enough to allow the integration of a cognitive
representation of the already mentioned anomalous cards.
Not it seems that in the case of a new perceptual input which
closely resembles other previous experiential input, there is a ten-
dency to recognize that new input as the one previously experienced
when the perceptual details of the new input are not completely
available. However, a detained experiencing of the new input, during
which the characteristics of the latter may be analyzed and incor-
porated, will allow the recognition of such a new input as a new
experience and its proper identification thereafter.
Incidentally, such a durability of well learned cognitive repre-
sentations appears to support the stochastic process of integration
of synaptic matrices during learning which was discussed in the pre-
vious chapter.
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Although intended for other purposes, the preceding study usi
anomalous cards clearly illustrates the relative stability of the
cognitive representation of an experiential event in terms of its
objective meaning.
There is no dearth of empirical examples in the psychological
literature whose results may be viewed as illustrating these notions
of stability in the cognitive representation of an experiential
event.
According to the model of human behavior pursued by this disser-
tation, it appears that the phenomenologi cal manifestations of cog-
nitive representation considered above are in theoretical agreement
with the principles for neuronal network integration postulated in
the preceding chapter.
To summarize, the view presented in this chapter postulates that
there is a sort of physical continuum between the environment and
the cognitive representation of such an environment in the brain.
The physical continuum in question appears to make use of the func-
tional processess which mediate behavior, such as speech, motor func-
tion, and so forth. These behavior-mediating processes which appear
to serve the behavioral expression of the cognitive representation
of ongoing experience, are functionally tied to such a cognitive
representation.
Since behavior appears to be metaphorical, the cognitive repre-
sentation of ongoing experience is fittingly envisaged as a synthe-
sized functional analog of such an ongoing experience and possessing
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metaphorical properties.
As indicated earlier, the segregation of the basic functional
elements of the model depicted by Figure 2 represents an artificial
separation of otherwise functionally inseparable factors. As that
figure indicates, the stochastic cognitive representation of ongoing
experience alluded to throughout this work is functionally influenced
by an affective complement or core affect linked to it.
The relative omission in this chapter of such an affective
influence on the cognitive matrices has been intentional.
The purpose behind such an omission has been to describe human
behavior as primarily the manifestation of the integrated cognitive
representation of ongoing experience, independently of the affect
linked to it.
Indeed, such an affective influence constitutes an important
functional factor in the metaphorical properties of the representa-
tion of ongoing experience. The discussion of how core affect effects
the cognitive representation of ongoing experience is the task of the
ensuing chapter.
C H A P T E R III
INTEGRATION OF AFFECT AND COGNITION
From the preceding chapters it may be observed that the cyto-
architecture of the cortex may appear deceptively simple when com-
pared with the complex cognitive functions which may be ascribed
to it.
The complexity of such functions is obvious in the difficulty
which is encountered in attempts to describe the cognitive repre-
sentation of ongoing experience.
Particularly difficult, as it could be observed in the previous
chapters, is the description of the cognitive analog of ongoing
experience in readily understandable terms.
As it was observed previously, the global cognitive represen-
tation of ongoing experience proposed here is a functional analog.
That is, there is an analogical correspondence between the func-
tional systems of the organism and the environment.
Thus, the cognitive representation of ongoing experience and
the experiential event being represented share the same dimensional
qualities. And as mentioned earlier they also share a physical con-
tinuum. For example, human or mechanical sounds could not be heard
if a space of vacuum existed between the source of the sound and
the listener.
As a result of these representational factors the visual per-
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ception of one's environment appears to be a sort of commentary
mirror image. However, be that as 1t may
, ,„ sensQry
are integrated in a manner which enables the individual to perceive
the dimensions of the environment through any one of such sensory
modalities. An example of this is the ability of the congenitally
blind person to draw objects never seen.
To facilitate the discussion in this chapter, it will be assumed
that the ultimate integration of the higher-order cognitive matrices
is synonymous with a functional mirror image of the environment.
That is, viewing the global cognitive representation of the environ-
ment as a sort of functional reflection.
In this case, the brain, especially the neocortex, is conceived
as a cognitive generator. That is, it is considered to function as
a sort of cognitive machine.
However, while the representational function is a cognitive ana-
log, its interpretation by the brain by means of the latter's asso-
ciative capacity may be different from one period to another depending
on the level of affective influence linked to the cognitive represen-
tation .
The affective influence in question, as may be derived from the
material covered so far, is the affective complement to the cognitive
representation or core affect.
In other words, the concrete, objective meaning of the experi-
ence produced by the analog cognitive representation acquires a
subjective dimension. Thus, the experiential event has a subjective
meaning in addition to what it means objectively or concretely.
This affective influence on the cognitive processes has been
considered for about four decades to emanate from the structures
which comprise the limbic system in the brain.
As it appears, a brief exposition of the limbic structures
and of some of their pertinent connections may establish a neural
substrate for core affect and facilitate its visualization.
The Limbic Influence: Core Affect
The structures of the limbic system form a somewhat undefined
ring around the perimeter of the inner aspect of the cerebral hemi
pheres
.
Some of these structures are, the hypothalamus, the amygdala,
the hippocampal formation, the hippocampal gyrus and the cingulate
gyrus. Also the dorsomedial and anterior nuclei of the thalamus,
the septal nuclei in the posteromedial frontal lobe, the limbic
midbrain area, and probably portions of the orbital and medial cor
tex of the frontal lobe. Of these structures the hypothalamus is
considered the central point of the major part of limbic activity
(Strub & Black, 1981 ).
The structures of the limbic system operate in reciprocal
association with each other and with other structures. In general
terms, the function of these structures has been considered to be
responsible for innate drives, memory, and emotional behavior.
Strub and Black (1981) enumerate several important reciprocal
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neural connections between the limbic structures themselves and
other areas of the brain. Some of these neural pathways are gra-
phically depicted by Figure 3 in material ahead which considers
neurotransmitter activity.
One of the major reciprocal neural pathways between the limbic
structures themselves and other cerebral portions is the fornix,
which travels from the hippocampus to the mamillary bodies of the
hypothalamus and the septal nuclei of the frontal lobe.
A second major pathway is the group of fibers going from the
mamillary bodies to the anterior nucleus of the thalamus, and from
there to the cingulate gyrus.
A third major neural pathway, the stria terminals, runs from
the amygdala to the ventromedial hypothalamus and the septal region.
The fibers of a fourth major pathway, the medial forebrain
bundle, emerge from the inferior frontal cortex and septal nuclei
and go to the limbic midbrain area after connecting with the lateral
hypothalamus.
There are many connections between the structures of the limbic
system themselves and other brain areas in addition to the four main
fiber pathways enumerated above.
The amygdala has fiber connections directly with the hypotha-
lamus
,
wi th the orbitofrontal cortex, and with the habenula and septum
Also there are interconnections between the limbic midbrain area
and the brain stem reticular formation.
Of particular importance to certain aspects of the model of
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human behavior being proposed are the ascending activating and in-
hibiting reticular systems.
These systems appear to determine the level of alertness of a
person as a function of the dynamic balance between the two of them
(Strub & Black, 1981).
In arousal, some of the fibers originating from the pons reach
thalamic nuclei with extensive interconnections, especially the
anterior thalamic nuclei which sends afferent fibers to the cortex.
Limbic system structures, such as the hypothalamus and septal
nuclei, receive a great number of ascending fibers from the mesen-
cephalic reticular formation.
The ascending inhibiting system, which works in counterbalance
with its activating opposite, when stimulated produces a decrease
in arousal which depending on the level of stimulation could lead
to a state of sleep.
The ascending activating system, on the other hand, may induce
states of hyperalertness and overactivity similar to those which
can be observed during periods of anxiety. Apparently, this acti-
vating system may participate in the general state of arousal defined
as anxiety, particularly during the waking hours.
A probable mechanism for the latter is that anxious arousal
could stimulate the activity of the ascending activating system
or block the ascending inhibiting system. In addition, it is pos-
sible to postulate that anxiety resulting from an abnormal elevation
in core affect could override the counterbalanced activity of these
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systems beyond a particular threshold of the anxious arousal. Such
a threshold of anxiety may be violently evident when one is awakened
from a nightmare by intense manifestations of anxiety.
At any rate, it appears that the balance between the ascending
activating and inhibiting systems maintains a particular level of
cortical tone at all times. The cortical tone would be higher during
periods of alertness and lower during sleep. The latter means that
even during sleep there is a minimal level of activation in the brain
Yet, it appears that during sleep the activation of the brain is
not quite enough to maintain a coherent associative process. There-
fore, the cognitive matrices during sleep would be somewhat disor-
ganized and the associative process could be idiosyncratic or aber-
rant. The latter would produce the deficient version of the ordinary
global function of the cognitive matrices commonly known as dream-
ing.
The manifestations of the functional effects of anxious arousal
during dreaming may be seen in the increased sharpness of thinking
during sleep which allows some cognitive consolidation of the ex-
perience for recall after awakening. Such an enhanced sharpness in
cognitive representation would obviously result from the increased
synaptic interaction of the neuronal networks involved. The func-
tional effects of anxious arousal during sleep also may be seen in
the vividness and sharpness of the dream. Obviously, in the latter
instances the ascending inhibiting system would be maintaining some
control on the level of cortical arousal despite the presence of some
88
anxiety during sleep.
Since a dream is just a poor version of ordinary thinking it
will be influenced by the intensity of core affect. Therefore, the
content of a dream may reflect an emotional state between an anti-
cipation of harm and an anticipation of nurturance depending on the
prevalent intensity of core affect.
As illustrated by Figure 3 (Betz, 1979) on the following page,
the level of cortical activation appears to be mediated mainly by
the neurotransmitters norepinephrine (NE) and serotonin (5-HT).
Norepinephrine, originating from the locus ceruleus in the
pons and the medial reticular formation, is transmitted to the
structures in the limbic region and to the neocortex.
Serotonin is considered to dampen large inputs and magnify
small inputs, thus allowing a variability in the system. Serotonin
arises from the pontine raphe nuclei and is transmitted to the hypo-
thalamus, the basal ganglia and the neocortex.
A particular neurotransmitter associated with limbic activation
is dopamine (DA). As indicated by Betz on the same illustration
ahead, dopamine arises from both the pars compacta and substantia
nigra in the tegmentum. The dopamine arising from the substantia
nigra is transmitted to the basal ganglia complex and it is asso-
ciated with complex body functions, such as, postural changes and
drinking.
The dopamine emerging from the pars compacta is transmitted to
the nucleus accumbens
,
which is presumably the portal of entry for
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Figure 3. Schema of major brain regions, structures and pathways.
(NE= norepinephrine, DA= dopamine, 5-HT= serotonin, MFB= medial
forebrain bundle, Ach= acetylcholine, S.T. = stria terminalis,
GABA= gamma-ami nobutyric acid) Note . From "Some Neurophysiology
Aspects of Individual Behavior" by B. J. Betz, The American Journal
of Psychiatry
, 1979, 136, 1251-1256. Copyright 1979 by the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association. Reprinted by permission.
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dopamine into the limbic system.
In both instances the transport of dopamine is modulated by
the inhibitory feedback activity of gamma-ami nobutyri c acid (GABA).
As it appears, failure in the controlled modulation of dopamine
entry into the limbic system may create a disorganized limbic system.
The latter could result in a state of excessive arousal linked with
unrefrained hypothalamic activity associated with defensive behaviors
against harm. In apparent connection with the latter, Betz suggests
that it is possible to assume that an excessive amount of dopamine
in target systems, such as the basal ganglia and limbic system,
disrupts their functioning in a manner which induces the manifes-
tations of the behavioral complex she describes as schizophrenic
phenomena
.
In general terms, fleeing and fighting behavioral reactions are
controlled by the amygdala and the hippocampus (Strub & Black, 1981).
The amygdala in this case transmits signals to the hypothalamus to
either inhibit or release defensive responses to protect the organism
against any danger. Evidently, a general state of arousal occurs
at the limbic and cortical levels during any period of defensive
activity by the organism.
The following quotation describes a postulated sequence of
activity in the limbic system while encountering and emotionally
laden situation. The particular situation being considered is that
of the smashing of a parked automobile by a moving vehicle while
the owner of the parked car is watching (Strub & Black, 1981,
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The view of the limbic influence on the cognitive representation
of experience postulated by this dissertation differs a bit from the
foregoing description.
In the model being proposed, a threatening event such as the
one described above would similarly have an objective analog repre-
sentation in the higher-order cognitive matrices. The aversive
elements of such an event would also be vastly associated with
previous similar knowledge which is symbolic of danger to the par-
ticular individual.
Assuming that the analog cognitive representation of the event
could be fractioned into a large number of elements, each cognitive
element would carry with it a particular level of symbolic danger.
Such an allegorical threat would be proportional to the degree of
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danger perceived during the current event.
Assume that there is a constant low-level signal potential
of danger to the limbic system from the cortex in reaction to the
most minimal environmental demands from the organism. As such, all
the elements of the current experience possessing any degree of
symbolic threat would elicit an increase in such a danger signal
in proportion to their representative risk.
The sum of the increases in the danger signal or the strongest
minacious potential associated with any cognitive element would
elicit the elevation in the limbic "sensation" of danger.
Obviously, such a sensation of danger would in turn elicit a
normal defensive reaction of the body with a resulting display of
defensive behaviors associated with fleeing or fighting, that is,
as if repelling an attack.
Under these circumstances there would be an increase in visceral
or autonomic nervous system activity and arousal at all levels of
the central nervous system.
The characteristic level of general arousal during this state of
affairs, that is, anxiety, may have both physical and functional
manifestations according to its effect on the somatic and visceral
functions and its effect on the neocortex, respectively.
The level of anxiety in this case would be proportional to the
intensities of the danger signal and the resulting limbic sensation
of threat.
Obvious in the situation being described is that the state of
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anxiety and the defensive behaviors occur so simultaneously that
they blend into one action.
As a matter of fact, it appears very likely that a state of
increased arousal is necessary for the implementation of the de-
fensive behaviors against possible harm.
According to the model being proposed the core affect resulting
from the constant low-level input of a signal of danger to the limbic
system should be present ideally at such a minimal range of activity
that it would elicit only very subdued or adaptive defensive beha-
vioral reactions.
Accordingly, such a constant normal range of the sensation of
threat would result in a tonic level of minimal general arousal
in the central nervous system.
A mild need for safety which is out of the awareness of the
person results from the normal level of the sensation of danger.
Such a need for safety would drive the person to display feelings
such as empathy and love, and generally seek a higher level of a
sense of competence in interacting with the environment.
Above the ideal normal range, this sensation of danger which
has been labelled in this work as core affect would elicit anxiety
and defensive reactions proportional to its intensity.
Therefore, in the light of these notions, anxiety and other
defensive reactions are triggered by the intensity of core affect
at any given moment when a threat is perceived. It should be em-
phasized that anxiety is construed here as a ordinary reaction to
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elevations in core affect. Therefore, anxiety could not be synon-
ymous with core affect at any time.
The locus of core affect in the limbic system appears far from
being determined. It is possible that many limbic structures par-
ticipate in the production of the sensation of danger which charac-
terizes the concept of core affect.
However, according to the clinical observations during the
three-year period of this investigation, core affect has been des-
cribed as a visceral discomfort with pain-like characteristics,
like a sensation of danger or imminent organismic disintegration.
The latter observations assign to the hypothalamus an important,
if not predominant, role in the limbic regulation of the manifesta-
tions of core affect. Obviously, the limbic structures appear to
work as a system and the sensation of danger or consternation in
question, which appears equivalent to the popular notion of emotional
pain, very likely could be the product of the activity of the system
rather than of one single structure.
Indeed, there are enough reciprocal connections between the cor-
tex and the limbic structures to account for a discharge symbolic
of danger to the limbic system in general.
However, such a symbolic input would appear to be best modulated
by the frontal lobes in association with the hippocampus and to
some degree with the limbic system in general.
In very simplistic terms, after receiving a danger discharge
above the ordinary low-level potential from the cortex and hippo-
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campus, the amygdala would be a primary candidate to transmit to
the hypothalamus a signal which would lead to the release of defen-
sive activity in proportion to the strength of such a signal and the
core affect elicited within the system.
The resulting discharge of neural, endocrine and defensive
organismic responses may be attributed predominantly to hypothalamic
activity. The responses to a particular event would be proportional
to the level of threat elicited by the cognitive representation of
such an event.
Clearly, in the previous situation of the automobile crash a
stimulus which is symbolic of danger is present.
However, core affect may be present in the absence of stimuli
with obvious elements symbolic of danger, such as in the case of
fear of an i nnocuous object
.
The reason for this, as formulated
earlier, is that the limbic sensation in question is present at
all times, although desirably at very inhibited levels.
There is no question of core affect being amenable to being
described as some sort of sensation of danger. And as it will be
discussed later it can be construed as different feelings depending
on the context of the situation.
To elaborate further, core affect is proposed to be ordinarily
within a particular range which serves as the force behind a mild
need for safety. This mild need for safety, customarily is not
within the scope of awareness but serves as the drive behind motiva-
tion and the need to seek nurturance and support commensurate with
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its intensity.
The constant presence of core affect makes it necessary for the
individual to develop behavioral maneuvers to maintain a sense of
safety, despite not being aware of the sensation of danger in ques-
tion nor the need for safety.
When core affect is present above its normal range it may or
may not be perceived as such. However, its elevation is evident
in the increased level of arousal or anxiety and other defensive
responses in the form of behavioral maneuvers aimed at reducing
its intensity. An elevated core affect is also evident in the ap-
prehensive cognitive interpretation of the environment by the indi-
vidual .
Quite obviously, what is being described immediately above
is either a defensive reaction to an aversive stimulus or a mal-
adaptive state of emotional upheaval.
The limbic sensation of danger formulated in this section may
be also construed as a sensation of threat or consternation, vul-
nerability and, very appropriately, emotional pain, among many other
descriptions
.
According to the model being proposed here, such a sensation
is the core affect which underlies human behavior.
The Faces of Core Affect
Attempting to define core affect in terms of limbic system
activity appears to present the same mammoth difficulties encoun-
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tered in attempting to define ongoing experience in terms of neuronai
cognitive matrices in earlier materia,. However, of the two concepts,
core affect appears to be more obvious in the intercourse between
the person and the environment.
Core affect, as described here, has phylogenetic roots and
is conceived as a universal human affect. It appears to be exactly
what Koestler (1967, cited in McLean, 1979) has called the "para-
noid streak" inherent in the nature of the human being.
McLean (1979) redefines the latter as "a general affect charac-
terized as an unpleasant feeling of fear attached to something that
cannot be clearly identified". (P. 27) McLean further emphasizes
the ability of this affect to manifest itself in many different
ways. The high frequency of paranoid symptoms in psychosis is
considered by him to support such a general affect.
Undoubtedly, core affect is very well known to everyone in the
forms of fear and emotional pain. For centuries, poets have been
describing the unhappiness inflicted by the unfil filled need of
the feeling of safety which is love.
From the evolutionary point of view, an elevated intensity of
core affect must have been an absolute necessity for survival during
prehistoric times. One can only imagine the numerous and continuous
dangers facing prehistoric humans. A constant elevation in core
affect would have been necessary then to maintain a continuous defen-
sive posture.
According to the view of human behavior proposed here, it was
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the vulnerability associated with core affect which probably prompted
the formation of early societal nuclei.
The need for safety or support prompted by core affect is what
ordinarily drives the individual to seek the interaction with others.
Similarly, core affect appears to be the cohesive force which main-
tains the integrity of personal relationships, and of social and
political systems.
However, while a normal range of core affect intensity leads
to adaptive fulfillment of the need for safety, a higher than normal
intensity leads to unproductive means for fulfilling such a need.
In the latter case, the individual reacts to the environment
in a defensive manner, as if he were facing some sort of danger
which is actually not present. A major problem in this and every
other case is that the person is ordinarily not aware of the core
affect, nor sometimes of the defensive nature of the behavior per-
formed to diminish the intensity of such a core affect.
As such, the individual may engage in avoidance, aggression,
or other behaviors associated with a defensive posture.
In general terms, a basic postulate of the model being proposed
is that the individual ' s behavior is virtually always aimed at main-
taining an inhibited core affect.
Of course, as depicted by Figure 2 earlier, core affect, as a
function of the limbic system, is considered here a functional
element of the model
.
Being present at all times, core affect performs two major
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reciprocal functions, among its many effects.
One function is its own activation by a cortical input sym-
bolic of danger. In terms of the activation of core affect, it
should be recalled from earlier material that the cognitive element
symbolic of danger may vary according to its nature. That is, its
effect may vary with the severity of the danger symbolized. The
more severe the danger the stronger the effect of the cognitive
element symbolic of danger and the more intense the core affect.
Obviously, such an activation would elicit a defensive reaction
proportional to the intensity of the core affect. It should be
emphasized that the defensive reaction of the organism, while directed
at the environment, is basically only a reaction to core affect.
The strength of the cognitive input to the limbic system sym-
bolic of danger invariably would determine the intensity of the
core affect. However, as postulated earlier, the cognitive value
of the element, which may by high or low, would not matter with a
very strong symbolism of danger. In other words, a strong element
of danger within the scope of awareness, that is, in the highest-
order cognitive matrix, would probably elicit the same intensity of
core affect when out of active perceptual awareness.
An anecdotal example may be considered to illustrate the
concept
.
At about the age of seven years, a boy was bitten by a
very vicious dog under ususual circumstances. As recalled, some
relatives and friends decided to give a surprise birthday party to
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one of the cousins at a neighbor's home. These neighbors had two
dogs with very ferocious reputations which were supposed to have
been locked in one of the rooms during the party.
On the day of the party, the seven year old boy was charged
with bringing in the cake shortly after the party was to start.
Being as apprehensive as most boys his age would be, he asked if
the dogs were present as he entered carrying the cake into the
living room. He was assured that the dogs were locked away and
encouraged not to be afraid.
However, one of the dogs was lying under the sofa and when the
boy was in the center of the living room, it jumped up and dug its
fangs on the boy's left forearm. Naturally, the boy was taken by
surprise and was very scared, but did not drop the cake. After his
arm was treated, the party went on as scheduled. Be that as it may,
it is very likely that the boy did not eat cake that day.
Many years later the same person, now an adult, reportedly
did not like cake because it tasted dry and too sweet. In addition,
he felt somewhat anxious at weddings and birthdays for no reason
at all, and did not like parties with more than a few participants
or if they were noisy. He also was afraid of dogs with certain
appearances
.
The point in the process of being made is that cognitive elements
from that early experience still elicited years later an intensity
in core affect equal or close to the level associated with the ini-
tial experience.
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It should be noted that the cognitive element symbolic of
danger need only to have a vague connection with danger or with a
previous threatening experience to elicit core affect.
It is derived from the above that the model being proposed
considers the representation of ongoing experience being metaphor-
ically linked to any previous associated information. That is, due
to the extremely associative properties of the cognitive processes,
there is a constant integration of new experience with stored infor-
mation. An example of the above is the many associations that a
concept, such as a ball would have. It is clear one may spend
considerable time before running out of verbal associations to
such an object, depending on age and experience. That is, for a
small child, the number of associations which could be obtained
would be much smaller than for the average adult.
Now, besides being activated by cognitive elements symbolic
of danger, the other major reciprocal function of core affect being
considered here is its influence on the cognitive matrices repre-
senting ongoing experience.
The way the latter is construed is that once core affect is
activated it will reach the cortex in the same form that it is pro-
duced. That is, as a sensation of danger. This sensation of danger
is envisaged to integrate with the cognitive matrices representing
ongoing experience.
As such then, the associative power of the cortex would auto-
matically try to adjust the cognitive matrices to the affective
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input. The resulting integration is a cognitive interpretation
of ongoing experience in accordance with the intensity of core
affect.
Such an automatic interpretation will be of a threatening
nature, that is, symbolic of danger, even when the person is not
aware of it. The threatening content will in turn become a threat-
ening input to the limbic system and elicit another increase in
core affect with the resulting defensive body reactions and behavi-
oral maneuvers.
The last increase in core affect will again in turn color the
cognitive matrices with a shade of threat, and the cycle would repeat
itself.
The latter is what is proposed to happen when someone feels
very threatened. The content of his thinking will reflect an anti-
cipation of adverse circumstances. The negative thinking would
increase the feeling of threat, which in turn, would intensify
negative thinking and so on in a reciprocal cycle.
These core affect reciprocal functions of being activated by
symbolic danger and of influencing the cognitive matrices to a
negative interpretation of the environment are always in operation.
The previous example of the dog bite considers elicitation
of core affect by cognitive elements symbolic of danger from earlier
experience
.
However, core affect clearly can be elevated to varying degrees
even when it is obvious that cognitive elements suggestive of danger
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are not present.
In the latter case, the elevated sensation of danger would
initially direct the subjective quality of the interpretation of
the environment to a negative one. Also the reciprocal core affect
functions between the cortex and the limbic system would become
acti ve.
A good extreme example of the latter case is that of a paranoid
psychotic state.
In the case of paranoid psychosis, the intensity of core affect
is chronically very high. Typically, the sensation of danger will
influence a subjective interpretation of the environment as threat-
ening. This, in turn, will increase the intensity of core affect
and the reciprocal activity will continue unless interrupted.
This reciprocal activity of core affect is what to a great
extent appears to maintain the continuous defensive posture in
paranoid psychosis and other states of emotional upheaval.
Without question, in paranoid psychosis the person has a sub-
jective feeling of imminent danger. However, unless explored, such
a feeling of pending harm remains out of awareness. The problem
in this case is that the person will interpret the environment as
harmful. However, since the person's cognitive matrices are, as
will be discussed later, in a state of disorganization, the inter-
pretation of the environemnt is idiosyncratic.
A particular clinical example which comes to mind is that of a
young man, who worked as a dishwasher in a restaurant. He used to
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recall that every time a waitress came into the kitchen, he believed
she was going to kill him. Therefore, he felt the need to attack
first. Fortunately, despite this person not going through a complete
course of psychotherapy he gained enough awareness of the mechanism
for his suspiciousness to be able to reduce the incidence of the
paranoid thinking within a short period of time.
It should be emphasized again that the cognitive representation
of ongoing experience and the influence of core affect on the cog-
nitive matrices are considered here to be integrated into a global
function.
The analog representation of ongoing experience has to be con-
sidered a global function with metaphorical properties because
behavior is essentially metaphorical, according to our earlier
definition of the term.
The functional metaphor. The metaphorical nature of the functional
representation of ongoing experience considered here does not allow
for the active separation of its components. However, it would be
heuristically convenient to divide the observed unitary function of
ongoing experience into the following three major functional aspects,
(a) The cognitive aspect would comprise any and all verbal and
nonverbal representational functions, including sensorimotor repre-
sentations and imagery, (b) The affective aspect would be consti-
tuted by the intensity of core affect, (c) The behavioral aspect
would be constituted by the mechanisms which mediate all verbal and
105
nonverbal behavioral activity.
Thus, in essence, this heuristic division assigns to the cog-
nitive aspect the responsibility for the representation of ongoing
experi ence
.
The affective aspect would be responsible for the subjective
quality of ongoing experience, while the behavioral aspect would
be responsible for effecting the functional representation of ongoing
experience.
The artificial division of the global representation of experi-
ence into three major functional aspects is depicted by Figure 4
on the following page.
The illustration portrays the global functional representation
of ongoing experience at the minimum finite period of time during
which such a representation could exist. In other words, it depicts
it as if static in time. Such a global representation at finite
time T has been denominated a functional metaphor .
That is, it is the briefest period in time during which a par-
ticular metaphorical or global representation of ongoing experience
can exist.
The latter means that ongoing experience is composed of succes-
sive functional metaphors. In analogy, this process could be concep-
tualized much like the effect produced by the extremely fast projec-
tion of the successive frames of a film.
Figure 4 depicts the functional metaphor Rs of stimulus S at
finite time T.
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The shaded area X represents the portion of our environment
upon which the focus of active perceptual awareness is placed. That
is, the highest-order cognitive matrix. As indicated earlier, it
should be recalled that active perceptual awareness is limited by
the person's sensory range.
Areas P obviously represent that portion of the environment
out of the range of the person's active perceptual awareness. How-
ever, as postulated earlier, such portions of the stimul us are repre-
sented in the functional metaphor in terms of higher-order matrices.
As a reminder, the representation Rs of areas P and X is an
integrated functional representation. Therefore, the representation
of these portions of the stimulus cannot be distinguishable from
each other except in terms of the focus of awareness.
The functional metaphor Rs has been artificially divided
into three functional aspects.
Aspect A is the stochastic cognitive representation of S. That
is, the integrated sum of the stochastic functional input of all
the cognitive elements from the stimulus S.
Functional aspect E corresponds to the sum. of the core affect
associated with the cognitive elements of stimulus S.
Finally, the third functional aspect (BMP) is composed by the
behavior-mediating processes used for the expression of the functional
metaphor. Two of these processes are speech and sensorimotor acti-
vity.
Particular efforts have been made in the illustration to empha-
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size the reciprocal interaction or integration of the elements of
one functional aspect with the elements of the other through the
synthesis of the functional metaphor.
To review, the global representation of ongoing experience
is considered by this model to be essentially a cognitive function.
That is, any experiential event is represented in the brain in terms
of a functional analog or reflection.
Such a functional reflection is construed in terms of the inte-
gration of stochastic systems of neuronal networks into cognitive
matrices. These cognitive matrices are considered to occur at very
high levels of associative integration. The latter means that they
possess metaphorical properties, such as meaning.
Moreover, these cognitive matrices are considered to be the
ultimate products of the integration of previous and current experi-
ence.
However, the functional reflection of ongoing experience receives
a constant limbic input in the form of a sensation of danger or core
affect. When any of the cognitive elements of the functional analog
of ongoing experience is symbolic of danger, there is an increase in
the intensity of core affect which is commensurate with the degree
of symbol ic danger.
As a result, a defensive reaction of anxiety and defensive
behaviors are displayed through the activity of the behavior-medi-
ating processes.
To continue, it is surely difficult to conceive ongoing experi-
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ence as frozen in time. However, with some imagination, one may
visualize the notion of the functional metaphor if a situation
requiring swift defensive action is considered as an example.
An example of the latter is the quick reaction one may have
to a sudden violent noise. The delay in response in this case is
very small. It seems at times that threatening auditory stimuli
elicit core affect and defensive responses quicker than threatening
visual stimuli.
A similar situation which comes to mind is that of driving on
a two-lane highway and noticing that an automobile coming in the
opposite direction is suddenly swerving towards our side of the road.
In this example, at the precise moment the cognitive element sym-
bolic of danger, the swerving of the car, becomes part of the func-
tional metaphor there is a virtually simultaneous increase in core
affect and almost simultaneously the release of a defensive behavior
is initiated. In other words, the cognitive representation, the core
affect, and the defensive reaction all occur automatically.
The latter is of particular significance because it means that
thinking is ordinarily automatic. That is, the associative processes
of the brain integrate information into cognitive matrices constantly
on its own.
It appears reasonable to consider that a person does not actual-
ly think, but that the brain does. That is, the brain performs all
the associative activity necessary to produce what one may understand
as ongoing experience. The latter becomes more real when one consi-
no
ders that ordinarily the person thinks and behaves according to the as-
sociative output of the brain. Such a situation exists, for example,
when the person uses behavioral maneuvers to decrease core affect whi ch
entertain a particular cognitive interpretation of the environment of
of oneself.
In this case, the person does not realize that the cognitive
interpretation in question is an automatic defensive maneuver which
is ordinarily out of volitional control.
An example of the above may be observed in the reasons for a
dislike for cake in the dog bite anecdote discussed earlier.
In that case, the person stated not liking cake because of i t tast-
ing dry and being too sweet. However, the truth was that thenotionof
cake had a symbolic value of danger of which the person was not aware.
As such, the cognitive analog of ongoing experience was injected
in that case with an elevated intensity in core affect. Then, by
means of its associative properties, the brain produced the necessary
cognitive formulation to validate the core affect in context with the
current experiential event. The net result was that the intensity of
core affect was reduced by the avoidance of the threat symbolized by
the notion of cake. The reasons given to avoid eating cake were cog-
nitive formulations of the concept in terms of core affect.
Theoretically, any experience, even the briefest one, consists
of more than one functional metaphor. It is also postulated that
the functional metaphor changes from one instant to another. This
change is considered to depend on the variability in the cognitive
elements and core affect, and the feedback from the functional pro-
cesses which mediate behavior.
That is, the global representation of ongoing experience at
any given instant is a metaphorical reflection of the internal and
external environment. As any part of the environment changes, the
functional metaphor changes also. As a matter of fact, it is pos-
tulated that the functional metaphor is never the same. In order
for it to be the same from one instant to another, both the entire
organism and the surrounding environment would have to be in a state
of suspended animation.
One of the apparent reasons for a different functional metaphor
from one representational instant to another is that the synthesized
representation of ongoing experience is historical.
In other words, previous experience integrates with every new
experience, creating an ever increasing net of complex associations.
The global nature of the functional metaphor may be artificially
broken down also into two representational components. As illustrated
in Figure 4 above, one of these is the representation of that portion
of the stimulus (X) which is the focus of active perceptual awareness.
The other one is the representation of that portion of the stimulus
(P) which is not the focus of awareness.
Once again, given the brief duration of the functional metaphor
in ongoing experience, it is necessary to consider a whole experi-
ential event in the formulation of the two representational functions
classified above.
Obvious,,, one representation rule ,„ both cases (f ^
t
rePreSentati
°"
iS
'
fUnCti °-' of the total penceiv-
able environment.
Another rule is that in both cases a „
_
elicited by the cognitive elements of such a representation
which are symbolic of danger.
However, H connect1on with ^^ ,„ ^ case rf^
Potion of the stimulus (X) focused upon by active perceptual aware-
ness the events symbolic of danger may be ohvious or may he con-
ceptually associated with part of the perception.
On the other hand, in the case of that portion of the stilus
(P) *fch is out of the focus of active perceptua! awareness the
elements commonly considered as symbolic of danger would invaria b l y
be out of awareness. They also could be hidden within a subliminal
^nocuous element in the for™ of a conceptual association.
The cases where the elements symbolic of danger are inherently
threatening, both when they are ohvious and then they are out of
awareness, have heen considered earlier and follow straightforward
formulations. Therefore, the example to be furnished further ahead
only aims at formulating the case where the element symbolic of
danger is hidden within a harmless element either within or outside
of active perceptual awareness.
It should be noted that in the case of elements inherently
symbolic of danger which are beyond the scope of awareness, they
are postulated to become obvious if focused upon. An applicable
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example is the anecdotal situation of the flat Hn t tlre considered ear-
during the discussion of the cognitive prices
The cognitive matrices responsible for „euronal
and the mechanism operating i„ the preceding situation have teen
considered before and do not need further elaboration ^
0«*mmy, It ,s clear * mt cogn1tjve
of danger always elicit an elevation in core affect. The latter
Happens regardless of whether they are obvious, i„herentl y dangerous
but outside of awareness, or hidden within a harass element in the
form of a conceptual association.
It appears plain that if a harness cognitive element elicits
an elevation in core affect it is because such an element could be
associated with a threatening experience which originally elicited
a similar elevation in core affect. On the other hand, it only may
be associated with another harmless cognitive element which in turn
may be associated with an original threatening experience.
The latter implies that the association is cognitive rather
than affective, because it would be a cognitive element which would
have a particular elevation of core affect linked to it.
Therefore, even stimuli which may only resemble or be vaguely
associated with the original stimulus, will elicit a similar eleva-
tion in core affect to that elicited by the original stimulus.
However, it appears that for the latter to occur, the core
affect elevation originally elicited must be substantial in the
case of a single experiential event, and less than substantial in
the case of a datively continuous threatening situation
The following clinical exampie iHustrates the foregoing assump-
tions
.
The Person in this case was a married woman slightly less than
sessions. She confined of constant severe disabling anxiety
shortness of breath, fear of he i ghts
, fear of ^ J^fear of falling asleep at night, fear of riding as a passenger in
a car, disrupted family relations, constant iHnesses reguirin 9
freguent hospitalizations, freguent episodes of hyperventilation,
and many other complaints.
Her history showed deprivation in ma ny areas. However, when
she was prepubertal, as a punishment, her stepfather allegedly
Placed her in a deep hole in the ground, for a period she described
to have been overnight. She recalled the incident and found it
very distasteful to talk about it, but could not see any relation-
ship between that incident and the circumstances which brought her
to therapy.
A particular memory of the incident was about calling for her
mother to rescue her and not obtaining a response.
Clearly, the core affectinthis case was very intense. Also
it was found out that a core affect elevation in this case was eli-
cited by any stimulus which in any way was associated with her early
experience. That is, even the vaguest similarity between the stimulus
and the physical properties of a deep hole in the group elicited a
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-ction of anxiety.
« height, descent, darkness, and s0 fonh
,
also any criticism.
The most extreme example of such distant associations was a
severe increase in anxiety as a result of an almost imperceptible
elevation of the door leading toahall„ay from hen hospital
The connection of the stilus to hen anxiety was discovered
by chance upon exploration of her description of the door as being
"up there".
Obviously, the preceding observations are based on many other
findings during the course of therapy. Nevertheless, it appears
that the lifted discussion of the clinical vignette suffices to
convey the intended concepts.
Vet, to one's consternation, the clinical example above presents
a complicating element. The complicating element in this case is the
chronicity of the elevation in core affect.
The problem here is that with a chronic elevation of core affect
considerably above its normal range, there would be necessarily an au-
tomatic and unwitting predisposition to perceive the environment as
threatening and to react in all likelihood with maladaptive defensive
maneuvers
.
Therefore, it appears likely that there would be an increased
sensitivity to threatening stimuli. This way, even completely harm-
less stimuli could be perceived as aversive, and of course, vague cogni-
tive associations to earl ier harmful stimuli would be more apt to bemade.
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A" 1n.port.nt point here Is that previous,, aversive sti rau ,i
which under normal circumstances would not elicit a defensive re.-
tion, would in this case.
The preceding may he illustrated with the earlier example of
the dog 5i te. In that case, the individuai
longer apprehensive about dogs. Nonetheless, when his oore affect
or insecurity is elevated, even if unaware of such ap ^
core affect, his apprehension about certain dogs may appear again
upon contact with the animals.
This implies that some of the intensity in core affect which
was linked to the stimulus before could be elicited anew due to the
Person's enhanced insecurity in the presence of residual threatening
cognitive elements associated with dogs. In this case, with the
increased core affect the reciprocal activity between the cortex and
the limbic system considered earlier is activated. That is, the
stimulus, again perceived as aversive, will in turn elicit another
increase in core affect, which in turn will further induce construc-
tion of the stimulus as threatening, and so forth.
At any rate, the foregoing consideration of the operational
aspects of the functional metaphor raises the need for additional
discussion of the phenomenological effects of core affect on the
global representation of ongoing experience. That is, what is the
cognitive interpretation of the environment as a function of the
intensity of core affect.
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^liti^e__fjce_of_j^^
Thprp •S«. e e is no mystery at this point
about the injection of a sense of danger into th.r e cognitive matrices
by core affect.
Also, it is not surprising that a person raay perceive the en-
vironment as harmful when therp i« a „ , .n e is a real danger present. After all
one sees this sort of thing often enough.
It is perhaps somewhat more difficult to conceive the person
as being affected by a mostly undetectable sensation of danger and
reacting to it without even knowing it.
Similarly unpalatable is to contrue the associative processes
of the brain as automatically trying to make sense out of such a
sensation of threat on their own, as it was proposed earlier.
To complicate matters, the defensive behaviors associated with
such a sensation are considered here to be mostly learned patterns
of response, to a great extent also out of volitional control,
and their intention to be mostly out of the realm of awareness.
Even though ordinarily one is unaware of core affect, its pre-
sence becomes evident in the behavior of the individual. Such a
behavior is always aimed at seeking a sense of comfort, safety,
control, competence, fulfillment, and the like. These attempts at
achieving a reduction in core affect are, proportionately, as
intense as the elevation in core affect.
In the course of these attempts to cope with core affect, the
individual tends to interpret the environment in context with the
circumstances of the moment. Invariably, such a cognitive inter-
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pretation is influenced by the spo.p iy we ense of vulnerability characteris-
tic of core affect.
Of course, the higher the vulnerabHity the more extreme is
the interpretation of the surrnimHinn amc b ouna g environment.
A clinical example recalled where core affect was very intense
'* 6Xtremely a " 9ry react ''°"
•* young woman to not finding
a vacant parking space on her way to an appointment.
Clearly, rage is a defensive reaction, which incidentally,
appears to be closely associated with anxiety.
In the latter case, the woman construed the unavailability
of a space to park her automobile as the cause of her anger because
she was concerned about being late for her appointment. As it
happened, however, she had ample time.
A less dramatic example is the clinical vignette of a woman who
would react with great anger and accuse a male acquaintance of being
discourteous because he would happen to look at his wrist watch and
excuse himself because he was late for a meeting. The same thing
happened with the therapist.
In the preceding cases, the women in question were suffering
from an elevated sense of vulnerability or core affect, but were
not aware of it.
Nevertheless, they interpreted their circumstances according
to how threatened they were, validating the sensation of danger
with elements in the environment.
Naturally, they did not plan to react that way. The associa-
119
rcum-
tive processes of the brain took r^rp ,f * *ca e of integrating the ci
stances with the need to reduce the core affect.
No question about it, the development of the cluster of defen-
sive maneuvers to cope with core affect must be influenced by cul-
tural, socioeconomic, developmental, and many other factors. That
is, no two persons try to quell core affect in exactly the same
manner.
However, the interpretation of the environment as a function
of the intensity of core affect is considered here as universal.
This interpretation may be associated with avoiding acknowledgment
of core affect, actively reacting to it, or passively validating it.
That is, the cognitive interpretation of the environment may at dif-
ferent times constitute the defensive maneuver or be part of it.
The idea of people interpreting their environment in terms of
negative affect is not new and has been considered to be the cause
for depression (Beck, 1976).
In the latter case, the person is considered to have a negative
view of himself, to interpret ongoing experience in a negative fa-
shion, and to have a negative view of the future.
The activation of this combination of cognitive factors is
considered to be the cause for the signs and symptoms of depression
in conjunction with an idiosyncratic way of processing information
(Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).
However, while these cognitive patterns appear to be considered
above as the primary step in the depressive syndrome, their source
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is stated as undetermined.
According to the mode, of hlTOnbeh«v1orbein9
cognitive patterns constitute a passive vacation of core affect
thrown the cognitive interpretation of the environment as a func-
tion of a state of vulnerability.
A measure of core affmrt since core »ff^+
.
i affect may be construed as an
unwitting sensation of threat, the cognitive interpretation of an
event could contain events associated with a particular
,evel of
subliminal apprehension.
Two modes in which those cognitive elements can exist are in
tenns of an increase or a decrease in the intensity of core affect.
In other words, they could exist in terms of either an aversive or
a Pleasant interpretation of the surrounding circumstances.
Since the need for safety is considered to drive the person
to seek nurturing interpersonal interactions, it would be useful to
examine core affect in terms of the aversive or pleasant cognitive
constructions made during such interactions.
It is postulated that any situation will be construed as plea-
sant it if satisfies the need for safety or nurturance. That is,
if core affect is reduced.
Likewise, a situation will be construed as aversive if it
increases the level of core affect or if it does not reduce it as
needed.
The neuropsychological mechanisms for these core affect opera-
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tions were considered earlier and it shall not be elaborated upon
them at this point.
To the case in point, it should be observed that if a situation
II construed as either peasant or unpleasant certain beliefs and
expectations could be foreseen according to the degree of core affect
-tensity associated with such a situation. Obviously, core affect
by definition a subli.ina, sensation of threat, may be identified
as an anticipation of ha™ when it is heightened or as an ant,cipa-
tion of safety or nurturance when it is reduced, as the respective
effects of two given situations. The latter would also be affected
by the prevalent baseline of core affect unrelated to the situation.
Depending on its intensity, core affect could act as a predisposing
factor or catalyst for the appreciation of any situation as either
adverse or favorable.
At any rate, when safety or harm is anticipated it is reasonable
to expect that such an anticipation would be based on the factors
surrounding the particular situation in which the individual finds
himself. As such, attributions are made to such a situation in con-
nection with the anticipation of either harm or nurturance. One of
those attributions could be how aversive or favorable the situation
may seem to the individual as a measure of either the anticipation
of harm or the anticipation of safety. In other words, what are the
foreseen consequences of the situation for the person.
Another attribution which could be made in the preceding situa-
tion is the level of anticipation itself. That is, the degree to
which the situation favors the reali,»t,-„ *n ization of an anticipation of
either harm or safety. I n still other terms th« *•, the estimated chance
of the foreseen consequences actually taking place.
Not it seems that one Way to evaluate the intensity of core
affect in a negative situation and the decrease of such an inten-
sity in a positive situation, is ,„ terms 0 f the perceived conse-
quences fro, the situation and the estimated likelihood of their
actual occurrence.
In other words, how threatening or nurturing the situation is
perceived as and to what extent it is reasonable to perceive it
as such.
The following preliminary experiment illustrates the relation-
ship between the two preceding notions while assessing the eleva-
tion or reduction in core affect.
The experiment considers events or situations which are based
on interpersonal interaction. It uses two subjects whose core affect
is assumed to be at subclinical intensities.
In the ensuing experiment, the two subjects, one 19-year-old
(Subject A) and one 21-year-old (Subject B) female college students
were each asked to complete two questionnaires every day for 30 con-
secutive days. One of the questionnaires was to be answered in connec-
tion with each subject's strongest positive emotion for the day.
The second questionnaire was to be answered in connection with each
subject's strongest negative emotion for the day. The questionnaires
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used were an amended version for Subject A, and an intact version
for Subject B of a questionnaire previous,, reported as a tool of
personaiity research (Epstein, in press). [t should be^
clarified that the emotions reported in the questionnaires are those
considered primary emotions, such as^ ^ ^^
wh,cb are considered to be defensive maneuvers and not core affect
The format of the questionnaires was the same in all instances
In essence, each subject was supposed to write narratives describing
the situation which elicited each of the reported emotions and to
rate, using a 5-point scale multiple variables which included con-
current emotions, duration and intensity of the emotions reported,
and so forth. Of all the variables, only four were used in this
experiment and were the focus of the experiment to the exclusion
of all other variables.
Of these four variables, one that was rated by both subjects
was the oMecliyJt^ of the interpretation of the subjective stimulus
eliciting reported emotions. That is, how reasonable their reactions
were in relation to the stimulus from completely subjective (coded
as 1) to completely objective (coded as 5).
For Subject A, one of two other variables considered was the
rating of the effect of foreseen consequences as a result of the
situation to which the emotional reaction was directed, from no con-
sequences at all (coded as 1 ) to either extremely favorable or ex-
tremely adverse consequences (coded as 5), depending on which ques-
tionnaire was being completed according to the type of emotion being
124
reported.
The other variable considered for Subject A was the rating of
the probability, of those foreseen consciences actua, ly occurring
should be noted that whatever the consequences foreseen were, the,
affected the subject's rating of the s*. That is, besides probab, y
being an invasion of privacy.
For Subject B, in addition to the rating of the objectivity
variable mentioned above, the si^icance of the situation eliciting
the emotional reaction reported constituted a variable and was to be
rated from trivial (coded as 1) to very important (coded as 5). The
rating of the significance of the situation eliciting the emotion
reported was worded in the instrument as the degree to which the
outcome of the situation would have important implications for the
subject's future happiness or well-being. In the latter context,
the rating of significance was considered to be approximately equi-
valent to the rating of the effect of foreseen consequences with the
probability of their occurrence, but in a less objective manner. For
this reason, the rating of significance was used with one subject
(Subject B), and the rating of the effect of foreseen consequences
and the probability of their actual occurrence were used with the
other subject (Subject A).
To summarize, both sets of two questionnaires for either positive
or negative situations were identical, except for the rating of
125
UMlicance for Subject B and not to. Subject A, and for the „«„
° f ^ effec^fjoxesee^^o^es and their orobabijit^f
-curcence for Subject A, but not for Subject B. Thus, the only
variable considered for both subjects was the rating of their object,.
VU* in their interpretation of the subjective stilus eliciting
a reported emotion.
The results of this pilot experiment show that as it would pro-
bably be expected, both subjects were somewhat increasingly more
objective in the interpretation of the stimuli for both negative and
positive emotions over the 30-day period. However, Subject B rated
the objectivity for stimuli eliciting positive emotions much higher
than for stimuli eliciting negative emotions, while the opposite
applied to Subject A. A much smaller discrepancy between the rating
of the objectivity for stimuli eliciting positive emotions and the
rating of the objectivity for stimuli eliciting negative emotions
was observed for Subject A than for Subject B.
Although Subject A was more consistent in the rating of objecti-
vity for both negative and positive subjective stimuli that Subject B,
both subjects showed mean ratings of objectivity at visibly higher
levels during the last 18 days than during the first 12 days.
While the rating of objectivity increased for both subjects
during the 30-day period, a different pattern emerged for the rating
of foreseen consequences and their likelihood of occurring, and for
the rating of significance for Subjects A and B, respectively.
As may be seen in Figure 5 on the next page, the mean ratings
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ng
»y Subject B of the significance of the situation editing the
emotional reaction show a different pattern for each of hoth the
negative and positive emotions during the 30-day period.
I" contradistinction to the rating of significance by Subject
B, the rating of the effects of foreseen consequences and the „ ta
Hhood of their occurence by Subject A followed a visible decreasi
pattern for both the positive and the negative situation, as depict!
by F,gures 6 and 7 in the ensuing pages.
Figures 6 and 7 display the patterns of the mean ratings for
Subject A of the effect of foreseen consequences and the probability
of their actual occurrence during the 30-day period.
The foreseen consequences as a result of situations at which
particular emotional reactions were directed were rated progressively
as less favorable or less adverse during the 30-day period. Similar-
ly, the probability of the actual occurrence of such consequences
were also rated progressively lower during the same period. It
should be noted that the correlations between the rating of the effect
of foreseen consequences and the probability of the consequences
actually occurring were r • +
.77, £ < .001 for the positive situa-
tions, and r = + .67, £ <.001 for the negative situations.
It is interesting to note that Subject A consistently rated the
negative consequences and the probability of occurrence higher than
their positive counterpart.
While it is difficult to generalize from the preceding results,
it is clear that both subjects became increasingly more objective
oto
UJ
o
z
UJ
o
UJ
00
z
o
o
CO
<
CD
o
cc
a
_j
VCD
CC<
UJ CO
>o
ce
0.
h-ffi
<<
ct m
uj O
occ
OQ-
2
>UJ
t— CD
x<
-o
_itr
ooa
>-UJ
LUCO
s<
UJCC
ccO
H>
X <
LU u.
CO
>
<
n
*ct
So
CN
>
<
PI
to
o
O
cc
UJ
a
>-
<
o
I
10
to
UJ
o
z
UJ
OD
za
UJ
CO
z
>>
+->
-Q
fO
-O
O
i-
Q.
CD
4-*
CJ
ra
U
00 CD
aj '•—}
u -Q
CD
ZJ
CT
<D JO
CO
to
o c
u o
c +->
O) 1X3
CD
in
CD
S- to
o
CD
>
O +->
>, to
o
a.
s~
CD
>
QJ
00 O)
u
CD cC CD
i-
O CJ
o
cn o
+-> ro
03 zs
a: +->
u
fO
CD
CD CD
S_ XI
rj
-m
cn
r- <4-
LL. O
129
o
5
o
UJ
-I
>m
a<
aim
>o
a.
a
-IUJ
UJ_I
i- to
<<
trto
mo
Qtr
Oa
5
>UJ
h-tfl
x<
OtD
-o
-itr
<
m
O
cr
a.
2
to
UJ
o >
z H
UJ j
a B
UJ <
to m
z O
O cr
o q.
m
>-
-IUJ
WtO
UJUJ
cr>
><<
UJ
V)
Q
O
cr
UJ
a
>
<
Q
I
CD
CO
UJ
J
>
V)
UJ'
O'
5
to
UJ
O
z
UJ
OD
20
UJ
01
Z
o
o
u
O)
'•"3
-Q
=3
CU 00
-Q
X)
c m
rO c
o
00 •!—
u m
C =3
CJJ +->
=3
-r-
CT Ol
qj
on ai
e >
O -r-
O +->
fO
e cn
QJ QJ
CD c
to
QJ C
•(-
o
Ct-
o
o a>
i_
i-
4-j =>
•r- u
i- u
cu o
>
QJ r—
to ra
13
QJ 4->
-C U
tf- S_
O >-
QJ
CD -C
C -4->
+-> ti-
ro O
or
>,
+->
QJ -Q
=3 -O
ai o
r- S_
Lt- CL
130
in their interpretation of subjective stimuli w1th time
, with Subject
B reporting higher levels of objectivity, especially for positive
si tuation.
With these high levels of objectivity reported, it cou ld be
expected that the rating of significance (see Figure 5) „ou,d fo, low
the same decreasing patterns as the rating of the severity of fore-
seen consequences and the probability of their actual occurrence (see
Figures 6 and 7) given that they appear to be similar parameters of
anticipated outcome. However, from the data available, it emerges
that the combined rating of the severity of foreseen consequences and
the probability of their occurrence, while a very ,i ke ly indirect
and relative measure of core affect, is not the same as the rating
of the significance a particular situation may have for someone in
terms of that same person's future.
The combination of the ratings of the effect of foreseen conse-
quences and the probability of their occurrence may be considered a
relative measure of core affect. However, it could also serve as a
tool for making adjustments to our interpretation of the environment
through the cognitive reformulation of our interaction with such an
envi ronment.
In the case of Subject A, that appears to have been the case,
and it is noteworthy that Subject A reported to have continued the
same evaluative process long after having completed the experiment,
especially for negative emotional states.
In connection with the preceding, it should be noted that cog-
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th
n
;
t1Ve
— «»- aspects sim.arto themethQd
*• Preceding experfmewt for^ fl ^ ^^ ^in the management of depression a „n + uSS10
" ^ other conditions (Beck et a,.,
1979; Emery, Hollon 8 Bedrosian, 1g8 l).
'tcan be said that conceptual, the preceding
Subject confront her sensation of threat or safety wi
the reality of her environment.
Such a process appears to have produced a gradual reduction
-
the intensity with which she perceived her environment. That is
a .ore neutral cognitive interpretation of the environment.
^ results of this latter experiment endorse the notion of
Positive emotions being also mediated by core affect, because they
appear to be associated with a strong reduction i„ such a core affect
as a result of an environmental factor.
in tune with our observations in this section, it should be noted
that during the period of clinical observation leading to this disser-
tation, the writer has found the confrontation of core affect with
environmental reality a very effective too, in obtaining fast improve-
ment in a variety of clinical symptoms. The reduction in symptoms in
the latter cases have been accompanied by a complementary change in
the cognitive interpretation of the environment.
Meaning While the notions surrounding the concept of meaning have
been covered, albeit indirectly, in the preceding sections, it would
be convenient to make a distinction between objective and subjective
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meani ng.
Clearly, ascription of meaning is a cognitive formulation of
a Particular object or situation. However, as has been continuously
emphasized, such a formulation is a global function.
Naturally, meaning may be ascribed to anything according to
its intrinsic properties or in terms of many other associations with
or without emotional tone. For instance, a plain square wooden block
may seem just that to some people, to others it may also have plea-
surable or unpleasurable emotional connotations.
Accordingly, objective meaning is considered here to be the
conceptual appreciation which describes the properties of a particu-
lar object, subject, or situation, but devoid of emotional connota-
tion.
On the other hand s ubjective meaning is conceived as the con-
ceptual appreciation which describes the same properties of such an
object, subject or situation, but charged with an affective tone.
Consider for example, a plain black circle on a white back-
ground. It is quite unlikely that the meaning ascribed to such a
circle would be less than objective according to our definition.
Not quite the same thing happens when one looks at the "faces"
on Figure 8 on the following page.
In this case, one may perceive the face at the bottom right
of the illustration somewhat friendlier than its diagonal counter-
part. That is, the face on the upper left may be perceived as gloat-
ing and perhaps as a little sinister. Although, there may be many
133
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other ways of perceiving the drawings.
The point is that there is a difference in the appreciation of
the faces. The appreciation of one of the faces is more negative
than that of the other.
The broken lines on the illustration have been added to illus-
trate the fact that the appreciation is global. Considering the
number of cells which the intersecting broken lines make, the elements
changing the affective tone of the perception constitute a little
less than 5% of the face area.
Similarly, the objective or concrete meaning of an object or
situation may change to a more subjective meaning under circumstances
increasing or decreasing the intensity of core affect.
For example, for one person automobiles may have meaning in
terms of their physical properties and of other associations not
particularly emotionally charged. The same person, however, could
later construe automobiles as threatening objects given circumstances
in which such an emotional shift could occur, like a near-death ex-
perience in an automobile accident. Obviously, in the latter secon-
dary instance, the notion of automobiles would be permeated by a
negative or unpleasant affective tone.
To explain the change in the example above, one may recall that
ongoing experience could be considered to be functionally represented
from instant to instant i n global cognitive terms. That is, each
instant of experience may be a cognitive instant historically associ-
ated with other cognitive instants through a stochastic neuropsycholo-
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"- " ^ -e affect which is ccpW
tary to the cognitive instant.
Thus, in terms of the example of the automobile, the object
'
would be cognitively represented in the brain in t-ho«.ne D the same way before
and after the accident. However, the affect associated with that
cognnive representation wouid he different after the accident and
the object would be appreciated differently.
In other words, since the person is the same, the cognitive
representation of the stimulus would virtually be the same in both
situations, except that after the accident there would be a particu-
lar intensity of affective discomfort associated with the latter
situation, creating different beliefs about the automobile and/or
related activities. Therefore, the basic change before and after
the accident would have occurred in the quality and intensity of
the affective tone, understood as part of the ongoing experience.
That is, the automobile or related activities may now be understood
to be threatening objects.
It appears reasonable to suggest that the quality of the affect
associated with any cognitive instant would be the factor determining
the meaningfulness of that same cognitive instant, that is, pleasur-
able or unpleasurable. This affective meaningfulness which an object
or situation may have for one person could be called subjective
(affective) meaning.
Thus, in order to change the subjective meaning of that instant,
its affective complement has to change while the cognitive represen-
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tatlon may re.ain virtually the same, but „ow understood in terms
of the new affective complement and different set of beliefs.
mmiMMmfm. Any elevation in core affect may be accom-
pamed by varying degrees of subjective discomfort. However there
my be individuals who do not knowledge any subjective discomfort
despite there being evidence of an elevated core affect in the same
individuals.
Subjective discomfort is considered here to invariably be a
mixture of core affect derivatives and manifestations of anxiety,
in varying degrees of one or the other.
By definition, it could be perceived as an uncomfortable sen-
sation characterized by a mixture of manifestations of anxiety and
feelings, such as visceral discomfort, apprehension, uneasiness, a
feeling that something is wrong, and so forth.
It appears that whenever subjective discomfort is negated by
the person, one is apt to observe other manifestations of anxiety
and symptoms such as pain, headache, and rationalization. It appears
such individuals are very distant from their own feelings.
Attitude. There is no question according to our view, that the
attitude a person may display toward another individual, object, or
situation is influenced by the intensity of that person's own core
affect. It must be reminded that the core affect in this case remains
much out of the realm of awareness.
In such a case, the subjective meaning someone or something
137
™y have for a person determine the type of behav . Qr such g
Person w„l d i spldy towards the said ^
For example, in the display of prejudice the individual is
directing a hostile and demeaning attack at someone else. This
hostile behavior may be in the form of a verbal or nonverbal action
or in just a thought format.
Prejudice is a particularly good example because it satisfies
the need for safety prompted by core affect in at least two ways.
First, the individual is able to use the maladaptive defensive
maneuver of generic aggression to deal with his own sense of vul-
nerability or core affect. In this case, the cognitive interpre-
'
tation of the victim by the aggressor constitutes a good part of the
defensive behavior in terms of the pejorative allegations about the
victim.
Second, the need for safety is partially satisfied by the support
and justification obtained by the aggressor from the relationship
with other persons displaying the same maladaptive behavior for iden-
tical reasons.
Clearly, in the case of prejudice, the aggressor unwittingly
attempts to decrease his own sensation of incompetence or core affect
at the expense of the victim.
The labels for core affect
. It could hardly pass unnoticed that
throughout the material covered so far, many different nouns have
been used for core affect.
The reason for the latter k m,,*'• t is that according to our concept of
core affect as a primary universal affect all „
. ,.
rr , negative subjective
feebngs are considered core affect derivatives.
That is, feelings of doom, inferiority, incompetence, sadness,
o^ness, help, essness
, worthlessness
,
C°nSternat1 ° ""« Nation, disintegration, guilt
and the endless list of others wnich would foHow are, without excep-ts, manifestations of core affect. Clearly, each different label
«« a cognitive i nterpretat 10n of the sensation of danger according
to circumstances, culture, experience, education, and the l, ke
Conceptually, for example, an actually guilty person is someone
«ho has inflicted intentional harm and will receive commensurate
puni shment.
Naturally, very few of the people who express feelings of guilt
fit that description. That is, they may feel guilty, but the reality
is that they are not.
However, what is important here is that if guilt is explored it
is found to be both a negative interpretation of oneself and an an-
ticipation of punishment or harm, that is, like something adverse is
imminent. Evidently, the similarities between the latter and a
sensation of danger or threat cannot be disregarded.
Perhaps the most flagrant evidence for the synonymous generic
relationship between negative feelings and core affect is that in the
presence of a significant elevation in core affect, the same person
may simultaneously use several different labels to describe how he
139
feels.
AH one has to do to prove this point is to explore the feelings
of someone who is very depressed.
Anjdety_
Hopefully redundant by now, anxiety is to be considered an auto-
matic and ordinary defensive reaction of the organism to an elevation
in core affect.
As recalled from earlier material, anxiety may be defined as a
state of general defensive arousal predominantly mediated by the lim-
bic system and by the reticular formation.
When an elevation in core affect occurs as a result of danger,
fatigue, pain, physiological strain, infection or other pathology,
injury, rejection, loss of support, stress, traumatic experiences
and other innumerable factors, including anxiety itself, a reaction
of anxiety is elicited.
Since core affect is readily increased by the mildest of the
environmental challenges, it is reasonable to expect some anxiety
here and there. Of course, when core affect is at a normal range
whatever tonic anxiety there is would be considered subclinical.
That is, its manifestations are not evident because the general level
or arousal is normal
.
However, when the intensity of core affect goes beyond the nor-
mal range, anxiety gains clinical significance.
According to the model being proposed here, there are two types
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of manifestations of anxiety, physical and functional.
The physical manifestations of anxiety are those produced by
the genera! state of defensive arousa, on physical processes, such
as the cardiovascular system, the muscles, the endocrine system, and
all other physiological mechanisms, except those serving the cogni-
tive functions.
As may be derived from the preceding, the funOn^ manifesta-
tions of anxiety are those occurring at the cognitive level. That
is, they are manifestations of the effects of anxiety on the function-
al integrity of the cognitive matrices.
The severity of the manifestations of anxiety in any case are
proportional to the level of anxiety prompted by the core affect.
One must not forget that anxiety is a unitary concept. It ap-
pears also that anxiety increases and decreases in a sort of inten-
sity gradient. Therefore, it would be difficult to discriminate
between partitions of such a gradient unless the discrimination was
being made between two somewhat distant levels of intensity. Natural-
ly, any fractionation of anxiety or its manifestations into discrete
stages would be arbitrary, albeit necessary for clarity.
Now one may observe that Figure 9 on the following page depicts
the manifestations of anxiety as a gradient in each case. It is
intended for the illustration to show that the higher the level of
anxiety, the more severe the manifestations of anxiety are.
Notice that the functional manifestations of anxiety are assumed
to begin appearing at a moderate level of anxiety. While the physical
141
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manifestations may beqin to annpar »+ a i~y 0 PP e at a low or negligible level of
anxiety.
Naturally, the gradients are theoretical and not absolute. That
means that for any particular person, either type of manifestation
of anxiety may have a slope varying from the theoretical one.
Some individuals tend to display physical manifestations of
anxiety predominantly, while others would tend to be more sensitive
to the effects of anxiety on the cognitive functions.
For example, a person displaying severe physical manifestations
of anxiety may, at the same time, exhibit very mild functional mani-
festations
.
Although less likely, a person exhibiting severe cognitive
(functional) manifestations of anxiety could simultaneously appear
to be suffering from mild to moderate physical manifestations of
anxiety.
The reason for the latter being less likely is that anxiety is
considered here a defensive reaction to core affect. This means,
that its purpose is to activate the tone of the organism for action.
Therefore, its effects would be predominantly aimed at functions
other than cognitive. As a result, a more intense discharge would
be needed for it to begin to affect the cognitive processes beyond
an adaptive increase in alertness.
One reason for a tendency to increased functional effects may
be that some people could have a neural substrate for cognitive
functions which is abnormally sensitive to anxiety.
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Another reason could be that such a cognitive neural substrate
receives an abnormally higher than usual limbic discharge with a
less than comparable discharge to other parts of the body.
In the case where both of the above abnormalities would be
Present, one could imagine the consequences on the cognitive matrices.
A similar situation may exist in terms of physical anxiety in
the case where there is an abnormally high sensitivity of some parts
of the body to anxiety. For example, the cardiovascular and gastro-
intestinal systems in some individuals. However, it is possible,
that just like in the case with functional manifestations of anxiety,
there could also be an abnormally intense limbic discharge affecting
parts of the body below the head.
When the long term consequences of the effects of anxiety on
the stomach, intestines, cardiovascular system, and other organs
of the body are considered, it is not difficult to imagine the dele-
terious changes which have the potential to occur in brain tissue with
functional anxiety of many years duration. Obviously, the constant
bombardment of the cortex by intense arousal for prolonged periods
would likely have generically similar effects to those induced by
chronic anxiety in other tissues.
While it would be unrealistic to enumerate all the manifesta-
tions of anxiety of one type or another, some examples will be given
below in terms of their severity. For the purposes of practicality,
the examples of the physical and functional manifestations of anxiety
are separately considered below. However, it must be reminded that
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both are manifestations of the same general defensive state of arousal
which facilitates behaviors such as aggression and evasive actions.
^^^^ In the mildest range of physical
anxiety, one could include symptoms such as dry mouth, moist palms,
flushed face, mild restlessness, and many others.
The moderate range of physical anxiety may include, among many
others, moderate restlessness and exacerbations of normal physiolo-
gical functions (e.g., increased heart rate).
It appears also convenient to consider less than severe sleep
disturbances as moderate physical manifestations of anxiety. However,
as may be recalled from earlier material, the ascending activating
and inhibiting systems may be associated with the opposite extremes
of cortical arousal. In addition, anxious arousal may be considered
to be in a position to stimulate the ascending activating system,
deactivate the ascending inhibiting system, or override the counter-
balanced activity of both systems. Hence, one would be technically
correct in also considering insomnia as a functional manifestation
of anxiety.
At any rate, insomnia is invariably intimately intertwined with
a cluster of physical manifestations of anxiety. Since it is our
aim to make an arti factual separation of the somatic from the cog-
nitive manifestations of anxiety, sleep disturbances will be included
among the physical manifestations of anxiety.
Among the severe physical manifestation of anxiety one may find,
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for example, severe sleep disturbances aaitat^u , g tation, severe disruption
of Physiological processes, and so forth.
Examples of physical manifestations of anxiety are plentiful
and it would be unnecessary to elaborate further on them.
However, it appears worthwhile to examine a particular clinical
case which shows the direct effect that anxiety may have on the phy-
siology of the body. The case in mind also dramatizes the relation-
ship between core affect and the cognitive interpretation of the
environment and between anxiety and core affect.
The clinical example to be described formed part of a colla-
borative presentation at a medical teaching facility regarding alter-
native therapeutic modalities (Segarra, Note 1).
The subject in this case was a considerably overweight man who
was slightly over 30 years of age. He reportedly was satisfactorily
employed and happily married, and was generally satisfied with him-
self and his life.
Generally speaking, the only major difficulties he could report
were to be suffering from untreated severe essential hypertension
and to be unwilling to take antihypertensive medication. His appre-
hension was so extreme that he would not submit to diagnostic pro-
cedures, such as, an electrocardiogram.
It appeared clear that the man was extremely concerned about
becoming seriously ill while simultaneously being unable to accept
treatment for his hypertension.
He reportedly did not find himself to ordinarily be a nervous
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person. However hp wa<: ^h- n n • ,, s taking an anxiolytic at the time, which may
have had something to do with his ,ac k of compiaints associated with
anxiety, except in connection with medica, management of his hype,-
tension.
As it turns out, the subject had received treatment for his
hypertension two years before with severely adverse consequences.
He had reportedly become critically ill due to severe potassium
deficits and pneumonic complications, and had to remain in an inten-
sive care unit for several days.
Ever since then, the subject became afraid of antihypertensive
medical treatment and the side effects of antihypertensive medication.
From the preceding observations it is gleaned that the subject
realized the need to lower a dangerously high blood pressure. Never-
theless, he perceived the consequences of antihypertensive treatment
so adverse that he would not try it. In addition, he was not willing
to engage in a course of psychotherapy.
At this point, the goal of the intervention was to bring the
blood pressure down as much as possible.
To that end, the subject was placed in a management program
consisting of a relaxation trance with visual imagery, biofeedback,
and incidental counselling associated with the discrepancy between
his fear and the benefits of antihypertensive therapy.
An increased temperature of the left middle finger and a reduc-
tion in the electromyographic activity of the forearm extensors and
frontalis muscles were used as indices of relaxation. Blood
session
and
The subject was seen for one hour approbate!* o„ C e weekly
for a total of nine visits.
Recalling, since core affect and anxiety elicit each other
the manifestations of anxiety are proportional to the level of such
-
anxiety, reducing anxiety may reduce its manifestations and in-
fluence a reduction in core affect. At the same time, a reduction
-
core affect will soften the negative cognitive interpretation of
the environment.
Again recalling from previous material, the global functional
representation of ongoing experience may be affected to some extent
if one of its functional elements is altered in any way.
In the present case, a relaxed state would decrease the severity
of the manifestations of anxiety, which in turn would be indicative
of a lowering of the level of anxiety, and of course, the blood pres-
sure.
At the same time, the successful application of biofeedback by
the subject would help increase to some extent his sense of competence
,
that is, reduce core affect, by the margin of control afforded by the
procedure.
Now, in that state of affairs, the cognitive interpretation of
the environment may be reformulated in less apprehensive terms,
especially if some pertinent incidental counselling is available.
Clearly, in the case being addressed, the acute elevation in
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-re affect is associated with a particular cognitive element s*.-
bolrc of danger. That element is the antihypertensive treatment
with medication.
As would be expected, as the process of a tonic relaxation
gradually too k place, the manifestations of anxiety decreased, and
the cognitive interpretation of the cognitive element previously
symbolic of danger became less negative.
Of course, as the general state of arousal diminished, the
indices of relaxation, electromyographic and temperature readings,
would reflect it.
Figure 10 on the next page illustrates the gradual increase in
tonic finger temperature during the course of the intervention. Ob-
viously, increased finger temperature reflects vasodilation which is
incompatible with the sympathetic peripheral vasoconstriction which
may be associated with anxiety.
A drop in temperature around the fifth session is considered
directly associated with an initial attempt by the subject to take
antihypertensive medication with some resulting side effects.
Likewise, Figure 11 on the following pages reflects some de-
creases in muscular tension readings during the course of the inter-
vention. However, the gradual changes in muscular tension are less
dramatic than those of the temperature readings. Once again, it
can be noticed an increase in tension around the fifth session asso-
ciated with an attempt to take medication.
Since the subject was very apprehensive initially about taking
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antihypertensive medication to the point of seeking relief through
behavioral methods rather than with drugs, his beliefs about the
medication must have become less negative by the fifth session for
him to attempt taking such medications.
The latter being the case, then the clinical elevation in core
affect must have been somewhat reduced by the fifth session.
As was illustrated by Figures 10 and 11, those indices of
relaxation, or obversely, of anxiety, indicated a decrease in the
general state of arousal.
Now, Figures 12 and 13 on the ensuing pages, illustrate the
gradual decrease in blood pressure during the course of intervention.
Notice the downward trend in blood pressure readings both between
sessions and within sessions. While the decreases between sessions
are the desired outcome, the within-session decreases are extremely
important because they demonstrate the discrete reduction in the
manifestations of anxiety as a result of a discrete reduction in
anxiety itself.
The latter is well illustrated by Figure 13. In addition, that
figure shows the gradual tonic decrease in the manifestations of
anxiety in terms of the decrease in blood pressure readings. As
can be noted on this figure, there was a smaller within-session effect
around the sixth session which may be associated with the anxiety
linked to the medication trial.
As would be expected, by the end of the intervention, the sub-
ject was able to take medications on a regular basis without much
152
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Figure 12. Systolic and diastolic blood pressure readings before and
after each treatment session. Note : From "Assessment and Choice of
Therapeutic Modality" by E. Segarra, Grand Rounds, Department of
Behavioral Medicine and Psychiatry, University of Virqinia Medical
Center, October 2, 1979.
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apprehension, fc,*^,^,^^
under control with medication.
n our view, the preceding case demonstrates the relationship
between core affect, anxiety, the physical manifestations of anxiety
and the cognitive interpretation of an experiential event. U aUo
'
depicts the target effect of anxiety on specific physiological sys-
tems which may be sensitive to it. ,„ the , 4tter case
_ ^^
cular physiological system was the cardiovascular system.
It should be clarified, however, that in the case considered
above, the acute core affect was associated with particular stimuli
«hose elements symbolic of danger had a known etiology during adult-
huod. Once the stimuli no longer elicited an elevation in core af-
fect, anxiety and its manifestations decreased to subclinical levels.
The latter is considered to mean that the above management
techniques may be very appropriate for obtaining a long-lasting
decrease in the physical manifestations of anxiety associated with
a particular stimulus symbolic of danger with a clear-cut origin..
In addition, they may be appropriate for the palliative reduction of
Physical manifestations of anxiety affecting a particular physiolo-
gical function or in the case of pain or injury.
It is postulated that those techniques would have a limited
effectiveness in achieving an enduring reduction in the physical and
functional manifestations of anxiety associated with a chronic clini-
cal elevation in core affect.
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1,1
°
f «*""«« e,evations in core affect, the
chcce of mana 9ement according to our lnodel WQu , d be psychotherapy
Psychotherapy as wi„oe discussed in chapter 6 is defied as the
of core affect is normalized.
It should be pointed out that according to our model, anxioly-
tics mainly act to ameliorate the physical manifestations of anxiety
caused by acute or chronic elevations in core affect. In addition
some anxiolytic effect by these drugs on the functional manifestations
of anxiety appears to take place sometimes. It appears that the use-
fulness of anxiolytics in obtaining a lasting improvement in con-
ditions associated with a chronic clinical elevation in core affect
would be less than negligible. Obviously, anxiolytic drugs would
make very poor substitutes for psychotherapy in such cases.
A particular problem with the use of medications in the manage-
ment of anxiety is that the latter is invariably reduced beyond the
level which ordinarily could be considered tolerable with minor dis-
comfort. It seems that in acute and chronic clinical elevations
in core affect the subjective need for comfort or support far exceeds
what would be reasonably expected. Therefore, the anxiolytic effects
anticipated by the person are quite exaggerated. Being that the
amount of medication administered is proportional to the degree of
discomfort reported by the patient, the dosage of the medication
invariably exceeds the degree of anxiety which ordinarily could
be tolerated well. Obviously, the latter is tied to some of the
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well known adverse consequent nf th„nsequences o the management of anxiety with
medications on a long term basis. An examolP of thmi p e those consequences
is the dependence on anxiolytics to rnn P withuc i cope with everyday ordinary en-
vironmental challenges.
A disturbing disadvantage of the effects of medication in the
manager of anxiety is that they hamper the progression of the
therapeutic process. It is postdated that in order for the process
of therapy to reach maturity the client must be in a position to
confront his own vulnerability. Obviously, such a confrontation
would necessarily entail some degree of affective discomfort and
anxiety. The prospects for the preceding therapeutic necessity
become dimmed by the use of neuroleptics or anxiolytics without
regard for the process of psychotherapy.
functionaljanifestations of anxiety. The severity of the functional
manifestations of anxiety follow the same rule of being proportional
to the level of anxiety.
In the milder clinical forms, one may include distractibi 1 ity
,
deficient recall, and mild exacerbation of existing cognitive deficits
(e.g., anomia), among others.
At the moderate range, some of the manifestations are considered
to be perceptual illusions, deficient concentration, memory deficits,
moderate exacerbation of existing cognitive deficits (e.g., dysphasia)
and somewhat idiosyncratic thinking toward the upper limit of the
range
.
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may
tang the severe function ma „i
f
estations ofm^ ^
-elude hallucinations, thought
,„„*„„, severe confusion
_
_
Plete disorientation, concreteness of thought, disorganized or
bizarre thinking, and severe exacerbation of existing cognitive
deficits (e.g., aphasia).
It ™ay be difficult to conceive all of the preceding symptoms
as functional manifestations of anxiety. However, if one considers
the potential barrage of neurodynamic and chemical activity to which
the cortex could be subjected to as a result of a state of general
defensive arousal, it is not difficult to visualize its effects on
the cognitive matrices.
The stochastic cognitive matrices postulated in this work would
be resistant to a loss in representational power due to their vast
associative properties. Clearly, with some increase in the intensity
of the level of arousal, the sharpness of the cognitive functions
could improve. However, with an excessively intense generalized
stimulation, one could visualize a disruption in the coherent dis-
charge properties of the neruonal matrices.
In the latter case, the increasing levels of cognitive matrix
disorganization would be directly associated with the increasing
levels of cognitive disorganization or dysfunction.
Obviously, in such a situation, the associative processes would
be disrupted and di stant concepts could be integrated with each other
to produce a metaphorical nonanalog of ongoing experience.
According to our view of the process, increasing levels of such
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a denized synaptic activity Wou,d create countiess of ,»„,„,
cognitive matrices. With pensive
,eve,s of excessively intense
station, there wou,d be eventuaUy severe cognitive dysfunction
« a result of the profound deterioration of the higher-order cog-
nitive matrices.
A particular process for which the functional manifestations
of anxiety have been examined is memory.
If one examines the graphic illustration of the Yerkes-Dodson
law (Loftus, 1980), it shows that the efficiency of memory increases
to an optimal level with increasing levels of alertness. However,
it additionally illustrates that the efficiency of memory also gra-
dually deteriorates with increasing emotional arousal once the optimal
level of said arousal has been passed.
A clinical example which vividly demonstrates the cognitive
manifestations of anxiety is considered below.
In this particular case, a chronic clinical elevation of core
affect is quite evident.
The subject in this case was a single woman somewhere between
20 and 30 years old, who was seen in individual therapy for slightly
more than 20 weekly sessions. Her complaints included constant
general anxiety, inability to hold employment, gastrointestinal
disturbances, and other physical distresses, severe anxiety attacks
which led to emotional crises, and so forth. A psychological evalua-
tion from two years prior to the period of therapy being reported,
indicated she performed at an I.Q. level of 63. Her life history,
159
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although obviously evidencing deprivation of several types indi-
cate that she had been able to complete high school despite havi
been labelled as retarded since childhood. It also indicated that
she had been under psychiatric care and took medication for several
years. It was evident that throughout all her life, this woman met
with rejection and negative affect whenever she tried to display
whatever intellectual skills she may have had.
Right at the onset of therapy, it was clear that his woman could
not learn as fast as the average person does, and that anything that
required performance from her produced severe anxiety.
For example, she would become disabled by anxiety by the actual
or imagined presence of a supervisor whenever she tried to hold a
job. Likewise, other attributions with the same results would be
made in other situations, such as those of interpersonal nature.
Therefore, difficulties such as interpersonal incompetence, fears
of several types, and a whole range of other symptoms were common
occurrences
.
However, by the end of therapy, the subject's I.Q. was found to
be 93, she had no symptoms, and was on her way to vocational rehabi-
litation.
The I.Q. scores difference in this case is quite significant.
Undoubtedly, in order for this woman to score an I.Q. of 93,
it would have been necessary for her to enjoy the approximate corres-
ponding level of cognitive function. Also, she had to have the neural
substrate which would support the measured intellectual performance.
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Given the severe manifestations of anxiety she exhibited pre-
vious to psychotherapy, according to the model being proposed it
may be concluded that her deficient intellectual performance
prior to therapy was predominantly a functional manifestation of
anxiety. This connection between anxiety and diminished cognitive
performance may be quite obvious at times during the psychological
evaluations of some school children.
Perhaps supporting the view presented here is the improvement
in cognitive functions following the brief administration of a neuro-
leptic to persons in an acute state of psychosis (Wahba, Donlon &
Meadow, 1981).
In the latter case, 44 hospitalized psychotic individuals were
placed in three treatment groups of high, moderate, and standard doses
of haloperidol for a period of 10 days. Clinical and psychological
ratings showed similar and significant improvement in concentration,
abstract thinking, and ability to respond appropriately in all three
treatment groups.
Clearly, the view which considers the above data in terms of a
decrease in functional anxiety, postulates the desired pharmacolo-
gical effects of haloperidol as a reduction in the cognitive (func-
tional) manifestations of anxiety.
In this case, the neuroleptics would act to reduce the level
of arousal and disorganization in particular neural pathways of the
limbic system. Some of these pathways have been considered earlier
in Chapter 3. In tune with the consideration of the effects of
anxiolytics in previous sections, the activity of neurolepUcs is
viewed here as a predominantly palliative effect on the functional
-ifestations of anxiety. Exception „ fflade to the consideration
of such an assuasive effect as a lon 9 ten, treaty of optional
d-orders as defined in this work
. Naturally, neuroleptics appear
at ti.es to have also some ameliorating effects on the physical mani-
testations of anxiety.
Of course, according to the model being postulated, the underly-
ing cause for chronic anxiety and its manifestations is the clinical
elevation of core affect. Therefore, the way to a subclinical level
of anxiety in our view is through the psychotherapeutic normalization
of core affect rather than by means of medication on a long term
basis
.
It is quite transparent that the material in this section es-
tablishes the functional and physical manifestations of anxiety as
a result of the varying activity of a normal defensive mechanism.
Similarly, it establishes said manifestations of anxiety as part
of the defensive picture which results from clinical elevations in
core affect.
Mlety__loo£. Now, it must be recalled that any mental or physical
stress elicits core affect and that the physiological activity cha-
racteristic of anxiety may be considered itself very stressful.
Therefore, one may conceive a repetitive loop where core affect
elicits a discharge of anxiety and the anxiety increases the inten-
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slty of core affect in a reciprocal vicious circle.
No doubt that anxiety could cli mb to very high levels through
this process. Such a process appears to be descriptive of the reel-
procal activity of core affect discussed earlier.
Emotional Pi stnrhanrpc
Emotional disturbances appear appropriately named because their
primary etiology is considered here to be a clinical elevation of
core affect.
In the view expressed by this dissertation, emotional distur-
bances are constituted by the maladaptive defensive behavioral maneu-
vers aimed at a reduction in the chronic clinical level of core af-
fect, together with whatever corresponding physical and/or functional
manifestations of anxiety which may be present.
As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, the defensive maneu-
vers in question are behaviors aimed at satisfying the need for safe-
ty which is out of awareness. However, they are directed mainly at
counteracting core affect, rather than at decreasing it.
The defensive maneuvers are functionally linked to the cognitive
interpretation of ongoing experience as a function of core affect and
are, at times, facilitated by anxiety, which recalling is in itself a
defensive reaction.
As a possible example is the situation of child abuse where a
very vulnerable parent becomes angry and uses physical force on a
163
crying child who may be ill or scared.
In the latter case, the already clinically high sensation of
danger or core affect in the parent is further increased by the
evidence of an elevated core affect in the child. The defensive
behavior is aggression, which appears to be facilitated by the in-
creased anxiety.
In another example, the individual's need for safety may be
alleviated to some extent by maintaining a rigid structure for every-
thing. In this case, the elevated core affect would be eliciting
increased manifestations of anxiety unless the person resorted to
some kind of activity which would provide the structure needed. A
particularly common type of such activity (or symptom, if preferred)
is the incessant toil of trying to organize the contents of a room
or house repeatedly over a short period of time in order to feel
comfortable. In all likelihood, the person in this case would not
be aware of the role of such an activity.
It should be noted that the defensive behavioral maneuvers are
considered here to be developed according to factors, such as, devel-
opmental, cultural, socioeconomic, physical, perhaps genetic, and
others
.
According to our view, the more chronic the clinical elevation
in core affect, the more complex is the cluster of defensive maneuvers
and the more affirmed are the beliefs associated with such defensive
maneuvers
.
On the other hand, temporary or acute elevations in an already
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clinical core affect may exacerbate the quality of the de-
fensive maneuvers, such as hostility becoming agression.
Obviously, the severity of the manifestations of anxiety
and the target functions affected by anxiety would contribute
to the type of clinical picture presented by the manner in
which the person interacts with the environment.
In the case of psychosis, just like in any case where
there are other than severe functional manifestations of anxiety,
the core affect has a clinical elevation and the defensive maneu-
vers are in operation.
In such a case, the cognitive representation and interpre-
tation of ongoing experience as a function of the intensity of
core affect would be characterized by a lack of cognitive logic.
Therefore, the defensive maneuvers could be extremely idiosyn-
cratic, bizarre or illogical in many ways. Nevertheless, their
function would be the same as in the case where there is no
cognitive disorganization, that is, attempts at counteracting
core affect.
A particular clinical example of the above was observed during
a visit to a large public psychiatric hospital. The situation to be
described occurred at a male ward during a very crowded Monday morning
meeting between staff and all of the residents. The group present
165
included many newly admitted residents »c «en'^b a as well as those who had
been admitted the previous week or before.
In addition, there were several visitors among the standing-
room only crowd. The visitors were particularly conspicuous because
either, 1
i
ke the staff, they were dressed in coat and tie or they
were females.
A very restless man, who kept trying to draw the attention of
the staff from the back of the crowded room, frequently excused him-
self from whomever was next to him to go out and drink some water.
Finally, he was able to attract the attention of the staff and ask
them, with some obvious hostility, about who had given permission
for his thoughts to be broadcasted on television.
The staff, consisting of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, pro-
ceeded as may be commonly done, to confront the man about the logic
of his beliefs before going on to talk to another resident. It seems
that in a case like this focusing on the affective content of what
was being said would probably have been more productive than focusing
on how it was said.
Clearly, according to our model, the man in the example was
feeling very threatened, that is, his core affect was very elevated.
His interpretation of ongoing experience and the expression of such
a representation reflected a need to protect himself from the invasion
of his privacy by all the strangers in the room. However, given the
disorganized associative state of his cognitive matrices, his expres-
sion was i 1 logical
.
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The task in this chapter has been very arduous since the con-
cepts being considered are as difficult to explain as they are to
discern. Each of the concepts discussed is considered to be an 1-
portant part of the integrated functional view of human behavior pro-
posed by this dissertation.
One very important principle which is implied in the theoreti-
cal constructions considered so far is worth emphasizing.
Such a principle is that regardless of the available cognitive
resources, core affect is always the same sensation and such cogni-
tive resources will always be used to attempt to fulfill the need for
safety.
Accordingly, whatever cognitive resources are available, they
will be used for the cognitive interpretation of ongoing experience
as a function of core affect. It does not matter if the cognitive
resources are very limited or more than adequate.
The great importance of the preceding is that it allows for a
better general understanding of the manifestations of anxiety, de-
fensive maneuvers, and behavior in situations like those in which
the person is intellectually impaired, has suffered brain damage, or
has any type of significant deficit in cognitive functions as a re-
sult of brain pathology of some sort.
That is, the model of human behavior being proposed is applicable
to all human circumstances.
Another very important precept which is also implicit in the
material covered to this point is that of the traditional notion of
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psychopathology or mental illness being alien to the model undergoi
description. This being the case, the concept of pathology here be
comes associated with actual deleterious changes in neural tissue
rather than with a conventional view of psychopathological activity.
Parenthetically, it is possible to assume, independently of
core affect, that cognitive disorganization in a limited number of
cases could be primarily the result of aberrant neurochemical vari-
ations in neural tissue. In that case, the deleterious chemical
changes would be attributed to some sort of tissue pathology or
defect. However, a significant elevation in core affect would be
an inevitable consequence of the latter situation. With such an
elevation in core affect the neurochemical activity in some areas
of the brain would be deviant anyway due to severe functional manifes-
tations of anxiety. Thus, the cognitive symptoms which may have been
initiated by an assumed abnormal neurochemical activity in this
case are maintained by the functional effects of anxiety. In
addition, it may be postulated that if the assumed tissue pathology
or defect and the ensuing deviant neurochemical activity were pre-
sent, their cognitive effects would be facilitated and/or enhanced
by functional anxiety. Based on the preceding, one may suggest
that even when the potential exists for an abnormal neurochemical
state due to tissue pathology or defect, the likelihood of psychosis
would be greatly diminished in the case of a normalized core
affect.
In connection with the preceding, the pathological possibili-ty of an abnormally extreme sensitivity of the cognitive struc-
tures to arousa, or of an abnormally intense arousal discharge
to the cortex could be construed as potentially responsible for the
cognitive manifestations of anxiety in some cases. This topic has
been considered earlier and will not be discus$ed any
here. Just the same
,
if core affect is lowered to a subclinical
level, the need for increased defensive functions would not be
present. That is, clinical levels of functional anxiety would not
be elicited in any case.
No doubt that if core affect is reduced during osychotherapy
such a reduction will most likely occur gradually. Therefore, one
may expect the gradient of functional manifestations of anxiety
mentioned earlier.
The foregoing conclusion dictates that the condition known
as psychosis is, according to such view, not an all-or-none
state but may occur in degrees. This means that psychosis may
'
be described in terms of varying levels of severity at different
times in the same individual.
Obviously, it is gleaned from the discussion that psychiatric
diagnostic categories (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) would
be considered in the proposed model as descriptions of the way the
person interacts with the environment as a function of core „m,t,
rather than being associated with any particular etiology.
The latter is convenient since the question of etiology becomes
unanswerable in most instances when the concept of ,„,.,,u, nines,
is applied.
An example of importance is the difficulty encountered in the
consideration of a putative etiology for the condition labelled as
schizophrenia.
An analysis of six major scientific models of the etiology of
schizophrenia concludes that the only con.non denominator to the models
was a second-order model which the authors call a vulnerability model
(Zubin & Spring, 1977).
The vulnerability concept is divided by the authors into two
major components. One component is considered by the authors as the
factor associated with the genetic endowment of the individual and
the other component is considered a factor associated with environ-
mental influences.
In any case, they suggest that the common denominator In ques-
tion is a natural "degree of vulnerability that under suitable cir-
cumstances will express itself in an episode of schizophrenic ill-
ness", (p. 109)
At any rate, they conclude that there is a threshold above which
there will be the expected symptoms if both the degree Of the vul-
nerability and the magnitude of the challenging event', in the environ-
ment are reciprocally high enough.
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That is, with a higher vulnerability a lesser magnitude of
the challenging events in needed, and with the increasing magnitude
of the challenging events a lesser vulnerability is needed for the
symptoms to appear.
Albeit for different theoretical reasons, the model being pro-
posed in this dissertation construes the interaction of the person
with his environment along similar lines.
In our case, however, the vulnerability in question is the inten-
sity of core affect. In general terms, with increasing levels of
core affect less demanding environmental challenges would be needed
to further elevate core affect and elicit defensive maneuvers and
functional and physical manifestations of anxiety.
On the other hand, increased environmental demands would elicit
complementary elevations in the intensity of core affect and could
produce similar effects. Naturally, the cognitive and reciprocal
core affect processes considered earlier would be in operation during
these situations.
Considering the model being proposed, one can reiterate that the
normalization of clinical core affect in any case would be the factor
underlying favorable changes in the cognitive interpretation of the
environment, the defensive maneuvers, and the manifestations of an-
xiety. Of course, what are called symptoms would be the expression
of any of the preceding functions.
Now, the behavioral patterns observed which are part of the de-
fensive maneuvers to counteract core affect appear to partially be
171
d.y.lopmenf 1
.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to the disoussion
of such defensive maneuvers in material ahead, to next examine brief,
ly the developmental aspects of core affect.
CHAPTER IV
THE ONTOGENY OF CORE AFFECT
As far as this clinical study is concerned, there is no doubt
about core affect being a phylogenetic product.
It may even be said that core affect is a phylogenetic property
of organisms whose complex defensive behaviors are mediated by struc-
tures like the human limbic system.
Clearly, the survival value of core affect in early humanhood
must have been incalculable. Nevertheless, as the functional pro-
perties of the neocortex were refined and social relationships con-
tinued to increase in complexity, the survival value of core affect
appears to have diminished.
As such, one may consider that under ordinary circumstances now
only enough core affect is needed to keep up motivation and goal-
directed behaviors, establish relationships, and so forth.
At any rate, if core affect is to be considered a phylogenetic
derivative of a survival mechanism, its presence must be evident as
soon as there is enough neural substrate development to sustain it.
The latter obviously occurs before birth.
Prenatal Core Affect
There are virtually no new neurons added to the number present
at birth. While the generation of new neurons has probably slowed
down somewhat by the time of birth, it may be calculated that neurons
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are created in the developinq fetal brain »t thQ *y , Ld D m at the rate more than
250,000 per minute (Cowan, 1979).
Obviously, at that rate of development, it is difficult to pin-
point the exact time when a function, such as limbic system activity,
hence core affect would start to operate. Nonetheless, one can judge
core affect being present when the embryo or fetus is perceived as
performing organized defensive behaviors.
Clearly, the display of defensive behaviors has to be preceded
by a learning period for those behaviors. Thus, core affect is most
likely in operation long before it can be judged to be present.
Much of what is known about fetal behavior is summarized by Verny
and Kelly (1981) in connection with the adult behavioral consequences.
Although their conclusions and those reached in this work are
separated by almost unsurmountable theoretical obstacles, their ob-
servations about fetal behavior adjust well to the core affect theory.
For example, they report that some reflex action development may
be observed in the unborn child by his fifth week. Also by the eighth
week, the fetus may react to the pushing on the mother's stomach by
making movements which resemble a squirming away from the point of
pressure
.
By the fourth month, the unborn child reportedly can grimace,
frown, or squint, and may start sucking if the lips are stroked.
The unborn child, according to these authors, is sensitive to
touch around the sixth month of intrauterine development. For exam-
ple, if cold water is injected into his mother's stomach, he kicks
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vigorously in protest.
Similarly, the unborn child would react to anxiety in his
mother.
The evidence considered by these authors indicates to them that
awareness in the unborn child may begin between the twenty-eighth
and the thirty-second week of gestation. The reason being that by
such a point the brain's neural circuits are reportedly as advanced
as a newborn's would be.
Obviously, one could go on and on citing findings which would
support a survival mechanism in the unborn child. But there is no
doubt that the unborn child reacts to physical and chemical stressors
with what appears to be a defensive behavior each time.
Clearly, if the fetus is reacting with a defensive posture, the
underlying discomfort could be, as it has been postulated here, a
sensation of danger. It should be noted that a sensation it must be
because cognitive function would most likely be extremely primitive
at this point.
Birth Experience
Barring prenatal extremes, the first really significant elevation
in core affect may occur at birth. It is perhaps the most traumatic
experience with the least cognitive development in the direct confron-
tation of the environment by the child.
The newborn appears to already have, albeit limited, an emotional
repertoire at birth. One is reminded by Ekman and Oster (1979) of the
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finding of expressions of disgust resembling the adult version in
the responses to unpleasant taste by newborn infants, anencephalic
infants, and hydrocephalic infants. Clearly, the latter suggests
other than high cortical origins for such an emotional display.
One can imagine how the sudden shift from the safe and nurturing
warm environment of the womb to the stressful conditions of birth may
elicit a supreme sensation of danger.
It should not be surprising to conceive the child as trying to
feel as secure as he felt in the uterus. Therefore, he may respond
with a decrease in his protestations if he is placed on or about the
mother's belly, or chest, or if he is held very closely by her.
Unfortunately, the safety of the womb is forever gone. From
now on, the child, with a very elevated core affect or vulnerability,
must learn ways to reduce such a vulnerability during his interaction
with the environment. For that, he is going to need the protection
afforded by his caretakers.
Developmental Progression
The range of personal characteristics which one may ascribe to
the adult does not appear to be applicable before adulthood to the
same person. If one considers cognitive development, it may be ar-
tifactually organized into functionally discrete stages from birth
to puberty, such as, sensorimotor
,
preoperational , concrete operation-
al, and formal operational (Piaget, 1975/1977). These artifactual
developmental stages perhaps could be considered somewhere between
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descriptive and explanatory of behavior (Bra ln erd,
,978), but tunc-
tional ly hierarchical
.
Likewise, the global functional representation or waning of an
experiential event in the nonadult may be constrained by the degree
of functional development. For example, it would be premature to
expect a child who does not crawl yet to start walking.
It appears clear that change in objective meaning in the case
of the adult could occur as a function of experiential events. While
in the case of the nonadult it involves not only such an experience,
but also the effects of the gradual integration and development of
functional systems until the adult level of functioning is reached.
It is reasonable to observe at this point that the observed
behavior in nonadulthood is compatible with the notion that during
this time in life the global functional representation of experience
or meaning is more susceptible to alterations than during adulthood.
It appears that during the period before adulthood the individual is
gradually developing mechanisms and functional strategies with which
to integrate experience until the adult level of meaning is reached.
The relative importance of experience in development appears to
be especially relevant during the first three years of life. The
first three years of childhood appear to be characterized by a sort of
sensitivity to the effect of experience on much later social beha-
viors, such as initiative, trust, compassion, curiosity, and so forth
(McVicker-Hunt, 1979), or their counterparts.
Illustrated by Figure 14 on the following page, the process of
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child development has been divided into four discrete stages in
terms of cognitive development (Piaget, 1975/1977) and other forms
of development.
The illustration is an adaptation of an almost identical table,
schematic of a neuropsychological model of child development (Holmes
Note 2).
In the present case, Figure 14 only aims at providing a very
schematic neuropsychological view of development.
The primary concern here is to postulate what major role cor
affect plays during development. Obviously, it would not be feasi bl
to provide an account of all the consequences and functions of core
affect during development.
It suffices for the purposes of this dissertation to present
the material in very general terms.
According to our view, core affect, while very intense at birth
n postulated to gradually decrease to a normal range of intensity
fey Tate adolescence or later under ideal circumstances. Although,
It is similarly postulated that the latter never occurs at the ideal
fevel
.
During the period between birth and 18 to 24 months of age,
ttare is considerable exploration by the child. During this period,
(osasiderable knowledge about objects is gained. Obviously, there is
«»! accelerated rate of synaptic adaptation. That is, a lot of asso-
Native interactions and integration, especially of the concrete
pnaperties of things. The most effective functional activity during
this period appears to primarily be occurring at the posterior asso-
ciation areas of the hemispheres.
As Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978) point out, both cerebral hemis-
pheres may be considered to work together in order that the integrity
of mental functioning be maintained.
.
They also point out that both hemispheres may have the ability
for mapping spatial context onto the perceptual and motor activities
of the hands. That is, mani pulospatial activities expressed in the
forms of drawing, constructing, and so forth.
However, the right hemisphere ordinarily develops eventual
enhanced abilities for both the perception of spatial stimuli and
the origination of spatial responses as part of a late manipulospatial
superiority over the left hemisphere. The latter is expressed as an
integrated bi hemi spheri c function.
The left hemisphere is considered to develop faster than the
right. As a result, language is considered to start developing in
the left hemisphere and to precede the effective manipulospatial
functions, which would come much later.
It could be suggested that there is some functional crowding of
the left hemisphere and hence language functions begin to gradually
displace some of the capacities for spatial perception and the produc-
tion of spatial responses in that hemisphere. Meanwhile, the latter
similar functions continue to operate fully in the right hemisphere.
Unhampered by language development, the right hemisphere may
assist the left with the development of language, especially providing
180
for the intonations! qualities of the latter (Holmes, Note 2).
It seems that infants respond to the tone of speech or of other
forms of expression with a greater degree of accuracy than they do
to the content of expression.
Clearly, the reference to tone has to do with the affective
context of the message. Therefore, if the tone is soft and nurturing,
the infant will most likely not display apprehension.
On the other hand, if the tone of the message is harsh and hos-
tile, the infant will invariably display apprehension.
It seems that during this early period the infant has to inter-
act with the environment predominantly with those functions facili-
tated by the right hemisphere.
Undoubtedly, the vulnerability or helplessness of the infant
is very intense. Thus, the infant begins to construe the objects
around him in terms of how they decrease or increase his discomfort.
In other words, core affect is very eJevated at this early age,
and the infant begins to find ways of attaining a relative sense of
safety. That is, begins to use maneuvers to counteract or decrease
his sensation of danger.
Clearly
,
at t hi s stage of development, his available resources
to interact with the environment are predominantly those subserved
by the right hemisphere and to a lesser extent those subserved by
the left hemisphere.
Therefore, his limited cognitive interpretation of the environ-
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ment
,111 be initially based mostly on gioba! perceptions of affec-
tive tone based on, for examp,e, spatia, and intonationa, functions.
Son,e of these spatial and intonationa, functions could include facia,
expression, tone or variations in pitch of speech, gestures of others,
patterns of being held by caretaker, and so forth.
At a certain point, the infant inadvertently develops maneuvers
to obtain a reduction in core affect. Some of these appear to be,
crying to obtain nurturance, attachment to certain objects, holding
on to caretaker, maintaining visual contact with caretaker, and so
forth.
What may be important here is that as a result of the development
of defensive maneuvers to cope with core affect and also to his gra-
dual confrontation of the environment, the core affect is reduced
somewhat as the child matures.
In other words, the initial intense helplessness begins to de-
crease as a result of the child testing his environment as he develops
the necessary agility to do so. At the same time, the infant reaches
a point where he begins to use objects in the environment to feel
secure and to rely less on the proximity to his by now obvious, source
of safety, the caretaker.
According to the model being proposed here, core affect would
always be the same sensation of danger, the difference at the very
early stage from other later stages and adulthood is obviously that
there is less cognitive development with which to understand the
environment in terms of core affect.
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No less than would be expected at any other time, the infant
would inadvertently interpret his environment as a function of core
affect using the limited cognitive resources at his disposal.
This means that there would be elements in the environment whose
cognitive representation, even at a very crude level, would become
linked to a particular level of core affect. That is, the elements
in question would become symbolic of danger in terms of the process
discussed earlier and would elicit increases in core affect with the
corresponding defensive maneuvers appropriate to current cognitive
development.
Anyone who has tried to interfere between a child one or two
years old and an object he feels comfortable with, has probably seen
a defensive reaction of anger.
Obviously, anxiety as defined earlier would always be present
as a reaction to core affect, whether it happens at an appropriate
prenatal stage or during adulthood.
It is not difficult to make a connection sometimes between some
of the physical symptoms of a child and anxiety. For example, a
higher than usual incidence of visceral or other physical complaints
in the absence of a putative pathology.
The cognitive interpretation of the environment in terms of core
affect could be observed sometimes in the infant's apprehension or
fear of strangers or of certain objects.
It seems that the superior capacity of the right hemisphere to
perceive spatial stimuli, to produce spatial responses, and to eva-
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luate the affective tones of visual and auditory stimuli continues
to develop in association with the functions of the left hemisphere.
The latter could be why expression without intonation does not
convey affective meaning. It could also be the reason for subjec-
tive meaning of visual stimuli being perceived according to spatial
relationships, such as was seen in the "faces" on Figure 8 in the
previous chapter.
However, the development of language adds a new dimension to the
representation of ongoing experience and the cognitive interpretation
of the environment.
The period between 18 to 24 months and 6 to 7 years continues
to see a cognitive activity predominantly modulated by the posterior
association areas of the hemispheres. Also, the complexity of the
cognitive matrices continues to increase with synaptic adaptation in
the brain proceeding as a result of experience.
During this period, language is characteristic and it is used
to express the cognitive interpretation of ongoing experience. Lan-
guage is also used to interact symbolically with objects, for example,
construing a box as a truck and ascribing animated properties to
inanimate objects.
This period may be characterized by an enhanced modulation of
cognitive functions by the left hemisphere. While, the right hemis-
phere continues to contribute to the overall subjective interpretation
of the environment.
However, what was probably a fairly pure sensation of danger at
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birth, that is, core affect, is by this time hidden within the cog-
nitive interpretation of the environment and the defensive maneuvers
developed to this point.
In other words, core affect goes underground due to its disper-
sion into the very complex associative process now in operation. In
this case, the sensation of danger may be construed as beginning to
become extensively intertwined with cognitive metaphors.
Thus, there may be a cluster of defensive maneuvers at any
given time. For example, during this period the child may place blame
on others to counteract his core affect, but at the same time, display
other defensive maneuvers such as aggression, resistance to authority,
helplessness, and so forth.
Despite the increasing cognitive distance between core affect
and the awareness of it as a sensation, it is possible for the child
sometimes to perceive core affect as such when it is clinically ele-
vated.
A very painful vignette about a paralyzed seven-year-old boy
i llustrates the point.
The boy in question was supposed to have suffered the traumatic
interruption of the spinal cord at the second cervical vertebra. He
could not breathe without a respirator and was supposed to have lost
sensory and motor capacity below the neck.
The family of this brave little boy lived a considerable distance
away from the hospital and they could only visit during the weekend.
So, presumably this contributed to an increase in his vulnerability.
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Many months of his hospitalization were spent in an intensive
care unit where he was always surrounded by elements symbolic of
danger, such as the malfunction warning sound from his or somebody
else's respirator. The obvious panic usually displayed during the
latter circumstances made clear that he understood this signal as
dangerous.
At any rate, during a contact when he was aware of considerable
subjective discomfort, he expressed, and reiterated on inquiry, feel-
ing a sensation of discomfort over all of his body. He further la-
belled the sensation also as sadness resulting from being told he had
"a bigmouth" by someone he liked.
Obviously, his sensation was probably visceral and mediated by
neural function above the injury and below the cortex. The latter
points to limbic functions.
It appears clear that during this period, the child is still
quite vulnerable and seeks the protective relationship with the care-
takers while at the same time testing the environment and increasing
his sense of competence.
During the period between the age of 6 to 7 years and 10 years
old, the considerable functional integration of both hemispheres is
very prominent. Clearly, the corpus callosum has reached adequate
functional efficiency and the associative process reaches new levels
of complexity.
By this time, the child may determine relations bewteen objects,
classify, and order objects in intrapropositional terms and focus on
186
-dividual elects of a complex problem rather than on the,, interre-
lationships to explain the problem. These are a few exiles of the
types of cognitive tasks that he has capacity for at this point.
What is important here is that the complexity of both the defen-
sive maneuvers and the cognitive interpretation of ongoing experience
increase tremendously. Therefore, core affect becomes still more
enmeshed into the cognitive processes.
However, an enhanced cognitive perspicacity still allows the
child to discriminate between opposite affective poles and see a
relationship between emotional comfort and discomfort. An anecdotal
example of the latter may be the statement of a girl seven years of
age, pondering on the relationship between fear and pride. Para-
phrasing her, she found it interesting that when she felt proud of
herself she was not scared. On the other hand, she reportedly would
feel afraid when the opposite would be the case.
At any rate, it is postulated that by this time under normal
circumstances the child has developed an extensive repertoire of
defensive maneuvers to suppress core affect. In addition, the child
begins to relinquish some of the protection furnished by the care-
taker. As a matter of fact, the child may become quite oriented to
peer activities at this point.
Yet, despite the spurt in the apparent need for independence
during this period the child essentially still needs the supportive
and protective influence of the caretaker. Obviously, at this point,
just like at any other point in development, the slightest hint of a
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potential loss of the sense of protection afforded by the relation-
ship with the caretaker produces a considerable elevation in core
affect and the consequences thereof.
After all, it is a sense of safety that the child seeks and
obtains from the relationship with the caretaker. One can imagine
the adverse results obtained when the threat comes from the caretaker,
who is necessarily perceived as a source of protection. Such is the
case in a situation of parental child abuse or neglect.
Nonetheless, this period is postulated as one where the intensity
of core affect is generally lower than during earlier and later peri-
ods of development. It could be seen as the period where the maximal
effects of caretaker support and protection have been reached.
Naturally, an increased cognitive amplitude most likely contri-
butes to the state of affairs. In terms of the latter, it may be
suggested that such an increase in cognitive capacity allows the
individual to test his core affect against the objective interpreta-
tion of the environment.
For example, the child may be apprehensive about a particular
activity, but nevertheless performs it without adverse consequences.
In this case, the child is able to learn and cognitively process the
discrepancy between his anticipation of danger and the harmless
nature of the activity.
Past the age of 10 years, the referential distance between core
affect and the cognitive awareness of it as a sensation of danger
becomes vastly greater.
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Clearly, by this time, the effective contribution of the frontal
lobes to brain function is quite evident.
From now on, the individual may use deduction to develop hypo-
theses from what may appear just possible to what may be a real alter-
native. In this case, cognitive operations are i nterproposi tional
.
That is, two ideas may be used to produce a third one. Also, the
individual at this point is able to grasp the meaning of proportions,
correlations, and probability, among many other cognitive tasks that
he is able to perform at the eventual adult level.
Obviously, the interpretation of ongoing experience in terms of
core affect and the defensive maneuvers to counteract the latter
become extremely complex from this point on.
Moreover, the defensive maneuvers appear now to become fairly
stereotypical. That is, the defensive maneuvers begin to acquire a
longitudinal stability which later becomes more firmly established
during adulthood. Barring of course, changes as a result of psycho-
therapy or any other appropriate experience.
However, the most significant event during this period is the
very high elevation in core affect which occurs during adolescence.
It is during this period that the individual is faced by the
demands for emotional competence from an adult world.
Understandably, the adolescent, who begins as a child and is
expected to end as an adult, initially depends on the ghost of paren-
tal or caretaker protection to feel secure.
As that sense of protection begins to be eroded by environmental
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demands for an adult level of Mntinna ii i r emotional competence, the intensity
of core affect begins to increase.
Ordinarily, the intensity of core affect or insecurity reaches
a zenith but the adolescent manages to gradually confront it, result-
ing in its gradual reduction.
In this case, the adolescent relinquishes almost all of the
sense of parental or caretaker protection. It is postulated that the
capacity to feel competent and safe is synonymous with a reduction in
core affect to a normal range.
This climacteric reduction in core affect is seen as a result of
the adolescent acceding to accept the demands for adult emotional
competence. That is, assuming responsibility for his behavior and
need of a sense of wellbeing.
This way, the adolescent reaches the crucial point in develop-
ment where a climax in vulnerability occurs, which constantly colors
his interpretation of the environment and elicits whatever defensive
maneuvers he has acquired by now.
However, under ideal circumstances, no matter how ambivalent he
would be or whatever his beliefs could be, in theory the adolescent
would ordinarily test his subjective impressions, ambivalence, and
beliefs against the objective reality and his core affect would drop
to about a normal range. In this case, the defensive maneuvers would
mostly be adaptive.
Unfortunately, the latter does not happen often enough. It is
likely that the adolescent will become an adult and remain with a
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somewhat elevated core affect. The latter means that depending on
how challenging the environment is at any given moment later on, the
intensity of core affect will similarly fluctuate.
As a result, adolescence appears to mostly end with an adult
who may display a cluster of defensive maneuvers which may include
both adaptive and maladaptive types. How adaptive or maladaptive
the person turns out to be would depend on the prevalent intensity
of the core affect which remains present after adolescence.
Evidently, with a chronic clinical elevation in core affect the
long term results could be as postulated in the material covering
emotional disturbances.
While it is outside the scope of this dissertation to expound
on the immediate consequences of the acute or chronic elevations
in core affect during childhood and adolescence, it should be indi-
cated that they have the same mechanisms in operation as during
adulthood. However, these must be considered and understood in terms
of the particular stage of development. For example, apparent psy-
chosis in either the child or the adult could be attributed to an
idiosyncratic or disheveled organization of the cognitive matrices
as a result of severe functional anxiety. However, such an apparent
state of cognitive disorganization has to be considered very cauti-
ously in terms of the cognitive equipage each individual carries at
the time. Obviously, the cognitive resources of a child are limited
when compared to those of an adult.
By the time a person becomes an adult, the intensity of core
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affect ideally should be at an approximate normal range. If it is
not, something happened during childhood or adolescence which pre-
vented its normalization.
Without going into detail, some examples of the circumstances
which are considered here to produce a pervasive clinical elevati
in core affect are child abuse or neglect, severe physical or mental
trauma, loss of parents, deprivation, history of rejection, overly
demanding or overly critical caretaker, and many others in an almost
endless list.
Clearly, the latter examples would be tied to the early conso-
lidation of maladaptive defensive maneuvers. Therefore, the farther
back in development the clinical chronic elevation in core affect
goes, the more severe are likely to be the maladaptive maneuvers. The
same would very likely hold for the manifestations of anxiety asso-
ciated with such a chronic elevation of core affect.
For example, a young child who uses physical symptoms to obtain
nurturance and support in order to feel secure and avoid going to
school for some reason or another, could use the same, albeit more
severe, defensive maneuver as an adult.
In any event, barring specific tissue pathology, any adult chro-
nic elevation in core affect above its putative normal range is
considered here to be a consequence of inadequate emotional develop-
ment. Clearly, the factors underlying such a developmental flaw
would be multiple, but could include socioeconomic, political, and
cultural factors in addition to any of a vast number of threatening
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circumstances.
At any rate, as indicated earlier, the defensive maneuvers an
adult uses to counteract core affect could include either adaptive
of maladaptive ones at any given time. And whatever such defensive
maneuvers are, they appear to display some longitudinal stability
during certain periods in the person's life.
CHAPTER V
DEFENSIVE MANEUVERS
Commonly enough, adult human behavior may be observed to display
a certain degree of longitudinal stability. For example, the long-
itudinal consistency of the majority of a substantial number of
variables related to the personality structure has been supported by
research in this area. In that instance, such a consistency was
supported by the intrasubject analyses of the data collected for 84
men and 87 women from early adolescence to the middle of the late
forties (Block, Note 3).
The relative stability of adult behavior appears to be confined
to behavioral characteristics within a particular range of possibili-
ties. Although the onset of psychological disorders and/or emotional
disturbances would probably disrupt the stability of the general
characteristics of the behavior of any individual, it is possible
even in such cases to recognize said stability in the form of a ty-
pical, albeit maladaptive behavioral repertoire (Shapiro, 1965).
Moreover, the maladaptive repertoire displayed may be constituted
by exaggerated versions of the previously distinguishing characteris-
tics of the behavior of the individual.
In the absence of disrupting conditions, it is possible to des-
cribe a particular person's ways of interacting with the environment
or with other persons in more or less the same terms throughout his
adult life and even be able to predict some of his behaviors.
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However, such a stability must be considered in terms of envi-
ronmental and personal factors. For example, the enduring charac-
teristics of the conduct of a particular individual could be consi-
dered in one context when he would be 30 years old, and in another
when he would be 60 years old.
Likewise, physical factors, such as the effects of aging and
disease could affect the context in which the individual's behavior
is considered. Moreover, ongoing experience also appears to be able
to change, or at least modify, those characteristic ways in which a
person behaves at different points in his life.
Of course, if humans did not have the capacity for change as
a function of experience then there would not be any reason to con-
sider psychotherapy as a possible agent of change!
Despite all the factors which may intercede with the apparent
constancy of human behavior, it seems reasonable to maintain that a
person will display a fairly stable range of behavioral characteris-
tics within a given lapse of time in his life.
That stability is what allows the observation of change in the
behavior of a particular person, either in the direction of an or-
dered and satisfying interaction with the environment as a result
of a beneficial experience, or in the opposite direction as a con-
sequence of adverse factors.
Typical examples of the enduring qualities of behavior may be
found in any of the adjectives recurrently used to describe a parti-
cular person.
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Clearly, the adjectives used to describe a particular person or
said person's behavior across similar situations also define what
may be considered as that person's personality.
In the latter respect, Stevenson (1969) suggests that "we may
define personality as the sum of the habitual reactions of a person
to external events", (p. 25)
Naturally, according to the model being proposed here, the habi-
tual reactions of the person to external events are actually defen-
sive maneuvers developed to avoid, counteract, or validate core affect
in meeting the demands for competence from the environment. There-
fore, according to our view, the personality of the individual may be
defined as the cluster of enduring defensive maneuvers which such a
person habitually displays in interacting with the events surrounding
him.
As sketched by Figure 15 on the next page, the defensive maneu-
vers are the phenomenol ogical outcome of functional integration. That
illustration provides a panoramic diagram of the model of human beha-
vior proposed by this dissertation. It depicts the integration of the
major functional aspects of ongoing experience with its phenomenolo-
gical manifestations.
Obviously, the complex interactions between the different ele-
ments of the model which are graphically illustrated by Figure 15
have been considered before and need not be elaborated upon any
further
.
The simplistic separation of the elements of the model of human
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since it
behavior portrayed by the figure is totally artificial
would be impossible to separate such elements in actuality.
The defensive maneuvers are considered to be an expression of the
integrated function of the brain much out of volitional control li ke
any other accompanying defensive reaction of the organism, and mostly
just as inadvertent.
Needless to say, awareness of the defensive maneuvers and their
purpose can be achieved, according to the view presented here.
The mechanism in operation for the defensive maneuvers is likely
to be evident by now. However, to recall, the defensive maneuvers
are aimed at fulfilling the need for safety resulting from the in-
fluence of core affect.
As indicated earlier, the defensive maneuvers are the extremely
complex, automatic product of the vast associative activity of the
brain. That is, the cognitive matrices are always processing infor-
mation in context with the intensity of core affect at any given time.
The logical nature of the associative processes, one could say, at-
tempts to make sense out of the core affect in terms of the functional
representation of ongoing experience.
Obviously, since the representation of ongoing experience is a
functional analog of the environment the behavioral expression of the
cognitive matrices occurs in context with the environmental circum-
stances. Therefore, the defensive activity would invariably be
directed at environmental factors.
At any rate, whatever the defensive maneuvers are, they are gra-
I'm
duany developed by the brain. Most of the learning appears to
occur before adulthood, but there would not be any obstacles for
the complexity of the defensive maneuvers to increase at any time
or for the person to acquire some new ones.
It should be reinforced that the defensive maneuvers could be
very complex. Sometimes they may be predominantly cognitive, as in
the case of the rationalization of affective discomfort. Other times,
they could be predominantly behavioral, as in the case of compul-
sions. On other occasions, they could be a mixture of observable
behaviors, cognitive formulations, and manifestations of anxiety.
The combination of the different behavioral maneuvers, especial-
ly maladaptive ones, which a person may use consistently may not fol-
low any particular correspondence between them. However, it appears
that some of them appear together more often than others. For exam-
ple, denial of emotional discomfort and somatization.
As Figure 15 suggests, the defensive maneuvers may be considered
either adaptive or maladaptive.
Obviously, the adaptive defensive maneuvers are those which are
productive for the wellbeing of the person. These are the ones which
facilitate a continuous sense of competence and a range of core affect
around normal elevations.
They are postulated to occur as a result of a very low level of
core affect, and are aimed at fulfilling a very mild need for safety.
The intensity of these defensive maneuvers in this case would
be associated with a tonic level of motivation and goal -di rected
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activity. It seems that a normal range in the intensity of core
affect serves primarily to maintain adequate levels of cognitive
functioning and arousal, that is, an adequate performance.
Therefore, one may say that for all practical purposes the
adaptive defensive maneuvers are not aimed in this case at counterac-
ting core affect because there would not be any significant elevation
of core affect to counteract above the normal range.
On the other hand, the maladey^^
are gen _
erally considered unproductive for the wellbeing of the person. They
presuppose an intensity of core affect above the normal range.
It should be noted that there would be instances when the defen-
sive maneuvers which are ordinarily considered maladaptive would be
very adaptive. For example, anger as a result of being the victim
of an attack.
At any rate, the maladaptive defensive maneuvers are very unpro-
ductive because they tend to be ineffective in counteracting core
affect and lead to maintaining or increasing the intensity of the
vulnerabi 1 i ty
.
From a social point of view, the latter may be due to the effects
of the repelling environmental reactions elicited by the defensive
nature of the maladaptive behaviors. From a functional perspective,
the increased vulnerability is due to the reciprocal cortico-1 imbic
mechanisms of core affect and the anxiety loop which were considered
in Chapter 3.
Maladaptive maneuvers ordinarily indicate a clinical level of
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core affect of acute (temporary) or chronic proportions.
Acute Core Affect
Obviously, the implication of an acute clinical level of
affect is that it is a temporary elevation from a normal baseli
The maladaptive defensive maneuvers in this case could al
similarly be temporary and ordinarily would not be descriptive of
the person, if the elevation in core affect is from a normal base-
line.
Of course, since the latter case assumes an individual whose
core affect is ordinarily at a normal range, the unwitting sensation
of danger would be assumed to eventually return to normal. Likewise,
the maladaptive defensive maneuvers in question would eventually fade
An example of the preceding may be the foreseeable display of
anger and helplessness by a spouse who unexpectedly has been asked
for a divorce. In this case, the emotional pain is expected to sub-
side gradually to a normal level and the defensive maneuvers to fade
away eventual ly
.
However, an elevation in core affect from a normal range is
postulated to tend to exacerbate the longitudinally stable defensive
maneuvers which the person uses to inadvertantly cope with core af-
fect in context with his circumstances. That is, if for example a
person ordinarily tends to seek structure to feel comfortable, an
elevation in core affect could exacerbate such a need for structure
to very maladaptive proportions. For example, from evident neatness
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to an obsessive concern over cleanliness.
The latter notion is very important because according to the
proposed model the intensity of core affect invariably fluctuates
and frequently goes above its normal range even in the most well
adjusted person. The latter is due to the frequent environmental
challenges the person faces in the course of living.
Therefore, one may expect that any person during any given
period of time will display a series of both adaptive and maladap-
tive defensive maneuvers.
The extent to which a person may be predominantly adaptive or
maladaptive would depend on what is the then prevalent intensity of
the core affect.
One may find such a person described in terms of his tendencies
to react in one way or another to particular circumstances. Which
is nothing more than a description of the tendencies to inadvertently
use particular established defensive behavioral maneuvers on a predic-
table basis.
Clearly, the assumption is that no person has the capacity to
avoid using particular maladaptive maneuvers or suffering from some
sort of manifestations of anxiety at one time or another.
Chronic Core Affect
The situation in the case of a chronic clinical elevation of
core affect is somewhat different from that of a temporary elevation.
In the case of such a pervasive clinical elevation of core
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affect, the defensive maneuvers would likely be generally maladap-
tive .
Naturally the severity of the maladaptive maneuvers could de-
pend to some extent on the severity of the intensity of core affect
at any given moment.
Therefore, if there is an increase in core affect over an al-
ready chronically elevated range, an exacerbation of the current
maladaptive defensive behaviors would occur. This maladaptive beha-
vioral exacerbation would be generically similar to the one occuring
with acute elevations in core affect from a more or less normal base-
line.
For example, the ordinarily suspicious person with a particular
clinical intensity of core affect would most likely become paranoid
with much higher levels of vulnerability. Obviously, in this case
the cognitive manifestations of anxiety would be facilitating the
exacerbation of the defensive maneuvers from suspiciousness to para-
noia in all likelihood.
Clearly, there are many other common examples of defensive
exacerbations, such as, from hostility to aggression, from helpless-
ness to hopelessness, from real i stic sel f-enhancement to grandiosity,
and so forth.
At any rate, it should be emphasized that in the presence of a
chronic clinical elevation in core affect, maladaptive defensive
maneuvers of one type or another would be pervasively predominant
over adaptive ones.
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Obviously, matters can become quite complicated with increasing
levels of core affect and functional (cognitive) manifestations of
anxiety. In this case, the defensive maneuvers, while still being
observed as such, could acquire very idiosyncratic and unrealistic
perspecti ves
.
An example of the above could be seen in the thoughts of a
person about being irradiated with a ray of wisdom by a man on the
moon
The defensive maneuvers may be classified in terms of the defen-
sive actions that they purportedly portray. Said defensive reactions
are labelled as avoidant, active, and passive.
Avoidant Defensive Maneuvers
The avoidant defensive maneuvers generally operate to prevent
acknowledgement of the core affect or of the discomfort associated
with it.
In the adaptive group one may include, for example, realistic
self-enhancement. In this case, the person uses valid information
to increase his sense of security by enhancing himself in context
with a particular environmental challenge or demand for competence.
A situation which may be applicable in the latter case is when
an individual's unwitting sense of threat is elevated by the compe-
tent performance of a coworker, but said individual recognizes his
performance as just as competent.
In the maladaptive group of avoidant maneuvers one could include,
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denial of subjective discomfort or concern, intellectual i zation
,
and rationalization, among others. Obviously, these defensive maneu-
vers are very common and their function again is to prevent the
acknowledgement of emotional pain or its functional effects.
The main characteristics of these defensive maneuvers are that
they basically are all cognitive formulations of one type or another
and that in their case feelings are for the most part not acknow-
ledged, but rationalized.
An anecdotal example which comes to mind, is the statement by
a depressed young woman about how unhappy her father must have been
when she was younger because he used to travel all the time and could
not spend a lot of time with her.
Active Defensive Maneuvers
The active defensive maneuvers are characterized by some kind
of reactive activity, and appear to be more closely associated with
the physical manifestations of anxiety than the others.
The adaptive maneuvers in this case are those related to goal-
directed activity, such as, alertness, motivation, and the like.
The maladaptive maneuvers of the active type are further classi-
fied into three types. These are, the primary emotional reactions,
neurotic symptoms, and somatization.
Primary emotional reactions . The primary emotional reactions, such
as, anger, jealousy, and the like are considered here to be defen-
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sive maneuvers in the form of response tendencies aimed at counter-
acting emotional pain.
The latter view is in considerable agreement with the notion of
emotional behavioral reactions being response tendencies based on
intuitive appraisal accompanied by physiological changes organized
toward approach or avoidance (Arnold, 1960).
However, while the development of particular types of primary
emotional reactions may have been influenced by cultural, develop-
mental, and other factors, the neural substrate for their expression
appears to be present in all cases.
For example, emotions, such as, anger, disgust, sadness, and
a combination of fear-surprise appear to have unambiguous facial
expressions across cultures according to a recent review by Ekman and
Oster (1979).
At any event, the primary emotional reactions appear to be
modulated by defensive physiological mechanisms to some extent. Per-
haps, this is the reason for their appearing to be facilitated by an-
xiety or a state of general arousal.
The maladaptive properties of the primary emotional reactions are
associated with an obvious lack of correspondence with the environ-
mental reality. For example, the parent who physically assaults an
infant because the latter is crying and the parent is unable to sleep.
Another example could be, the unjustified jealousy of a vulner-
able man who observes his spouse talking amicably with another man.
Clearly, the exaggerated and inappropriate nature of the defen-
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sive reaction to the circumstances may be a hallmark of maladaptive
primary emotional reactions. It seems the individual appears to
react as if he was facing an imminent threat which is not there.
Of course, the apparent defensive reaction to a nonexistent
threat is characteristic of maladaptive defensive maneuvers of any
type, but it appears more evident in behaviors such as anger and the
like.
Naturally, when facing a real danger such primary emotional re-
actions, especially anger, may be very appropriate and possibly
just as necessary then as anxiety could be for survival.
Neurotic symptoms. It would be unlikely to find arguments against
considering symptoms, such as, tics, compulsions, obsessions, phobias,
and the like to be maladaptive.
In the view of the model being proposed, these behaviors are
considered to be defensive maneuvers against the sensation of danger
which defines core affect. In these cases, the persons are aware
sometimes of the anxiety which is elicited by core affect, or may
become aware of such an anxiety without much difficulty.
As a matter of fact, the manifestations of anxiety are in many
cases what the individual intentionally is trying to avoid.
The mechanism in operation here would be that the person whose
emotional pain is above a normal level, learns at one time or another
to use a particular behavior to counteract his sense of vulnerability,
and hence the manifestations of anxiety. Therefore, whenever anxiety
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is in effect, the person performs the behavior in question and an-
xiety decreases. Obviously, anxiety decreases because there has
been a palliative decrease in core affect.
SomaMzaj^on. Somatic complaints are also considered here to be
used as maladaptive defensive maneuvers in many instances.
In the case of somatization, the brain of the individual learns
to use the somatic complaints to validate somewhat his vulnerability
and to obtain nurturance from his environment, or to avoid a challeng-
ing situation.
It seems that in this case, the person learns to use physical
manifestations of anxiety on target organs which may be sensitive to
such an anxiety.
In many instances, such as for example, in some cases of pain,
colitis and many others, the person lives in a continuous saga of
treatment from one professional to another, but never achieving the
resolution of his problem.
Naturally, the stressful nature of the symptoms themselves in-
creases core affect, which in turn causes an increase in anxiety,
which in turn makes the symptoms more severe.
While somatization has some elements of avoidance and helpless-
ness, its major characteristic as a maladaptive defensive maneuver
is considered here to be the use of physical anxiety on sensitive
target organs and using the symptoms to deal with the environment.
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Passive Defensive Maneuvpr*;
The principal mechanism in operation in the maladaptive passive
defensive maneuvers is the cognitive and functional validation of
core affect, that is, a functional surrender to core affect. Said
differently, it is like giving up to an unwitting sensation of inevi-
table harm and of being helpless to prevent it. Obviously, the latter
occurs in degrees.
In this situation a person has learned to understand core affect
as, for example, hopelessness, and to validate it in terms of his
beliefs about himself and the environment. In other words, the brain
has learned to process the sensation of vulnerability as a state of
hopelessness as if facing some imminent and inevitable danger. Ob-
viously, the cognitive interpretations by the individual of himself
and of the environment would reflect that feeling of hopelessness.
Clearly the situation being discussed is one instance of the
condition known as depression. It should be noted that our view of
depression is in some agreement with the view of such a condition in
terms of a learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975).
Now, while there appear to be definite physiological manifes-
tations of this negative cognitive state, these are considered to be
part of the defensive maneuver and not its cause.
That is, it is postulated here that the alterations in the acti-
vity of neurotransmitter substances and other accompanying physiolo-
gical concomitants in depression occur as a result of the functional
validation of core affect by the brain In this m,"• i n case, the expression
of the analog of ongoing experience would be constituted by the cog-
nitive interpretation of the environment as inevitably harmful to-
gether with the beliefs associated with such an interpretation and
the many physiological concomitants to depression.
It should be observed that the preceding construction of the
condition known as depression assigns to the antidepressant drugs
the role of modulators of some of the neurochemical changes which
result from the validation of core affect by the brain. Like with
the drugs used in the management of anxiety, the use of antidepres-
sants is postulated to be useful as an assuasive course of action in
depression rather than as a treatment which would produce psychothera-
peutic change.
The improvement which may be obtained in depression with cog-
nitive psychotherapy (Beck et al., 1979) supports the above view.
According to the view proposed here, during the conditions of
helplessness or hopelessness (i.e., depression) is when the indivi-
dual is most directly in cognitive contact with core affect. The
other time is during the experiencing of core affect as fear.
The adaptive types of the passive defensive maneuvers may reflect
some of the most tender and productive ways to interact with the en-
vironment. In this case the person appears to unwittingly use the
emotional pain not only to obtain nurturance but to offer it to some-
one else.
For example, in the case of empathy, the intensity of the per-
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son's vulnerability is increased with the observation of someone
else's suffering. That is, the behavior indicative of an elevation
in core affect displayed by the person who is suffering is a generic
cognitive input symbolic of danger to the observer.
Naturally, the observer is not aware of the process, but when
his emotional pain or core affect is elevated he may use such a sen-
sation to identify with the other person's suffering. That is, there
is a cognitive interpretation of the situation as painful by the ob-
server, directly as the consequence of an elevation in his own core
affect. In this way, the observer's own discomfort becomes a relative
index of the pain being suffered by the other person.
In love, just like in the case of any other defensive maneuver,
the purpose is to satisfy the person's subliminal need of safety.
Obviously, at the ideal adaptive level love is prompted by a normal
range of vulnerability. The latter would mean that a mutually satis-
fying feeling of safety and a sense of equal responsibility and com-
petence would be characteristic of a relationship between a man and
a woman whose levels of vulnerability would be at an ideally normal
range
.
Of course, the perfect relationship does not exist according
to our proposed model, because the intensity of emotional pain fluc-
tuates according to physical and environmental demands and both mem-
bers could not keep an ideally normal level of such a core affect
continuously. Thus, the degree of closeness in the relationship would
be determined by the degree of vulnerability of each of the members
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les
of the couple and by the types of defensive reactions and strategic
each would display towards the other during any given period of time.
Bethatasitmay, it is possible to conceive the possibility of
an idyllic relationship in the case where both members of the couple
are only vulnerable to an ideally normal level.
It should be indicated that there may be other factors in a
love relationship which decrease core affect. These factors are cog-
nitive elements in ongoing experience which are symbolic of safety.
That is, they are associated with a reduction in core affect. Such
cognitive elements may particularly include, but not be limited to,
the physical and other personal characteristics of someone which one
may like or find pleasant.
Perhaps it should be brought up at this point that the confron-
tation of core affect or its derivatives appears to be useful in
softening the persistent nature of any of the maladaptive defensive
maneuvers during the course of therapy.
Obviously, if the defensive maneuvers and anxiety are in reac-
tion to a subliminal anticipation of danger or vulnerability anything
which would decrease said core affect would also cause fading of the
defensive maneuvers and decrease the anxiety.
Perhaps the most obvious proof for the preceding assumptions
are the improvements which are obtained in anxiety and the defensive
maladaptive maneuvers by just receiving emotional support.
The construction of ongoing experience by the brain is influenced
by the intensity of core affect. Thus, when the vulnerability is
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above normal the cognitive representation of ongoing experience
becomes symbolic of danger and in tU rn further increases the in-
tensity of core affect.
However, with consistently frequent cognitive input which
refutes the notion of environmental danger the cognitive interpre-
tation of ongoing experience eventually would be more objective or
more of a cognitive analog of the environment. As such, the afferent
communication from the cortex to the limbic region would not contain
elements of danger, but rather statements about the absence of the
1 atter.
Obviously, in the latter situation there would be an unwitting
ancitipation of danger which is being constantly dissociated from
the cognitive elements of the representation of ongoing experience,
and which is gradually diminishing as a result of a lack of cognitive
stimuli which would elicit it.
In context with the preceding, a person may be instructed in the
understanding of core affect as a subliminal sensation separate from
the cognitive representation of ongoing experience. That is, one may,
for example, feel worthless, but be able to cognitively appreciate
the fallacy of such a feeling.
Similarly, when a person is called stupid, he may identify the
elevation in core affect as a feeling of being stupid, but admit to
himself that he is not and subsequently not feel stupid anymore.
Therefore, one may confront core affect directly in the same
manner.
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To that effect, the clinical interventions during the course
of this theoretical investigation have obtained gradual improve-
ment in defensive behaviors and other symptoms in most instances
when the person has been instructed to tell himself that he feels
in danger, but that there is no danger, either in a scheduled manner
or only during moments of increased discomfort. This technique has
been especially useful in the cases where there have been severe
physical symptoms.
It should be specified that the latter instructions have gra-
dually produced the desired results even when the person has been
invited to follow the instructions without being informed initially
about the reasons for doing so.
This confrontation of the intensity of the emotional pain with
the objective environmental reality can be done in several different
ways to obtain the desired decrease in the frequency of the maladap-
tive behaviors and in other symptoms. However, the degree to which
it may be successful appears to depend on it being instituted within
the process of a psychotherapeutic relationship.
Interpersonal Relationships
Generally speaking, all human relationships are modulated by
the intensity of core affect. Therefore, depending on how symbolic
of safety the relationship is, that is how strong the need is to
preserve it. The latter difference could be obvious between the
relationship among two coworkers and the one between spouses.
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In terms of the model being proposed, it may be concluded that
the capacity of a person to establish and maintain satisfying close
interpersonal relationships is an inverse function of how subliminally
insecure such a person is. That is, such a capacity would be inverse-
ly proportional to the intensity of core affect, particularly in the
case of elevations above its normal range.
It appears evident that our society impresses as being very
compressed and that the person lives in constant interpersonal inter-
action. Regardless of what one is doing or thinking, or where one
is coming from or going to, it is almost impossible to avoid inter-
acting directly or indirectly with others. It would appear then,
that the lion's share of core affect elevations are associated with
interpersonal and/or social demands.
Being a social creature, as assumed by this work, the defensive
maneuvers an individual uses to cope with core affect in his inter-
action with the environment would, to an enormous extent, operate
in the interpersonal context. For example, a very vulnerable person
would have difficulty with trusting and feeling competent enough
to become close to someone without some sort of discomfort associated
with core affect.
As postulated here, interpersonal closeness acts as a demand
for emotional competence. In other words, for a person to feel secure
with others he must have some measure of feeling secure within him-
self.
In the case of a vulnerable person, a demand for emotional or
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interpersonal competence is very threatening. Therefore, attempts
at closeness in the latter case would cause a further elevation in
core affect.
The latter is a paradox in the sense that the person who may
need the most the secure and competent feeling of closeness cannot
tolerate said closeness because the demand for the emotional com-
petence required exacerbates his insecurity.
At any rate, if a person is being affected by an intense subli-
minal sensation of threat his tendencies would be to interact with
the environment in an apprehensive manner. That is, as if he was
in some sort of inconspicuous danger.
In that case, he could unwittingly make excessive demands from
his environment for nurturance and/or react to it defensively or with
hostility. For example it is quite common to find that no matter
how much support one may offer at a particular time to someone who may
be very dependent or depressed it may not be considered enough by that
person, especially on an initial contact. It seems that the need of
comfort far exceeds a reasonable limit during periods of augmented
vul nerabi 1 i ty
.
At any rate, during any given period of time, the behavior,
thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of a person would reflect unwitting
efforts to defend against a subliminal sensation of danger in context
with the environment and interpersonal relationships.
Being that core affect is, according to our view, the motivating
force underlying the person's investment into interpersonal relation-
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ships, ,t is not difficult to conceive the therapeutic relationship
as a vehicle foe the realization of such a core affect or vulnera-
bility.
i ve-
CHAPTER VI
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC CHANGE
Psychotherapy is based on the assumption of its own effectl-
ess as a method which may make evident an equally assumed change-
ability of behavior. Change in this case may be sought through ways
which may include but not be limited to behavioral, psychological,
or social manipulation and the purveyance of support and communica-
tion by another person trained in such endeavors (Enelow, 1977).
It is extremely likely that at this very moment a given number
of clinicians is engaged in efforts ranging from their best to their
worst, to help promote change in one particular aspect or more of
an individual's life. The methods or approaches used by such clini-
cians may vary among them, but the purpose is always to produce change
in the direction of a goal set by either the therapist and client
jointly, or unilaterally by one or the other.
However, when change may be suspected of having taken place,
one can but only infer that such a change took place from the obser-
vable behavior of the individual, from the reports of others, or
from that individual's own reports. Thus, what actually took place
as an intrinsic aspect of the individual, that is, the nature of the
change and the process by which that change occurred may be considered
to belong in the realm of theory.
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The abundance of theories of therapy creates the possibility
of a different theory behind the therapeutic efforts of each one of
several clinicians at any particular point in time. Moreover, it
is likely that the number of theories of therapy will increase rather
than decrease. To this latter effect, it has been reasonably obser-
ved that the disappearance of any particular school of psychological
theory has a low probability due to the loyalty many of its followers
will invariably demonstrate (Frank, 1978). Therefore, one may find
theories of therapy ranging from concerns about observable behaviors
and events to concerns about inferential perspectives.
In a conservative form of behavior modification, for example,
the clinician may be more concerned about observable behaviors and
events than about inferences related to mediational processes for
the behaviors observed (Wolpe, 1969). Thus, the intention is to
deal only with observable behavior. Such is the case of systematic
desensitization where the basic underlying mechanism of change has
been assumed to be the incompatibility between the behavioral symp-
toms of an emotional state, such as the recognized fear of a par-
ticular object, and physical relaxation. Despite its limitations,
just the fact that a method such as systematic desensitization may
be successfully applied in some cases may be sufficient justification
for its utilization independently of the possible idiosyncrasies of
the theory behind it.
However, it could be noted that the relaxation component of
systematic desensitization has been conceived as being a matter of
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mental, rather than physical relaxation in the case where instruc-
tions are given to the subject to sel f- i nstruct to hecahn (Michenhau™,
1977).
As it is evident in the latter procedure, the same incorporates
cognitive changes into the sphere of the techniques of behavioral
modification to constitute one instance of what has become to be known
as cognitive-behavior modification (Mahoney, 1974; Michenbaum, 1977).
It appears that the prominent distinction between behavior modifica-
tion and cognitive-behavior modification resides in the expressed
theoretical and methodological emphasis of cognitive causal factors
in the latter and the lack of that same emphasis in the former.
The theoretical emphasis on the cognitive causation of what
have been labelled as emotional disorders is characteristic of several
models of behavioral change which emphasize cognitive theory and
methodology (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962). For example, in one
instance it has been suggested that in a condition such as depression,
the cognitive structures or mechanisms are not themselves disordered,
but rather that the contents of the cognitions do not correspond to
external realities (Beck, 1976).
In other terms, the premises upon which a person bases his be-
liefs and imaginal experiences may be incorrect. This way, in a case
such as clinical depression, the ideas one may have about the environ-
ment and oneself and the facts about the external world emerge as a
sort of cognitive conflict. That is, such as having notions of one-
self as a failure while the evidence points toward the opposite.
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The origin of such cognitive distortions is assumed to be defec-
tive learning during the person's development, and thus, subject
to change or correction through the semantic exchange between the
client and the therapist, and through cognitive exercises (Beck et al
.
,
1979; Emery et al .
, 1981 )
.
Besides the theoretical ascription of therapeutic change to
the direct effect of cognitive changes or behavioral manipulations,
intense emotional experiences have been suggested to also produce
some type of psychotherapeutic change (Frank, 1974). A related si-
tuation may be described by the following description of personality
change, in connection with the analysis of a minor revolution at a
Japanese relocation camp (Leighton, 1946).
It is fairly well recognized in psychology that at periods
of great emotional stir the individual human being can
undergo far-reaching and permanent changes in his persona-
lity. It is as if the bone structure of his systems of
belief and of this habitual patterns of behavior becomes
soft, is fused into new shapes and hardens there when the
period of tension is over. (p. 360)
It is, in terms of the preceding, a known fact that several
contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches emphasize the dominant role
played by intentional emotional experiences in therapeutic change.
It appears obvious that although the many different forms of
therapy, even those not referred to here, emphasize different or
combined theoretical formulations and may utilize similar or different
techniques, they all have in common, in varying interpersonal degrees,
the relationship between the client and the therapist.
This relationship by force has to be considered unique in each
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instance. No matter how consistent across situations the therapist
may attempt to be, the variability from one client to another would
have a differential effect on the different client-therapist relation-
ships.
This personal interaction between the client and the therapist
appears so related to therapeutic change that it has been used as
the theoretical core of the therapeutic maneuvers in interactional
(Cashdan, 1973) and interpersonal (Rogers, 1951) process-oriented
models of psychotherapy. In the interactional model, for example,
the client replaces maladaptive interpersonal strategies with adaptive
ones as a result of his interaction with the therapist (Cashdan , 1 973)
.
It seems more reasonable to assume that each therapeutic rela-
tionship has certain unique properties, as may occur between any two
persons, independently of the technique used, than to assume that
the therapeutic relationship would always be the same given a parti-
cular theoretical approach or a particular technique. In other words,
like in any other interpersonal interaction, each member brings into
the relationship a different set of defensive maneuvers and many other
factors, such as differences in sex, race, culture, education, age,
and so forth.
Moreover, the differences between therapeutic interactions could
be considered liable to increase if it has been correctly observed
that there is a trend in psychology toward eclecticism in the practice
of therapy, while particular theoretical orientations may still be
professed by the same eclectic practitioners (Mahoney, 1977). However,
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despite the potential for said differences it is our contention in
material ahead that the process through which the therapeutic rela-
tionship develops appears to be generically the same in all instances.
Despite the differences among clinicians in terms of the theories
they subscribe to, the techniques they use, and the type of relation-
ship they seek, or even have with the client, it is fairly evident
that all formal psychotherapeutic interventions may achieve relative-
ly satisfactory results at one level or another of outcome criteria
(Smith, Glass & Miller, 1980).
The latter appears to be in agreement with the related suggestion
that the treatment of what have been formally recognized as emotional
disorders may predominantly follow any one of three methodological
or theoretical routes, that is, cognitive, behavioral, or affective
and achieve somewhat similar results (Frank, 1973). One may observe
based on the model considered in this work, that it is a combination
of these functional routes which is challenged during the therapeutic
process
.
Except for didactic or experimental reasons, it would be ludi-
crous to assume, even in an extreme form of behaviorism, that the
therapist would be interacting with the client at only one functional
level rather than with the very complex makeup of the person as a
whole. It is impossible to look at any particular form of therapy
and in the absence of a theoretical bias not to consider that cog-
nitive and affective changes and manipulations or, as suggested by
Enelow (1977), reinforcement of certain behaviors of the client by the
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therapist are part of such a process. Thus, despite the emphasis
on a particular theoretical perspective or a specific technique the
therapist is dealing with a whole system rather than with the part
of that system to which such a theory or technique may apply.
Now it seems that all formal psychological clinical approaches
may achieve somewhat satisfactory results at one level or another.
These results may be considered possible with the use of simil
different techniques based on the same theory or on different theori
in a therapeutic relationship with a unique combination of interper-
sonal elements. Therefore, it appears that something happens in each
case which is common to all therapeutic attempts which achieve any
relative measure of success in meeting their goals.
Evidently, in agreement with the model being proposed in this
work, what is common to all partially or completely successful psycho-
therapeutic situations is probably what appears to be either a passing
or durable functional change which may take place as a result of the
intervention.
Without question, the basic change being addressed here is either
a transient or lasting reduction in the intensity of core affect as a
result of the therapeutic intervention.
The enduring character of the reduction in core affect or it
fugacious nature would be determined by either the fulfillment of the
psychotherapeutic process in the former or the lack of its realization
in the latter. Obviously, the latter means, according to our view,
that psychotherapeutic change occurs if and only if the therapeutic
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process reaches maturity.
In other words, psychotherapeutic change is a basic reduction
in the intensity of core affect to a fairly stable normal range as
a function of the psychotherapeutic process. Obviously, the norma-
lization of such a sensation of threat would be accompanied by an
increase in adaptive defensive maneuvers, by the fading of symptoms
and maladaptive maneuvers, and by a more realistic cognitive apprai-
sal of ongoing experience.
As stipulated, as a result of the process of psychotherapy, the
normalization of core affect occurs to an adaptive baseline. This
baseline would be just the amount of vulnerability necessary to main-
tain tonic cognitive and affective functions. However, as indicated
earlier, core affect could become elevated above its normal range by
physical and environmental challenges or stressors in the course of
living. Therefore, symptoms and maladaptive maneuvers may be present
during those periods at which there are core affect elevations above
the normalized level.
Nonetheless, if the person has gone through the whole process of
therapy according to the model proposed, it is postulated that he
should ordinarily be able to recognize the recurrence of symptoms
and maladaptive defensive maneuvers as indicators of an elevation
in core affect and use the understanding acquired during psychotherapy
to confront such an elevation in vulnerability.
After all, once a person has completed a full course of therapy
he is supposed to enjoy the emotional competence required to confront
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adversity, at least under less than catastrophic conditions.
Naturally, under catastrophic conditions the person's vulnera-
bility is so intense that he may temporarily display symptoms and
maladaptive defensive maneuvers. The reasons for the latter, as
discussed in Chapter 3 earlier, are the aggregated functional effects
on the brain and the rest of the body of an intense core affect.
However, once the crisis is over his core affect would gradually
subside and the person would recover capacity to cope with emotional
pain, with a return of vulnerability to a more or less normal range.
It may be necessary in some cases where recovery is not prompt
after the crisis is over for the person to again contact the therapist
briefly for a booster interpretation of current circumstances in terms
of an elevated core affect.
Now, in order for the person to be alerted of an increased vul-
nerability by anxiety, negative thinking, maladaptive behavior, or
other symptoms, he must understand what core affect is, how the brain
and the rest of the body react to it, and what sort of defensive
maneuvers he uses or has used to cope with it. The latter knowledge
does not appear difficult to acquire during psychotherapy with spe-
cific techniques befitting the model being proposed.
Psychotherapeutic Techniques
As it would be evident to those who would formulate emotional
disturbances in terms of core affect, most techniques used in psycho-
therapy would be in agreement with the model being proposed, even
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though they may have been conceptualized under other theoretical
auspi ces
.
For example, a particular therapeutic approach mentioned earlier
which is entirely supported by the theory of core affect is the inter-
actional model of therapy suggested by Cashdan (1973).
Cashdan suggests as the basis for his model of therapy the need
of people to interact with and depend on one and other for their emo-
tional wellbeing. The incapacity to achieve a sense of emotional
wellbeing is in this case associated with the display of maladaptive
interpersonal strategies by the person. Obviously, these concepts
are in complete agreement with the interpersonal needs stipulated
as manifestations of core affect.
After an initial period of supportive interaction, Cashdan sug-
gests the confrontation of the maladaptive strategies displayed
towards the therapist and others by the client and the channelling
of the client's behavior to the display of more competent interper-
sonal strategies. At any rate, therapeutic change is evident when
the client is free from symptoms and consistently displays competent
behavior.
While Cashdan's model of therapy is not discussed here in enough
detail to offer a complete picture of its process, suffice it to note
that is theoretical foundations and techniques are in comparative
agreement with the core affect principles considered in this work.
Moreover, Cashdan's therapy model fits well into the process of thera-
py based on core affect which is considered in pages ahead.
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While the theoretical mode! being proposed is amenable to
therapeutic techniques, there are some specific interventions which
are particularly suited to the model.
The principal one of these interventions is helping the client
understand himself in terms of an unwitting anticipation of danger
or vulnerability. In the latter case the client would learn what core
affect is, learn to recognize it if possible, and become aware of the
defensive maneuvers he uses to cope with it.
In addition, anxiety manifestations of any type would be inter-
preted to the client in terms of defensive reactions to core affect.
Similarly, the effects of core affect on thoughts and beliefs would
be interpreted as such, rather than in terms of the lexical content.
Particularly helpful with this model has been to explain to the
client that his problems or symptoms are direct or indirect conse-
quences of an elevated core affect and not due to disease, and to
describe to him the process of psychotherapy.
Obviously, these latter interventions may be performed at any
appropriate time during the course of therapy, but usually their ini-
tiation has been found to be most propitious during the earliest
phase of therapy.
Of course, a basic aim of these interventions is to allow the
client to objectify his feelings. That is, to confront the feelings
in terms of the actual circumstances surrounding him. For example,
if a person expresses paranoid thinking the feeling behind those
thoughts is gradually reduced through semantic exchange to an antici-
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pation of danger which the client is then asked to confront in
text with the actual nondangerous circumstances surrounding him.
As explained earlier, the cognitive input to the cortex then
would be a negation of the limbic sensation of danger, which in turn
causes a cortical afferent input to the limbic system of a lack of
danger. The theory assumes that this repeated cortical afferent in-
put to the limbic system is what gradually reduces core affect and
allows for it to be understood and perceived as a pure sensation of
danger.
Similarly, the message the brain gets from a supportive inter-
action is also of a lack of danger because the analog cognitive repre
sentation of the therapist and his behavior in the brain is that of
a source of safety. The latter is, according to the model proposed,
why emotional support decreases core affect.
Naturally, the traditional view of organized subconscious psycho
dynamic processes would not be consistent with the model being pro-
posed. As such, during the clinical work preceding this writing
the existence of such processes has been purposefully de-emphasized.
It is noteworthy to mention that virtually all of the individuals
who completed a course of therapy and most of those who did not
during the period of clinical observations which form the basis for
this dissertation, found it very simple and palatable to understand
themselves and their problems in terms of the core affect theory.
To a considerable extent the specific interventions above aim
at equipping the client with skills to cope with elevations in core
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affect on an ongoing basis after leaving therapy. Thus reducing
the chance of any further need of therapy under ordinary circum-
stances .
It is important to emphasize that the most effective ongoing
techniques during the course of therapy with this model are the con-
frontation of negative feelings (core affect) with the reality of
the surroundings and the interpretation of behavior in terms of core
affect.
It should be pointed out, however, that while direct confronta-
tion of core affect is most effective, indirect confrontation of the
sensation of threat may be necessary in cases where the person is not
acquainted yet with core affect or when the capacity to conceptualize
such a core affect is not present. In this case, the particular fee-
ling or thought may be explored in the same form as it is perceived
by the person rather than as a sensation of threat.
For example, a person whose core affect emerges as a feeling
of guilt, could be led to confront such a feeling with the reality
of not being quilty of anything. That is, one may feel in a parti-
cular way which does not conform to the reality of the environment.
Clearly, the techniques mentioned above are just a few of the
types of clinical interventions which could be performed with this
model. Among the types of clinical interventions which are compa-
tible with or supported by the core affect model are virtually all
of the cognitive, interpersonal, and behavioral techniques.
It should be pointed out that using the specific techniques of
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interpretation and confrontation of core affect indicated above,
and the model in general, considerable expediency appears to be
achieved in completing the whole process of psychotherapy in a rela-
tively short period of time. For example, it has been found with
the model being proposed that under favorable circumstances the pro-
cess may have been completed in as few as ten sessions. However,
that matter requires further investigation with quantitative para-
meters .
The Process of Psychotherapy
In terms of core affect theory, the process of psychotherapy
can only occur as a function of the relationship between the client
and the therapist.
It becomes necessary that a competent interpersonal relation-
ship be established between the therapist and the client for the
process of psychotherapy to be completed and produce the normaliza-
tion of core affect.
The latter means that, according to our view, the therapeutic
relationship has to proceed from one of dependency on the therapist
as a provider of safety to one where the client feels on equal ground
with the therapist.
In our view, therapeutic change occurs when the client accepts
responsibility for his own sense of safety and the therapeutic rela-
tionship shifts to a close interpersonal one, where both the client
and the therapist perceive each other without apprehension and as
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competent persons. In other words, the change would be from a ther-
apeutic relationship to a competent social relationship.
As stated earlier, core affect is proposed here to be the moti-
vating force underlying all interpersonal relationships. Therefore,
it is not surprising to find that in order for core affect to be
normalized the process of therapeutic change depends on the develop-
ment of a competent interpersonal relationship between the client
and the therapist.
Since core affect is a subliminal sensation of threat or danger
which is most apparent in the interpersonal realm, it fits that
relief from such an emotional pain be sought in an interpersonal con-
text. It should be observed that the latter is largely predetermined
by the recognition and establishment of interpersonal relationships
as sources of nurturance and safety during the period before adult-
hood. Obviously, the latter process is a functional aspect of the
brain and one may not be quite aware of it.
Since the therapeutic relationship is the medium for the norma-
lization of core affect, the process of psychotherapy has to be
considered in terms of the changes in the intensity of core affect
as a function of the phases in the development of such an interper-
sonal relationship.
The process of psychotherapy is depicted graphically by Figure
16 on the following page.
Obviously, such a graphical representation is purely theoretical
since the core affect curve shown has to be generically qualitative.
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That is, it is postulated, according to the clinical observations
upon which it is based, that the curve varies somewhat in each indi-
vidual case. It should be emphasized that such a vulnerability
curve would not be a smooth one as represented in the illustration
due to the constant fluctuation in the intensity of core affect.
The latter means that the relative proportions of vulnerability
represented in the illustration on the vertical axis are qualitative
rather than representing absolute values in the intensity of core
affect.
Similarly, the theoretical periods for the process of psycho-
therapy indicated on the horizontal axis of the illustration do not
represent actual values for the duration of each period. Like for
the intensity of core affect, it is postulated that the duration of
each period of the process of psychotherapy will vary with each
individual case.
However, the illustration depicts the qualitative changes in
the intensity of core affect (shaded area) which can be predicted
as a function of the therapeutic process. Such qualitative changes
are based on the similar relative variations in core affect indirect-
ly observed in all the cases which completed a course of psychotherapy
during the three years which preceded this writing.
The latter means that, according to our model, the process of
psychotherapy is qualitatively identical in every case. In other
words, such a process is always constituted by the different periods
or phases represented by Figure 16 in the preceding page.
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The process of psychotherapy, as the illustration indicates,
is divided into four chronological periods which according to the
model proposed can be predicted in every case. These phases are the
mm^enod, the cjntUaJjenod, the o^tej^^ and the
termination period
.
In addition, the illustration depicts certain points in therapy
which have considerable clinical importance. The first point (A)
represents the very initial contacts with the client. The latter
is followed by the point where the critical period begins (B) due
to the pull on the client for emotional competence by the relation-
ship. Next comes the critical point (C) where the client shifts
from a very high vulnerability to a feeling of wellbeing. The last
three points of interest are the peak of discomfort during termina-
tion (D), the last session (E), and the period after therapy (F).
Parenthetically, the theoretical process curve for emotional
pain depicted by Figure 16 appears to qualitatively coincide with
the core affect curve which could be construed for the developmental
progression from birth to adulthood. In the latter case, the cri-
tical period, for example, would represent adolescence.
Support period
. There is no question about the favorable consequences
of support being the most blatant evidence for the sensation of vul-
nerability postulated as core affect. When a person with a clinical
elevation in core affect enters a therapeutic interaction a decrease
in vulnerability can invariably be seen immediately. As depicted by
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Figure 16, the point of entry into the relationship (A) represents
the highest level in the intensity of core affect.
Naturally, no matter how much support one may offer it may not be
enough and the client may withdraw from the relationship immediately.
Also, the extreme vulnerability in the client during the initial
contacts itself acts as a barrier to therapy because support may be
unwittingly perceived as a sign of closeness, which would be very
threatening due to the demands for emotional competence it imposes.
During this period of supportive interaction the sensation of
danger gradually decreases tonically. Obviously, during this period
the client performs considerable work in understanding himself and
confronting his core affect, but always deriving a sense of safety
from the relationship with the therapist.
According to our observations, the benefits of support and in-
creased understanding arrive at a point where they have reached their
optimal level of effect. At this point the client feels comfortable,
usually the symptoms are either mild or absent to a great extent, and
the client is coping with his environment with mostly adaptive maneu-
vers .
It is during this period when the therapist begins to relate
to the client in ways which establish a demand for competent behavior
from such a client. The latter may be in the form of merely asking
the client where he feels he is in therapy or how close to termination
he is. Also, for example, just by relating to the client as if he
was an emotionally competent or secure person.
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The onset of the discomfort associated with the latter is in-
dicated by B in Figure 16 and initiates the second stage or period
of psychotherapy.
Cri tical peri od, it is during this period where the sense of vul-
nerability reaches high levels as a result of the demands for com-
petence from the therapeutic relationship.
A most interesting aspect of this phase is that the person feels
terrible but is generally handling his environment adequately.
A vignette which comes to mind is that of a woman who reported
suicidal thoughts during this period just like those at the onset of
therapy and to feel just as uncomfortable. However, when asked to
describe her ongoing activities, she reportedly was enjoying her work
and getting along with everybody, was busy taking care of her family,
whose members were all suffering from influenza, and she herself
was taking antibiotics for a respiratory infection with strict ad-
herence to the prescription because she desired to get over her
i 1 1 ness
.
Needless to say, exploration of the discomfort evidenced a feeling
of threat quite separate from her environmental circumstances and
behavior. Such a feeling of threat disappeared quite promptly after
being explored and confronted. As a matter of fact, the client found
it quite humorous after the discomfort was explored and interpreted.
Clearly, one of the hallmarks of this period is that the client
returns to the use of some of the maladaptive defensive maneuvers
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displayed at the beginning of therapy.
Some clients may indicate being bored with therapy, feeling that
therapy does not help, or report a desire to leave therapy right
away because they feel as well as they wanted to feel. They may
insist on the therapist doing something for them which would relieve
their discomfort quickly but not be able to know what they are asking
for or display a host of other similar behaviors.
The behaviors listed above are aimed at breaking the relation-
ship, increased demands for nurturance, criticism, and many other
defensive activities.
In parenthesis, it should be pointed out that since the thera-
pist is also a participant in the establishment of the therapeutic
relationship his core affect would also be subject to significant
elevations during this period.
Therefore, this is a time when the therapist may fall prey to
his own maladaptive defensive maneuvers. Obviously, there are many
dangers associated with the latter situation. For example, it appears
that this would be the stage of therapy where the therapist may be
most willing to allow the client to leave the relationship premature-
ly or make the client's statements and behavior his own personal is-
sues. Based on our construct of the process of therapy, the critical
period of psychotherapy is the phase where the therapist is most
likely to be technically or personally inappropriate.
At any rate, a prominent topic during this period is that of
interpersonal relationships. Also, it is perhaps the stage at which
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most people leave ongoing psychotherapy for one reason or another.
During this critical period the intensity of core affect in-
creases to a maximal point of discomfort, which is the threshold
into a feeling of wellbeing. This point of maximal discomfort is
considered here to be the critical or turning point in the process
of psychotherapy and is indicated by C in Figure 16.
It should be stressed that according to the observations on which
this process is based, the culmination of the sensation of threat
at this point can be very intense. As such, the maladaptive defen-
sive maneuvers may also be intense. The latter means that depending
on the types of defensive maneuvers observed initially, the therapist
has to assist the client with the interpretation of the symptoms or
discomfort to avoid undesirable consequences.
For example, in the case of an initially depressed and suicidal
person, it is possible to predict that the same maladaptive maneuvers
may be displayed by the client during the critical period of therapy.
Especially important is to monitor cognitive function in a client
with original tendencies to become disorganized with core affect
elevations
.
It is at the critical point in psychotherapy where the cognitive
interpretation of core affect as an actual anticipation or sensation
of danger which is not consistent with environmental reality allows
the client to shift from being an insecure and vulnerable person to
start being the opposite. The critical poit is postulated as the
juncture where the limbic sensation of danger is finally defused and
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becomes increasingly susceptible to the normalizing effects of the
established cognitive feedback of no danger which has been slowly
developing up to this point. Basically, what the person does here
is to confront his own sense of vulnerability purely as a sensation
unrelated to environmental reality. In other words, affect is ob-
jectified.
Clearly, the sudden drop in core affect which occurs when the
critical point is crossed is considered to be encompassed by the
dissociation of a great part of the limbic anticipation of danger
from the functional analog of ongoing experience. Therefore, the
cognitive interpretation of the environment becomes more realistic
and pragmatic. In many cases, however, the sudden drop in the inten-
sity of core affect and defensive reactions of the organism may cause
an exhilarating nurturant feeling of varying duration.
Once the client crosses the threshold into a feeling of compe-
tence the third phase of therapy starts.
Competence period . The hallmark of this period is the swift feeling
of relief and wellbeing which occurs with the shift from a chronic
clinical core affect to one closer to the normal range. As a matter
of fact, some clients have reported considerable elation with the
process from vulnerability to a capacity to feel secure. Obviously,
a positive affective state is seen by the model of behavior being
proposed as a reduction in a negative affective state. That is,
positive feelings are construed as the reduction in core affect whicl
240
corresponds to such feelings, rather than as the activity of a pro-
cess antagonic to core affect. In other words, positive affect
is conceptualized as the relief from emotional pain.
However, it is possible to postulate that a reduction in core
affect could activate or disinhibit some sort of endorphin or endor-
phin-like activity in the brain. The latter is more realistic in the
case of strong positive affect as the result of a sudden large drop
in the intensity of core affect.
Thus, the brief exhilarating positive feeling which may follow
the large drop in intensity of core affect at the critical point in
therapy may be construed to be produced by the stimulation or disinhi-
bition of such an endorphin or endorphin-1 i ke activity.
It is during the competence period that the client may begin to
see core affect and the defensive maneuvers in others. This is also
where it is common for the client to link developmental events to the
elevation in core affect which brought him into therapy.
Similarly characteristic during this stage of psychotherapy is
for the client to become interested in learning about the process
and to tie ends to explain to himself the many behaviors, situations,
thoughts, and feelings which could come together now.
Clearly, the state of the relationship is very close, pleasant
and quasisocial at this point. However, when the notion of termina-
tion is introduced a new phase of therapy in entered.
Termination period . There are two small elevations in core affect
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during this period. One occurs when termination is targeted, and
the other, which is smaller, occurs with the last meeting between
the therapist and the client, indicated respectively by D and E in
Figure 16.
Obviously, the end of therapy is symbolic of the loss of support
or of a safety factor and some elevation in core affect takes place.
However, like in any other situation, interpretation of the discom-
fort as core affect by both the client and the therapist is performed^
but more in terms of an equal relationship.
According to our view, the process of normalization of core
affect is actually completed after therapy has ended, as indicated
by F in Figure 16. In other words, the client has to overcome the
last strand of vulnerability attaching him to the therapist and con-
tinue feeling secure without the contact with the latter.
Naturally, the relationship continues from then on at a more or
less social level and both the therapist and the client feel about
equal to each other. Such a relationship should remain competent
and interpersonal ly satisfying after therapy has ended.
A Question of Nomenclature
The foregoing section has considered therapeutic change as a
functional shift from an elevated sensation of danger intrinsic to
the person to the reduced normal range of activity of such a sensa-
tion .
Clearly, the change has to do with the individual and not with
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his environment. In addition, the change occurs as a result of a
process denominated as psychotherapy.
If the process described here is psychotherapy, then a distinc-
tion may be possible between the latter and what could be labelled
as counselling.
The distinction being made here is that psychotherapy is actually
a functional change to a normalized core affect in the individual,
while counselling may be the manipulation of behavior, environmental
factors, or relationships in terms of their symbolic value of safety.
Naturally, the apparent reduction in core affect in the latter
case is caused by the increase in safety factors rather than by the
normalization of core affect. With the removal of the safety factors,
core affect elevations would become evident again.
For example, an individual with an elevated core affect may be
very sensitive to ordinary environmental stress, but if the stress
is removed the manifestations of core affect could become milder, at
least temporarily. However, if the stress is again brought into
the situation the manifestations of core affect would become evident
again.
On the other hand, if the same individual undergoes the process
of psychotherapy, his tolerance for ordinary stress would increase
substantially and he would not react in the same defensive manner to
ordinary environmental factors which were previously stressful.
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Other Applications
Since in the model being proposed core affect is considered
to underlie human behavior it is not difficult to assume that the
applications of such a model are inexhaustible. Discussion of all
the possible applications of the model would most likely turn out
endless. Besides, many of the applications of the model may be best
approached from an empirical point of view.
Nonetheless, there are a few applications of the model of the
process of psychotherapy proposed here which would be probably appro-
priate to mention briefly.
Supervision
.
The concept of core affect and the process of psycho-
therapy postulated give strong indications of being very effective
in clinical supervision. The latter impression is based on the faci-
litative nature of the process in the supervision of clinicians.
In terms of the preceding, the predictive properties of the
theoretical curve of the process of psychotherapy allow the clinician
and the supervisor to share a common theoretical framework to conceive
and formulate the developments in therapy. It is perhaps the capa-
bility for the prediction of the shifts in core affect and the mani-
festations of the latter which make the model potentially very useful
in supervision.
Obviously, such a view emphasizes a formulation of the therapeu-
tic process in terms of the ongoing affective context rather than the
cognitive or behavioral content. That is, the emphasis is on what is
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the affect being conveyed rather than on how it is being expressed.
C linical group setting. An area where the proposed core affect
model appears to work well is in clinical interventions with mul-
tiple relationships, such as, with couples, families, and groups.
In these cases core affect becomes the common denominator of the
group and the relationships between group members are construed in
terms of core affect.
The process appears virtually identical to the one described
earlier, except that the process curve for each member of the group
could be somewhat different from that of any other member. Clearly,
the differences would be in terms of where in the process each member
of the group would be at any given time. It seems also that the
process tends to proceed at a slower pace in group interventions
than in individual therapy.
Evaluation of outcome
. A particular property of the model of the
process of psychotherapy being proposed is that it establishes para-
meters for outcome during its different stages.
Obviously, if the parameters for therapeutic change are con-
strued only in terms of the normalization of core affect, then
outcome could only be evaluated in cases where the process of therapy
had reached maturity.
Since it is not unlikely that many persons drop out of therapy
before a long lasting therapeutic change occurs, the outcome para-
meters for that population would have to be established according to
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the period of the process of therapy reached at the time the inter-
vention ended.
Of course, the fact that someone may be allowed to drop out of
therapy without some definite efforts by the therapist to encourage
that person to remain engaged with therapy, may be considered a
negative outcome measure in itself according to the model being pro-
posed.
It should be noted that since, with a few possible exceptions,
the model being proposed does not consider emotional disturbances
to be illnesses, a clinical intervention based on core affect would
lack definition as a treatment modality. However, for the sake of
tradition and convenience one may avoid that issue.
Be that as i t may , in terms of outcome one must consider that
treatment or therapy is aimed at the normalization of a sensation
of danger which may become again clinically elevated under serious-
ly adverse circumstances. In this case, the outcome of the clinical
intervention may have been excellent, but the person may require
a second intervention in order to reduce the acute elevation in core
affect produced by extraordinary or catastrophic circumstances.
The preceding suggests, according to the model being considered,
that psychotherapeutic interventions do not cure anything, but merely
induce the attenuation of emotional pain to a stable adaptive base-
line.
Naturally, some of the reactive symptoms which characterize
elevations in core affect may result in pathological physical condi-
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tions sometimes. For example, somatic consequences of chronic core
affect elevations, such as ulcers, colitis, and so forth. Indeed,
it does not come as surprise to find that these reactive pathologi-
cal symptoms improve with psychotherapy. Similarly, physical
symptoms attributed to pathological processes which are ordinarily
exacerbated by anxiety may improve with psychotherapy. For example,
it is not uncommon for clients to report decreases in the dosages
of antihypertensive or pain medication needed and a general reduction
in physical complaints during and after the course of psychotherapy.
Obviously, the latter fringe benefits of psychotherapy may be
atrributed to a reduction in the manifestations of anxiety due to
the normalization of core affect.
Regarding the possible applications of core affect theory, it
is difficult not to succumb to the temptation of an endless enumera-
tion. Assuming the theory as valid it becomes a simple task to
imagine the legal, social, and political consequences from its
application to the different areas of human involvement.
For example, according to our view criminals would be looked
upon as clinically maladaptive in terms of our definition of emo-
tional disturbances. However, they would not be considered mentally
ill even in the presence of severe functional manifestations of
anxiety unless a determinable pathological reason (e.g., tumor,
encephalitis) for the cognitive dysfunction and criminal behavior
would be found. The impact of the preceding view of criminal beha-
vior on just the legal system alone would be tremendous.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
There is no question about the model of human behavior proposed
by this dissertation being somewhat controversial. The latter may
be related to the very pragmatic approach the model takes to explain
behavior and therapeutic change.
For example, as earlier introduced, the model is alien to the
traditional view of psychodynamic subconscious processes and to the
concept of mental illness.
Clearly, the model proposed suggests that what may be understood
as psychodynamic processes is nothing more than the sel fdetermi ni ng
associative processes of the brain under the influence of a limbic
sensation of danger. As postulated in previous chapters, the inte-
grated cognitive activity of the brain ordinarily does not depend on
volition but rather on the functional analog of ongoing experience.
Obviously, the functional analog of ongoing experience would be
an integration of the current event with the cognitive elements of
previous experiences which are in any way connected with each other.
The preceding, according to our view, occurs not because the indi-
vidual wants it to occur, but automatically as a result of the very
complex associative functions of the brain, which are proposed to
be mediated by the cognitive matrices.
Similarly, the defensive maneuvers the individual uses to cope
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with core affect in context with the environment, that is, that per-
son's behavior, are out of volitional control for the most part.
In other words, behavior is virtually out of awareness until
after it has occurred. It is common for a person to review his
behavior at any given time and find it to have been inadvertent.
For example, some individuals could react with anger or other
defensive maneuver to the same situation over and over, despite
wishing they would not do it.
According to the model proposed, even planned actions or inten-
tional thinking may constitute unwitting maneuvers against core
affect, their purpose therefore out of awareness.
The preceding review of some of the properties of the model
of human behavior proposed, which have been considered earlier in
this work, suggests that people do not act as freely as one may
think they would from predetermined influences.
In other words, since an adult's behavior is virtually self-
determined, the decisions and actions of such a person in the ordinary
course of living would be the product of an intrinsic brain function
rather than of the will of that person.
The latter is perhaps one of the most controversial issues
raised by the core affect theory. The theory implies that what is
usually considered as the freedom of the individual to intentionally
pursue a goal or formulate a decision is in fact somewhat limited.
According to the theory proposed, under ordinary circumstances
the person can choose from whatever alternatives the functional pro-
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cesses of the brain produce. However, even the choosing of an alter-
native in itself may constitute or be part of a defensive maneuver
against core affect.
It would seem that a person who has become aware of his own
core affect and how he defends against it, could be in a position
to use that knowledge to increase the amount of freedom he would have
from such predetermined functional influences. Naturally, the inten-
sity of core affect in the latter case would have to be at a normal
range.
However, the model proposed suggests that regardless of how
aware one may become of one's own core affect and defensive maneu-
vers, the freedom to choose and decide will inevitably always remain
to the greatest extent under the influence of the intensity of such
a core affect.
Yet, despite its controversial nature, the model of human beha-
vior proposed by this dissertation may be construed as having some
very desirable properties.
One of these properties is the simplicity of the concept underly-
ing the model. This simplicity allows for a coherent relationship
between the biological reduction of the model and the phenomenology
of behavior. At the same time the principle of core affect can be
consistently used to interpret behavior at any time during the per-
son's life and under conditions ranging from everyday life situations
to clinical interventions.
In the clinical environment, the simplicity of the notion of core
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affect has been favorably received by clients. In addition, while
needing some further observations, the impression is that persons
with somewhat less than average intellectual skills are able to con-
ceptualize the notion of core affect without great difficulty.
Of particular importance, is that the theory proposed furnishes
a suitable model for the understanding of neuropsychological ly im-
paired individuals. In the latter case, given particular cognitive
resources, it can be determined how those resources emerge as ex-
pressions of or defenses against core affect. Clearly, the latter
would facilitate the clinical interventions with such individuals.
While there are indications that the model enables the process
of psychotherapy in individual interventions to occur in a relatively
brief period of time in the absence of severe functional manifesta-
tions of anxiety or drug dependence, more work is needed to verify it.
The further elaboration on the properties of this model of human
behavior appears unnecessary in connection with the aims of this
theoretical study. On the other hand, now in closing the task of
the dissertation appears to have hardly begun.
Perhaps the reason for the latter is that what has been developed
in this dissertation is a theory whose validation currently resides
in its conceptual and clinical applications rather than in strict
empirical findings. In addition, one must consider that essential
functional aspects of the model, such as the cognitive matrices, are
beyond the reach of current empirical determinations.
It is our belief that the validity of the model becomes explicit
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during its applications and that its basic design will withstand
the rigor of the clinical and empirical research which would have
to be performed in order to confirm the observations and concepts
postulated here.
The postulates of the theory of core affect may be used as the
rationale for many existing techniques and procedures which are based
on other theories. However, any type of research conducted to con-
firm or negate the validity of the proposed theory must conform to
the constraints of the latter. The determination of the validity
of the theory can only be performed in terms of its own logic and
design. That is, without violating the integrity of the theoretical
model
.
In terms of the material presented in this work, two things
appear reasonably certain. One of those is that a neuropsychological
understanding of human behavior is the way to the future. The other
is that core affect is universal.
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